Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

4-30-2011

A Village-level Economic Evaluation of the Southwest Poverty
Reduction Project
Xiugen Mo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Mo, Xiugen, "A Village-level Economic Evaluation of the Southwest Poverty Reduction Project" (2011).
Theses and Dissertations. 339.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/339

This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

Template Created By: James Nail 2010

A VILLAGE-LEVEL ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE SOUTHWEST
POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT

By
Xiugen Mo

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy
in Economics
in the Department of Finance and Economics
Mississippi State, Mississippi
April 2011

Template Created By: James Nail 2010

Copyright 2011
By
Xiugen Mo

Template Created By: James Nail 2010
A VILLAGE-LEVEL ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE SOUTHWEST
POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT
By
Xiugen Mo
Approved:
_________________________________
Benjamin F. Blair
Associate Professor of Economics
(Director of Dissertation)

_________________________________
Paul Grimes
Professor of Economics/Associate Dean
of the College of Business
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Meghan Millea
Associate Professor of Economics
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Steve Taylor
Professor of Economics
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Jon Rezek
Associate Professor of Economics
(Committee Member)

_________________________________
Barbara Spencer
Professor/Associate Dean of the
College of Business
(Graduate Coordinator)

_________________________________
Louis Dawkins
Professor/ Interim Dean
of the College of Business

Template Created By: James Nail 2010
Name: Xiugen Mo
Date of Degree: April 30, 2011
Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Economics
Major Professor: Benjamin F. Blair
Title of Study:

A VILLAGE-LEVEL ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE
SOUTHWEST POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT

Pages in Study: 136
Candidate for Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy
This research evaluates the post-program treatment effects of the Southwest
Poverty Reduction Project (SWPRP), a large-scale ($463.55 million) rural development
project jointly funded by the World Bank and the Chinese Government from 1995 to
2001. The SWPRP aimed at reducing poverty and increasing living standards for the
absolute poor in southwest China. The treatment effects are measured by the changes in
21 indicators at the village level. The dataset for this research includes 327 project
villages and 3887 non-project villages in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
Rigorous econometric methods are employed to remove selection bias. A probit model is
established to investigate the selection rule of the project villages. In addition to the
control function approach, different methods of propensity score matching such as
nearest neighbor, caliper or radius, and kernel-based matching, are used to estimate the
treatment effects, including the average treatment effect, average treatment effect on the
treated, and average treatment effect on the untreated.
The evidence from the treatment effect estimations shows that the SWPRP
achieved its overall objective but not necessarily all specific objectives. The evidence

Template Created By: James Nail 2010

supports a statement of significant impacts on farming, off-farm employment, and
infrastructure by the project investments, while there is no strong evidence to support a
conclusion of significant impacts on primary education and rural healthcare services. The
poverty rate in the project villages was reduced by about 3.0-3.3 percent and net income
increased by about 24-26 Yuan. Further investigation of the specific treatment effects on
individual villages expose that the treatment effects vary with land resources in the
villages. Lastly, the project was successful in targeting the poorer villages but not
necessarily the poorest.
This research also reveals some findings of practical relevance for social program
design. The approach of integrated policies proves to be effective in large-scale poverty
reduction. However, designers should be aware that households may trade off one
activity against another to maximize their utility rather than simply follow the whole
package of integrated activities. In addition, the minimization of operational costs of the
project agents should not be detrimental to the effectiveness of the project.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Southwest Poverty Reduction Project1 (SWPRP) was a large-scale
development project aimed at reducing poverty and increasing living standards for the
absolute poor of southwest China. The project was funded jointly by the World Bank and
by the Chinese government and targeted 1798 of the poorest villages. The project was
implemented from June 1995 until December 2001. The project involved a total
investment of $463.55 million which included low interest loans and grants for various
development projects.
Any evaluation of the performance of the SWPRP should keep in mind the overall
objectives of the project. The first objective2 of the project was to demonstrate the
effectiveness of approaching the task of poverty reduction on a large scale that integrated
policies at the local and village level. Local integration has proven successful in projects
of much smaller scale but has rarely been attempted at the scale of the SWPRP.
The second objective was to facilitate labor migration from the project villages,
where the employment opportunities were few, to the urban areas where employment
opportunities were much greater. During the project period, employment opportunities
were much greater especially in the urban eastern provinces, due to intensive investment
of capital from domestic and foreign sources. However, labor in remote rural areas had

1
2

World Bank Project ID: P003639
Report No: 13968-CHA (Agricultural Operation Division 1995, 23)

1

difficulty accessing these opportunities because of the lack of information and the high
cost of commuting.
The third objective was to improve the capacity of poverty monitoring at both the
national and local levels. Prior to the project, poverty was tracked by some individual
governmental departments but there was no systematic monitoring at other levels.
The fourth stated objective, and the most important with regard to this study, was
to “significantly reduce absolute poverty in 35 of the very poorest counties in
southwestern China.” 3 This was to be accomplished using village-level policies aimed at
building infrastructure, providing education, improving health care services, and as
mentioned above, improving labor mobility.
Previous attempts to measure the impact of the SWPRP include the
Implementation Completion Report by the World Bank (Agricultural Operation Division
2003) and a recent World Bank report by Chen, Mu and Ravallion (2008). Citing the
results of a survey by the National Statistics Bureau of China, the Implementation
Completion Report indicates that the program was successful in increasing per capita
income from 939 to 1422 Yuan and in reducing the poverty rate from 32 to 13 percent.
However, these results are based merely by comparing pre-program and post-program
respondents in the program area alone without comparison to a control group and without
any attention to selection bias.
In a more rigorous study, Chen, Mu and Ravallion (2008) used the method of
difference-in-difference matching in order to account for possible selection bias and
examined the impact of the program by comparing participating and non-participating

3

Report No:26132 (Agricultural Operation Division 2003, 2)

2

households. They showed that, relative to nonparticipants, the program significantly
increased income, reduced poverty but did not increase consumption.
The research presented here differs from the above attempts by focusing on the
village level impacts. One of the primary objectives of the project was to integrate
policies and decision-making at the village level in order to reduce poverty. Program
policies were targeted to villages and not individual households. Examining the results of
the program at the village level provides a clearer picture of the benefits of integrative
policies and the overall performance of the program. In addition, since the decision to
participate in the program was made at the village level, examining the data at the village
level allows a more careful consideration of any possible selection bias.
In this study we examine the impact of the SWPRP at the village level, not only
by estimating per capita income and poverty rates, but also along several other indicators
of well-being in rural China including housing type, livestock ownership, and agricultural
production. Control function and matching techniques are used to calculate differences in
these measures between participants and nonparticipants taking special care to account
for selection bias. The adequacy of these methods is assessed and differences in the
results will be studied. Finally, the village level effects are compared to the household
level effects of Chen, Mu, and Ravallion (2008).4
The first step is to estimate a probit model for the project village selection process
from a sample of 327 project villages and 3887 non-project villages. The purpose of this
model is twofold. First, it is used to estimate the probability of participation, so called

4

Chen, Mu, and Ravallion (2008) use difference-in-difference matching which compares pre-program and
post-program outcome measures between the participating and non-participating households. Such preand post-data is not available at the village level which is being studied in this research and thus different
estimation techniques will be employed. So, while the two studies are different in data and methodology,
comparing the results should provide some additional information regarding the effects of the SWPRP.

3

propensity scores, for each individual village. Second, the results of the probit model are
used to analyze the behavior of local project agents in determining which villages would
be selected for participation in the project. We find that variables correlated with
selection are also the same variables that indicate poverty. Therefore, it seems that the
selection process was indeed successful in targeting poor villages. However, we also find
that project agents selected villages with characteristics consistent with minimizing the
operational cost of the program. As a result, the selected villages were not necessarily the
poorest villages.
The second step is to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE), the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and the average treatment effect on the untreated
(ATNT), using both the control function approach and the propensity score matching
approach. Implementation of the control function approach was accomplished using a
correlated random coefficient model (proposed by Heckman (1985)). This model allows
us to investigate how the treatment effects vary with village characteristics. We find that
the availability of land resources were the major source for heterogeneity of the treatment
effects among participating villages. Propensity score matching was implemented using
three different methods - nearest neighbor matching, caliper matching, and kernel-based
matching. Each of these different methods produced similar results. We find that the
SWPRP was successful in increasing net income per capita by about 24-26 Yuan and
reducing the poverty rate by about 3.0-3.3 percent in 2000 when the investment in the
project was completed.5 Evidence of project success is also indicated by an increase in
farming activities, off-farm employment, and rural infrastructure. However, our model
5

The construction period of the SWPRP was officially considered from July 1995 to June 2001. However,
in the financial management system of the World Bank, investments have to be fulfilled before the
reimbursement. The investment in Guangxi was completed by 2000.

4

shows no evidence that the project had a significant positive impact on primary school
enrollment or on the delivery of health care services in the project villages.
Our findings are similar to those of Chen, Mu and Ravallion (2008) but smaller in
magnitude. This is expected because our estimated effects are at the village level, which
includes both the participating and non-participating households, while their findings are
at the household level. Our findings are of additional interest in that we demonstrate the
effectiveness of the SWPRP strategy of targeting poor villages rather than the
households.
In the next chapter, a brief profile of the SWPRP project is presented; a
description of the affected Guangxi project area is provided; the dataset is described and
the results of naïve comparisons of means are provided. In Chapter 3, the conceptual
model for evaluating the project impacts and the methods used to account for selection
bias are discussed. Chapter 4 presents the project village selection process and analyzes
the probit results. In Chapter 5, the results of the correlated random coefficient model are
reported and the variation in the specific treatment effects is discussed. Chapter 6
provides and discusses the estimation of the average treatments effects using three
matching techniques. Finally concluding comments are provided as well as a comparison
with previous research findings.

5

CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTION OF THE SOUTHWEST POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT AND
DATA FROM THE GUANGXI PROJECT AREA
The Southwest Poverty Reduction Project was designed to reduce poverty in three
of China’s undeveloped provinces. This research focuses specifically on one of the
provinces, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (hereafter, Guangxi). This chapter
provides a brief description of the overall project, a description of the Guangxi region,
and a description of the dataset that will be used.
2.1

The Southwest Poverty Reduction Project
The Southwest Poverty Reduction Project (SWPRP) was a large-scale

development project aimed at reducing poverty and increasing living standards for the
absolute poor of southwest China. The project was funded jointly by the World Bank and
by the Chinese government and targeted 1798 of the poorest villages in three provinces.
The project was implemented from June 1995 until December 2001. The project involved
a total investment of $463.55 million which included low interest loans and grants for
various development projects.
The SWPRP invested in eight major components: rural primary education, rural
basic healthcare services, rural infrastructure, labor mobility, agriculture, township and
village enterprise (TVE),6 institution building, and poverty monitoring. The details of
6

According to the Township and Village Enterprise Law of the People’s Republic of China, TVE refers to
enterprises which provide support for agricultural production, owned collectively or by individual farmers,
and based in townships and villages. An example would be a raw material processor.

6

these investments are indicated in Figure 2.1. In each component, the project aided the
targeted areas with training, equipment, investment funds and technical service.
Investment: US$463.55 Million

Rural
Infrastructure
US$63,990,000
1 3.80%

Labor Mobility
US$133,330,000
28.7696

Basic Health
Prinlary
Service
Ed ucation
US$20,710,000 US$29,710,000
6.41%
4.47%

Figure 2.1
2.1.1

Monitoring
US$ ?,l S0,000
1.54%

TVE
Develo pment
US$ 42,310,000
9.13%

Ins titution
US$6,050,000
1 .31%

The Investment Components of the SWPRP

Education
The education component was designed to address the low educational attainment

in the project villages. The official figures of the enrollment rate and the completion rate
of children aged 7-15 in the project counties, prior to the project, was about 60 percent
and 45 percent respectively (Agricultural Operation Division 1995, p. 14). These low
numbers were assumed to be a result of the low quality in education delivery and difficult
access to schools. To improve educational delivery and access, the project provided
7

financial aid for school construction, equipment, teaching and school management
training. In order to further encourage children from poor households to enroll and attend
school, the project also subsidized tuition and nutrition. Unfortunately, according to the
World Bank (Agricultural Operation Division 2003, p. 5-6), these subsidies proved
ineffective in the project areas during the project period. Since no data, such as household
income, was available to make an objective identification of the children from the poorer
households, this portion of the project failed and was stopped soon after it began.
2.1.2

Healthcare
The healthcare component of the project was aimed at improving the accessibility

of healthcare services to the poor. The problem of insufficient basic healthcare for the
poor in rural China was due to two major issues: lack of local facilities and high cost of
treatment at existing facilities. To address these issues, the project provided aid in
establishing a health clinic in every project village. Doctors and nurses were trained and
subsidized to serve in the clinics. Medical equipment was purchased and start-up funds
were also provided for the purchase of medicine for each clinic. In addition to
establishment of the clinics at the village level, equipment and training was also updated
in hospitals at the township level. In order to help the poor in paying for their healthcare,
the project attempted to establish a health cooperative at the village level. Households
could choose to participate in the cooperative by paying a small registration fee, which
would be matched by the project. Once registered, households would receive discounted
services. Unfortunately, due to management challenges, this portion of the program was
also halted shortly after its implementation (ibid, p. 6).

8

2.1.3

Infrastructure
The main issues to be addressed by the infrastructure component of the project

were poor transportation and the shortage of drinking water. The World Bank
(Agricultural Operation Division 1995, p. 16) reported that before the project more than
40 percent of the administrative villages in the project townships were without adequate
access to roads and seasonal drinking water shortages plagued more than half of the
project villages. The project improved transportation by constructing roads to the project
villages that were without road access. In order to provide a supply of drinking water, the
project provided subsidies for each household to purchase cement in order to construct a
water tank which would store approximately 30 cubic meters of rain water.
2.1.4

Labor Mobility
Scarcity of arable land and the underdevelopment of a local industrial sector led

to a large surplus of labor in the project villages; estimated to be as large as 33 percent
prior to the project (ibid, p. 17). Conversely, intensive domestic and foreign investment
led to rapid growth of industry and an excess demand for labor in the urban areas.
However, due to lack of information and high transportation cost, laborers from the poor
villages had difficulty accessing these off-farm employment opportunities. In order to
alleviate these problems, the project provided training and financial support for
transportation, and established a network to collect employment information and help
companies recruit workers from the project villages.
2.1.5

Agriculture
Prior to the project implementation, agricultural activities in the project villages

were basically for subsistence; only a small portion was used to exchange for necessities
9

that could not be produced locally. Farming was carried out with limited arable resources
using traditional technologies passed down for generations. According to project
documents (ibid, p. 31), the aim of the agricultural component of the project was to
update the farming industry so that a substantial and sustainable increase in farming
income could be achieved. The project was designed to provide support for almost every
agricultural activity including cropping and animal husbandry. To implement the
agricultural component, local experts were hired to advise the project regarding
agricultural production for food as well as cash. The primary emphasis was on tree, pig,
cattle, and goat farming. The households in the project villages could choose the
activities in which to participate according to their preferences and available resources.
The technical training and other necessary support, such as improved crop variety, tree
nurseries and financial credits were supplied based on the choices of the households.
2.1.6

Township and Village Enterprise (TVE)
A variety of agricultural products, including tropical fruit, tea, silk cocoon, herbal

medicine, and forest products, were traditionally produced as raw materials for use in the
manufacturing sector. The TVE component (ibid, p. 33) was designed to support local
enterprises engaged in the processing of these agricultural products and at the same time
to promote off-farm employment opportunities. Prior to the project, many of the existing
TVEs used worn-out equipment and outdated technology passed down from the
commune system. The project identified 95 agro-processing and 26 mining operations to
receive project support based on the potential for job creation, commercial feasibility,
environmental risk, skill training, and backward linkages to project households.

10

2.1.7

Institution Building and Poverty Monitoring
The purpose of these two components of the project (ibid, p. 34) was to improve

and increase the capacity of government departments such as the Poverty Alleviation and
Development Offices (PADOs) and the Project Management Offices (PMOs) at county,
provincial and national levels in order to effectively manage the project and to monitor
the effects of the project on reducing poverty.
2.2

The Guangxi Project Area
The overall project targeted poor rural villages in three provinces in southwest

China, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Guizhou Province, and Yunnan Province
(see Figure 2.2). Within these provinces, the project covered 1,798 administrative
villages in 290 townships in thirty-five project counties. This accounted for one-third of
the administrative villages and one-half of townships within the project counties. The
beneficiaries of the project included 2.8 million residents (604,000 households). Because
of the availability of data, this research will focus on the effect of the project in the
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
A breakdown of the investments in Guangxi is shown in Figure 2.3. The total
investment over the life of the project was approximately 1104.86 million Yuan (1 dollar
≈ 8.26 Yuan). Agriculture received nearly 45% of the project funds. The other largest
spending categories were infrastructure, TVE, and labor mobility. As shown in Figure
2.4, the project covered only 12 counties in Guangxi. This included 515 villages in 91
townships and approximately 900,000 residents.

11
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Map of China Showing the SWPRP Provinces
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The Investment Components in Guangxi (Million Yuan)
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Map of Guangxi Showing the SWPRP Participating Counties

In the research presented here, a village refers to an administrative village.
Administrative villages are the fundamental organizational units with defined boundaries
in rural China. They have populations that range from one thousand to the tens of
thousands. Within the administrative villages are “natural villages”, which refer to
colonies of households ranging from several to over a hundred at particular geographic
location. A township is comprised of several administrative villages and a county
includes a number of townships. A city or prefecture governs several counties and a
province or autonomous region includes a number of cities or prefectures. Provinces and
autonomous regions are under the direct administration of the central government. These
administrative layers are illustrated by the diagram in Figure 2.5.
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Diagram Showing the Public Administrative Layers in China

Specifically, targeting the “poorest of the poor” was central to the SWPRP. The
Chinese Central Government defined a county as a being poor if its average annual
income was below the poverty line (300 Yuan at the 1990 price) (Ravallion and Chen
2007, p. 5). Using this definition, 28 counties were identified in Guangxi as being poor.
From these poor counties, 12 counties were selected for project participation in the
SWPRP and within these 12 counties 515 administrative villages were selected to be
eligible for aid under the project. The project villages are characterized by low income,
lack of education and healthcare, scarcity of natural resources, mountain geography, and
resided by ethnic minority. Details of the selection process are described in Chapter 4.
Characteristics of the project area prior to the project are described below.
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According the World Bank (Agricultural Operation Division 1995, p. 63), the
annual net income per capita in Guangxi project counties ranged from 221 to 297 Yuan
prior to the project. The population below the poverty line varies from 41.1 to 97.3
percent. Those living below the poverty line commonly suffered the cold and lack of
food, especially between February and July. This is the so-called the hunger season
because the grain stored from the previous year is running out and the new crop is not
ready to harvest. Many of these households have to borrow food in order to survive. For a
long periods living with low income, households failed to raise enough money to build a
safe house. Due to these low income and lack of saving, a large proportion of the poor
population lives in thatched houses which provide limited shelter. Needless to say,
education and healthcare are luxury goods for the households in the project villages.
The World Bank project document (ibid, p. 63) also reported that the enrollment
rate of the primary school varied from 70.6 to 93 percent in Guangxi project counties.
The completion rate even was as low as from 56.1 to 78.8 percent. In China, primary
school is compulsory education and financed by the government. At least one complete
primary school was established in each administrative village to teach students from
grades one to six. Several teaching points, branches of the complete primary school,
might teach students of grade one to three in the large natural villages. The majority of
teachers are hired by the government as permanent faculty for village schools. However,
government-hired teachers might be reluctant to teach in remote villages due to the
unfavorable living and teaching conditions. In these cases, local authorities have to raise
funds from residents to hire temporary teachers. Inadequate funds lead to the employment
of low quality temporary teachers. This is one of the major causes for the low education
attainment in the project villages.
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Healthcare services are available in the township hospitals. To reach these
services, residents in the project villages have to travel an average of 12.7 kilometers.
Meanwhile, the cost of medical care was high. In most case, healthcare service was not
available in the project villages. A few villages have informal clinics operated by “barefoot” doctors who are also part-time farmers. These clinics are not well equipped and the
“bare-foot” doctors usually lack basic training.
Natural resources, including arable land and clean water, are scarce in the project
villages. Farmland area per capita is 0.87 Mu7 in the project villages. Farmland was
allocated across households during the rural reforms of the early 1980s. Each resident
share almost the same amount of farmland and the household size determines the total
amount allocated to a household. Since the reform, this total amount remains fixed
regardless of the change in household sizes. This relatively even distribution of farmland
determined that all farms are small in size. Surface water is scarce. The majority of the
project villages are not located close to rivers or lakes. Although the annual rainfall is as
high as 1731 mm (ibid, p. 64), the rain water drains away easily through a well-developed
underground river. The majority of the project villages lack an adequate supply of
drinking water in the winter. In extreme cases especially those area within mountainous
geography, residents have to travel as far as 4 kilometers to obtain drinking water in the
winter.
The scarcity of natural resources is a serious problem especially when combined
with the local geography. Villages in Guangxi can be geographically categorized into
three types: flat land, hill, and mountainous villages. The mountainous regions are
categorized as karst topography, which is characterized by limestone and underground
7

Mu is a unit of land measure used in China; one Mu equals one fifteenth of a hectare or about 0.17 acres.
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rivers. The majority of the project villages are of geography of this type. This geography
is also prevalent in our dataset (96.7 percent, 316 out of 327 villages). In these
mountainous villages, the natural villages are usually enclosed by steep rocky peaks or
high slope mountains. These mountains form a football-stadium-like valley and the
natural villages usually perch on the bottom or a side of the mountain. Though there is
some flat land on the bottom, the majority of land is not cultivatable because of the steep
slope and the rocky surface. This particular landscape, combining with the seasonal local
weather, results in serious natural disasters. In the summer, the rainfall is concentrated
and accounts for about 80 percent of the total annual waterfall. The rain water runs down
the mountain slopes quickly and pools on the bottom of the small valley. When this
happen, all crops on the flat land are flooded and lost. In the drought season of winter, the
surface water disappears into the underground river. Meanwhile, top soil on the slope
land is washed away by the heavy rains, which lead to the low productivity and low
incomes in the villages. Improving the productivity and income in the mountainous
villages is difficult because they are isolated by the mountains from receiving information
regarding new technology and access to markets.
Other factors that isolate the project villages in Guangxi are the cultural
differences. In China, Han is the majority ethnic group and the others such as Zhuang and
Yao are in the minority. However, as shown in our dataset, the non-Han ethnic groups
including Zhuang and Yao are the majority and account for 86.3 percent population of
the project villages. The major differences among the ethnic groups are their languages.
Although Chinese is taught in all schools in China, the non-Han minorities maintain their
languages after school. In addition to the low quality of education in the minority areas,
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the non-Han laborers usually have lower Chinese language communicating skills. As a
result, they have less opportunity to work outside their communities.
2.3

Description of the Data of Guangxi Project Area
Data for this research comes from a village-level survey of 327 project villages

and 3887 non-project villages in 2000, the fifth year of the project. The survey was
conducted by the Poverty Alleviation and Development Office (PADO) in Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region. The sample of project villages accounts for 63% of the 515
project villages in the region.
In order to evaluate the impact of the SWPRP, twenty-two outcome measures
were chosen from the survey. These measures are listed in Table 2.1 along with the
means and standard deviations of the project villages, the non-project villages and the
pooled sample of project and non-project villages. In the table, incomes and poverty rates
are computed at the 2000 price, and Chinese government adopts a poverty line of 826
Yuan since 2000. The table also shows the results of t-tests comparing the means of the
outcome measures for the project and non-project villages.
The simple comparison of means indicates that villages participating in the
SWPRP have significantly higher incomes, better housing, greater labor mobility, more
livestock, and a more reliable water supply. However, these results also indicate that the
project villages have lower school enrollment and reduced access to physicians.
It is important to note that the above simple comparison of means is a naïve
comparison without any consideration of bias. Our dataset is in fact the observations on
the treated and untreated sample from a quasi-experiment or non-experiment because the
treated and the untreated sample have not been assigned randomly. The naïve comparison
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may suffer from the problem of invalidity. Mayer (1995) summarized nine possible
internal threats and three external threats to the validity of non-experiments. The internal
threats include (1) omitted variables, (2) trends of outcomes, (3) miss-measurement, (4)
misspecification of variances (homogeneous or heterogeneous), (5) political economy,
(6) selection, (7) attrition, (8) simultaneity, and (9) interaction between selection and
assignments. The external threats are (1) interaction between treatment and selection, (2)
interaction between setting and treatment, and (3) interaction between historical events
and treatment. In the case of the SWPRP, some of these threats are likely to occur and
lead to bias in impact evaluation.
Unobservability arises from the unobservable counterfactuals and omitted
variables that might affect outcomes and project participation. The problem of
counterfactuals will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. Examples of omitted
variables are unobservable political influence, soil type, and local weather. Political
influence is unobservable while soil type and local weather are observable but no data is
available at the village level.
The project implementation spanned a period of six years. The outcome path of
each village may have their own time trends. This time-variant property may cause bias
in impact evaluation.
Miss-measurement may occur in the survey data as a result of estimation rather
than measurement. For variables such as land and distance, the miss-measurement may
be trivial. However, for variables such as crop production and income, data are estimated
rather than actually measured. The households may fail to recall their production and
income accurately since the survey is retrospective.
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Project impacts may be heterogeneous among the individual villages. The impacts
of the project are achieved through the interaction between the project investment and the
village characteristics. The differences in investment activities and village characteristics
may result in different outcomes in particular villages.
The problem of selection is obvious. The SWPRP targeted the poor villages by
choosing the lower income villages. The project villages may be incomparable to the
non-project villages. Politics might also play a role in the selection process of the project
villages since the process involved many local representatives with different interests.
This non-random assignment of project villages is the major source of bias.
The other possible source of bias is from historical events. Our dataset includes
villages from two types of counties, the state-defined poor counties and the state-defined
non-poor counties. The poor villages from the state-defined poor counties were eligible to
receive aid from the central government prior to the SWPRP while the poor villages from
the state-defined non-poor counties were not.
Attrition is not a problem in our dataset since no project village withdrew from
the project.
Due to the cross-sectional dataset, we are not able to control for the time-variants
and the error of miss-measurement. However, measures can be employed to minimize the
bias from historical events, unobservability, heterogeneity, and selection bias. To control
for the historic bias, we exclude the villages from the state-defined non-poor counties
from the original dataset. The new dataset for the models established in later chapters
includes 327 project villages and 2214 non-project villages from state-defined poor
counties. In this research, models constructed by control function method and matching
method are used to evaluate the project impact controlling for the possible bias from
20

unobservability, heterogeneity, and selection bias. The subsequent chapters describe this
bias in more detail and describe the modeling techniques that will be used to account for
it.
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I ncome
per Capi t a
Househol d i
Househol d i
of Househol
of Househol
of Househol
of Househol

0. 14
14. 09
43. 45

2. 15
0. 47

11. 97
1. 83
0. 01
0. 01
0. 01
0. 00
0. 01

0. 29
0. 24

2. 41
17. 77
33. 20
0. 42
0. 55
0. 58
0. 36

93. 20
995. 77
89. 90

209. 06
54. 00

662. 08
253. 78
1. 13
0. 38
0. 49
0. 26
0. 14

21. 26
17. 62

705. 77
1984. 71
1865. 65
49. 97
39. 84
52. 30
29. 47
31. 25
24. 83

267. 06
40. 17
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94. 13
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86. 46

2. 25
0. 49

12. 14 576. 60
1. 94 228. 55
0. 01
1. 32
0. 01
0. 21
0. 66
0. 01
0. 00
0. 25
0. 01
0. 54

0. 30
0. 25

2. 48 743. 82
18. 60 2268. 90
35. 58 1973. 45
0. 43
46. 72
0. 57
53. 57
0. 61
38. 06
0. 37
25. 74

0. 46
41. 72
24. 69

6. 54
1. 46

54. 49
4. 78
0. 04
0. 02
0. 02
0. 01
0. 11

1. 14
0. 94

9. 29
58. 01
64. 63
1. 46
1. 86
1. 84
1. 26

Note: Mu is a unit of land measure used in China; one Mu equals one fifteenth of a hectare or about 0.17 acres.

93. 27
1012. 74
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- 0. 01
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7. 21
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0. 08
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0. 12
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<. 0001

0. 06
0. 00
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<. 0001
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<. 0001
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Per cent age of Mal e Labor Empl oyed Of f - f ar m
Per cent age of Femal e Labor Empl oyed Of f - f ar m

Weal t h and
Net I ncome
I ncome Per
I ncome Per
Per cent age
Per cent age
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Table 2.1

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
To model the impact of the SWPRP, two issues need to be addressed at the outset
--unobservability of counterfactuals and selection bias. This chapter describes these
problems and the methodologies that are used to account for their presence.
3.1

Conceptual Model
The problem that the researcher faces is how to calculate the effect of a policy or

program (usually called the “treatment” in the literature) on program participants in the
absence of an explicitly formed control group.
To illustrate consider a policy maker evaluating the effectiveness of a voluntary
public health program for villages in rural China. One obvious measure of effectiveness
(if data were available) would be to compare the infant mortality rates between program
participants and non-participants at some time after the program has been completed.
However, such a simple comparison assumes that (1) there is no self-selection problem,
i.e., the variables which affect the choice of whether or not to participate in the program
do not affect the outcome measure; and (2) the variables that affect the outcome measure
and the way that they affect the outcome measure are the same for participants and nonparticipants. For example, a self-selection problem may arise if the villages that choose to
participate in the public health program were those villages with the better water and
sewage systems. In this case, the effectiveness of the program would be biased upward.
Further, it may be the case that those villages that participate in the program have a better
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education infrastructure, and as a result, while this did not affect their decision to
participate in the program, this variable does affect the outcome measure differently in
the participant population than it does in the non-participant population.
Instead of simply measuring the differences in outcomes between participants and
nonparticipants, one could measure the effect of the treatment or policy as the difference
in some outcome measure between the participants in the treatment and their
“counterfactual” outcome measure, i.e., their hypothetical outcome measure if they had
not participated in the program. Since it is impossible to observe data for individuals that
are simultaneously both participants and non-participants, the counterfactual data must be
estimated and is usually estimated using data from the non-participants. Again, however,
researchers must account for selection bias.
In order to examine these issues further8, consider measuring the treatment effect
of program participation based on some measurable outcome y. The researcher can
observe the outcome measure for the treated villages,

, and for untreated villages,

,

where we assume
(3.1)
(3.2)
where

and

are general functional forms, not necessarily linear, relating the

outcome measures to village level characteristics, X and where we assume
0. The superscript 1 and 0 represent the treated and untreated by the project. The
subscript i denotes individual villages, i=1, 2, 3… n and n denotes the sample size. The
impact of the program is given as the difference in outcome measures between the treated

8

This discussion follows Blundell and Dias (2008).
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and untreated villages. Allowing for possible heterogeneous effects across villages, this
“treatment effect” is defined by
≡
(3.3)
Participation in the program is determined by some selection rule. Let d be an
indicator of participation where d=1 indicates participation and d=0 indicates
nonparticipation. Further, suppose that participation is based on the following selection
rule
d

0
1 if g Z ,
0
otherwise

(3.4)

where the function g(·) might represent the expected utility function of the program
administrator and where Z and v are observable and unobservable variables (to the
researcher) affecting the participation decision. Using d as an indicator, we can write an
equation for the treatment effect on village i as
d

1

d

(3.5)

or
d
d
where we further assume that

(3.6)
,

and

are independent of Xi and Zi.

The goal of the researcher is to derive an estimate of the treatment effect, αi, being
careful to account for any bias that may arise in the estimation process. Inspection of
equation (3.6) reveals that two types of bias may arise due to the selection process. The
first occurs if ui is correlated with di (or equivalently with either Zi or vi). This implies
that some unobservable characteristics affecting the outcome measure also affect the
selection into the program. The second form of selection bias occurs if αi is correlated
with di (or equivalently with either Zi or vi). This arises if villages are selected based upon
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their expected gains arising from participation. Several estimation methods have been
suggested to account for these forms of bias. The three most common approaches are
methods of matching, control function, and instrumental variables. Due to data
limitations in this study, the use of instrumental variables will not be considered. The
control function and matching approaches will be discussed in the next section.
Before proceeding it will prove useful to introduce some common alternative
measures of program participation. Instead of estimating the individual effects of
participation (αi) most researchers estimate some form of average effect across a
particular subpopulation. The most common measures used in the literature are described
below.
The average treatment (participation) effect, ATE, measures the effect of the
treatment on a randomly chosen village. Mathematically, for an individual village
|
|
(3.7)
and for the population as a whole
ATE
ATE X dF X
- ∑ ATE X

(3.8)

The average treatment effect on the villages assigned to treatment, ATT, is
defined as
,

,d

1

| ,

,d

1

E
E
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, ,d
1
, ,d
1
X ,Z ,g Z ,
g Z,
0

0
(3.9)

The latter equality following from independence of

,

and

from Xi and Zi.

Integrating over Xi and Zi for all those receiving treatment yields
|d

1
,

∑

,d

1

d

,

, |d
1

,d

1
(3.10)

where n1 is the number of villages receiving treatment and n=n1+n0, where n0 is the
number of villages not receiving treatment.
Lastly, the average treatment effect on a village that was not assigned to
treatment, ATNT, is defined as
,

,d

0

| ,

,d

0
, ,d
0
, ,d
0
X ,Z ,g Z ,
g Z,
0

=
E
E

0
(3.11)

Integrating over Xi and Zi for all those not receiving treatment yields
|d
∑

0
, ,d
1 d

0
,

, |d
,d
0

0
(3.12)

The goal of this research is to estimate ATE, ATT, and ATNT for the outcome
measures listed in Table 2.1 while accounting for selection bias. The next section
describes the control function and matching methods that will be implemented.
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3.2
3.2.1

Empirical Model and Estimation Methodology
Control Function Approach
This approach was developed by Heckman (1979,1996) and is sometimes called

the Heckit procedure. Assuming the functions in (3.1) and (3.2) are linear, the outcome
measures for the treated and the untreated are given by
y

β X

u

(3.13)

y

β X

u

(3.14)

For simplicity, we also assume that the selection rule given in (3.4) is linear,
′

1
0

d

′

0
0

(3.15)

where γ is the coefficient in the selection function, and where

,

and

are

independent of Xi and Zi and,
1
~

0,

(3.16)

The treatment effect as measured by ATE is conditional only on the covariates X
and not on the selection rule. Thus, estimation of the unconditional ATE follows that
given in equation (3.8) repeated here as
(3.17)
The estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT, is dependent
upon the selection criteria. As presented in the previous section,
|d

1

ATT X , Z , d
1 dF X, Z|d
- ∑ d ATT X , Z , d
1

where
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1
(3.18)

ATT X , Z , d

1

X β

β

E

′

|

(3.19)

Given the distributional assumptions above,
(3.20)
and
(3.21)
,

where

is the correlation coefficient between

and v, j=1,0 and

∙ and Φ ∙ are the standard normal density and distribution functions,

where

respectively. Substituting these relations in the conditional measure
ATT X , Z , d

1

X β

′

β

Φ

(3.22)

′

which can be substituted in the equation below to obtain the unconditional measure
|d

1

∑

d ATT X , Z , d

1

(3.23)

Similarly, the conditional measure for the average treatment effect on the untreated is
given by
ATNT X , Z , d

0

X β

β

(3.24)

from which the unconditional measure can be calculated as
|d

0

∑

1

d ATNT X , Z , d

0

(3.25)

In order to estimate these treatment effects empirically, the following two-step
procedure is implemented,
i.

Obtain

from a probit model on the selection into the program.

ii.

Compute the selection terms

iii.

Run the appropriate regressions for the treated and untreated groups
with the inclusion of the appropriate selection-correction terms
attained in step (ii).
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′

Φ

′

and

′

Φ

′

.

iv.

3.2.2

Given the results of the regressions, estimate the various conditional
and unconditional treatment effect measures.

Matching Approach
The purpose of matching is to try to create an ex-post control group among the

untreated by matching those in the untreated group with those that are most similar in the
treated group. Theoretically, if all the assumptions are satisfied, the only difference
between the matched groups is participation in the program of interest.
Matching occurs on the covariates, X. In order for the control group to be formed
correctly it must be that the untreated outcomes and the treated outcomes are independent
of the decision to participate. Formally, we require
d |X and y

y

d |X

(3.26)

where the symbol “┴” means “is independent from”. Thus, for each observation in the
treated set, we can look for elements in the untreated set with the same X characteristics.
These matched untreated observations are then used to predict the unobserved
counterfactuals E y d

1 and E y d

0 which are in turn used to calculate the

treatment effects ATE, ATT, and ATNT.
Using X to create a matched group among the untreated is only possible if the
covariates do not predict participation exactly, formally we require,
0

d

1|X

1

(3.27)

Obviously, care must be taken to choose the appropriate set of covariates. An
inappropriate choice may lead to a violation of (3.26), (3.27), or both.
Given a proper choice of X, matching typically involves the use of a “propensity
score” defined as the probability of program participation,
P X ≡ Prob d

1|X

(3.28)
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which is commonly estimated using logit or probit. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show,
if assumption (3.26) holds, the following also holds.
y

d |P X and y

d |P X

(3.29)

Observations in the untreated population are then matched with treated observations
based on comparisons of propensity scores using several alternative techniques.
To illustrate, let P and P be the propensity scores associated with a treated
observation i and an untreated observation j, respectively. In nearest neighbor matching, a
given number of observations in the untreated population with P closest to P are
selected as observation i’s matched group. Under kernel-based matching, all untreated
observations within a predefined neighborhood of P are selected as the matched group.
Once a matched group has been selected, the treatment measures ATT, ATE, and ATNT
can be estimated and standard errors can be constructed.
Estimation of a probit model using maximum likelihood provides us with an
estimate of the propensity score, the probability of participation in the program, given by

Φ

′

(3.30)

where Φ is the standard normal distribution function, X is a set of variables for village i
believed to influence the participation choice, and γ is the vector of estimated coefficents.
The choice of the variables in the characteristic X will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Using the estimated propensity scores, several different matching methodologies
will be employed to create the appropriate control groups for each village. Once the set of
control villages is created, the average treatment effect will be calculated as
∑

∗

∑

(3.31)
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where n is the total number of villages,
participant or nonparticipant) and

∗

is the outcome measure of a village (either a

is the average (possibly weighted as discussed

below) outcome measure of village i’s control group. The average treatment effect on the
treated will be computed as
∑
∑
where

(3.32)

is the number of villages participating in the program,

village, and

is a participating

is that village’s control group of nonparticipating villages. Finally, the

average treatment effect among the nonparticipating villages will be calculated as
∑
where

(3.33)

is the number of villages participating in the program,

village, and

is a participating

is that village’s control group of participating villages.

This study will employ the following matching procedures: nearest neighbor
matching, caliper matching, and kernel matching.
3.2.2.1

Nearest Neighbor Matching
In its simplest form, single nearest neighbor matching matches each participating

village to the closest nonparticipating village where “closeness” is measured in terms of
propensity score. The nearest neighbor becomes the control group for the participating
village. Similarly, nearest neighbor controls are found for the non-participating villages
as well. If village j is the closest nonparticipating village to participating village i, it is not
necessarily the case that village i is also the closest participating village to village j.
Nearest neighbor matching can be carried out “without replacement” or “with
replacement.” Matching without replacement allows each village to be used as a control
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village only once. In this case, if a nonparticipating village is the nearest neighbor to two
or more participating villages, it will only be matched to one participating village. The
other participating villages will have to then be matched with nonparticipating villages
that are further away and thus, less similar. This will result in an increased bias when
estimating treatment effects. In contrast, matching with replacement allows each
nonparticipating village to be used more than once. Thus each village is matched with its
most similar village in the other group. The drawback to matching with replacement
means that a potentially smaller sample of villages will be used as controls. This results
in an increased variance of the treatment effect measures. The study will employ nearest
neighbor matching “with replacement” in order to reduce the bias in the treatment effect
measures.
The variance and bias of the treatment effect estimates is also affected by
increasing the number of neighbors or matches. In M nearest neighbor matching, each
village is matched with the closest M villages in the other group. The average outcome
measure of these closest M neighbors becomes the control measure used in the
calculation of the treatment effects. As M increases, observations that are further away
(less similar) are matched which increases the bias but decreases the variance of the
treatment effect estimates. The risk of increasing bias can be reduced by limiting the
distance in which neighbors can be matched or by giving different weights to the matches
based on their distance away. This study will examine the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the number of neighbors used.
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3.2.2.2

Caliper Matching
While M nearest neighbor matching uses the M closest observations in the other

group as matches, without regard to distance, radius caliper matching matches all
neighbors within a specified distance. Another form of caliper matching mentioned above
is to match the M nearest neighbors within a specified distance. Caliper matching may
increase the number of matched observations and at the same time avoid bad (far away)
matches. Therefore, it can reduce the bias and decrease the variance of the treatement
effect estimates. The size of the caliper (distance) must be chosen carefully. Too small a
caliper may result in no matches and too large a caliper may result in poor matches. This
study will examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of caliper size.
3.2.2.3

Kernel-Based Matching
Rather than using only a predetermined number of “close” observations or the

observations within a predefined “distance” to create a control group, kernel matching
creates a control group from all or nearly all of the observations in the comparison group.
Each participating village is matched with a weighted average of the villages in the
comparison group. The weights are constructed based on some form of kernel, a function
used to assign weights to observations in the comparison group based on their distance
away from the treated observation of interest, where “distance” is defined as the
difference between the villages propensity scores. For the purposes of this study, the
weights for the comparison villages should decrease with distance from the particpating
village and should sum to unity.
Given a participating village i, the weight associated with nonparticipating village
j will be calculated as
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is the kernel expressed as a function of the propensity score for

village i, village j, and a “bandwidth” parameter, . For this study, the Gaussian form of
the kernel will be used,
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The bandwidth parameter determines how fast the weight decays as the distance from the
participating village increases.
In order to calculate the ATE and the ATNT, the treated villages are used as the
comparison group for the nontreated villages. Given a nonparticipating village i, the
weight associated with a participating village j will be calculated as
,

,
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For every participating village i, the corresponding counterfactual outcome
measure will be calculated as
∑

,

(3.37)

and for every nonparticipating village i, the corresponding counterfactual outcome
measure will be calculated as
∑

,

(3.38)
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(3.39)
(3.40)

The treatment effect parameters can then be estimated. By definition, the average
treatment effect is
∑
∑

(3.41)

The average treatment effect on the treated is
∑

ATT

∑

y

y i

(3.42)

The average treatment effect on the nontreated is
∑
∑

(3.43)

In kernel matching, two important issues must be considered. First, as stated by
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), “comparing the incomparable must be avoided.” That is,
the participant and nonparticipant propensity scores should be defined on a common
support (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997). The most common method to define the
sample over a common support is to discard all observations whose propensity score lies
below the minimum or above the maximum of the other group. For example, if the
propensity scores of the treated sample lie between 0.4 and 0.8, and the scores for the
untreated sample lie between within 0.3 and 0.7, the common support is the interval
between 0.4 and 0.7. The second issue is the selection of the bandwidth parameter, h.
While many suggestions can be made regarding the choice of h, (Jones, Marron and
Sheather 1996), this study will follow Todd (1999) and choose a fixed bandwidth. The
sensitivity of the treatment estimates with respect to the different bandwidth choices will
be examined.
36

Two extensions of kernel matching will also be investigated: local linear
matching (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997) and regression-adjusted local linear
matching (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1998). These methods follow the general kernel
matching procedure above except with different weights.
3.2.3

Hypothesis Testing
After deriving the average treatment effects, their variances must be estimated in

order to conduct statistical tests for significance. The variances for the treatment effect
from matching estimators were investigated by Abadie and Imbens (2006a). They
decomposed the variation between the estimated average treatment effect and its
parameters into three components: the difference between the conditional treatment effect
and the parameter, errors, and the bias caused by the matching discrepancy (

.

Abadie and Imbens show the bias will vanish and be dominated by the first two
components in a large sample. Their formulae for the sample variances of the matching
estimator is
|

∑
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(3.44)
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(3.46)
, d is the

is the number of times a unit is used as a match,

outcome conditional variance for village i, M is the number of matched neighbors. To
obtain the conditional variance involves a complicated computation. Abadie and Imbens
proposed a matching estimator for the conditional variance
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,

. In this

estimator, unit i matches with a fixed number J of units from the same treatment sample.
Then the conditional variance is
∑

,d

(3.47)

where Yi is the outcome measure at which the conditional variance is evaluated and Yj is
the jth nearest outcome measure from the same treatment sample. j=1,2…J is indexes for
the matched outcomes measure.
In bootstrapping, a set of estimated treatment effects for each village is created.
For example, in order to use bootstrapping to estimate the variance of the ATE measure,
a set of ATEi, i=1...N would be created. This set would then be sampled repeatedly with
replacement Z times to create other sets. For each of these sets, j=1...Z, the mean ATE,
would be calculated. The variance of the ATE would then be calculated as
∑

(3.48)

Variances for the other treatment measures would be calculated similarly.
Abadie and Imbens (2006b) argue that the non-smoothness of nearest neighbor
matching causes bootstrapping to be invalid. It is unclear whether bootstrapping is valid
for other types of matching such as caliper and kernel matching. In a related article,
Imbens (2009) suggests that increasing the number of matches can solve the problem of
the bootstrapping invalidity in nearest neighbor matching. “[T]hus, the bootstrap might
be valid for kernel estimators.” (p.42). On the other hand, bootstrapping is a widely-used
estimator and has been used by Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd (1997) and Chen, Mu, &
Ravallion (2008). This study will estimate the variances for the nearest neibhbor
matching, the caliper matching, and the kernel-based matching with the bootstrapping.
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With the treatment effects estimated from the nearest neighbor, caliper and
kernel-based matching estimators and the estimated variances, we will be able to carry
out t tests. The null hypotheses for the t-tests will be that the SWPRP project did not
produce an impact on the project villages, i.e., the treatment effect is zero. If the t-test is
significant, we will reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the project did produce an
impact on the project villages.
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CHAPTER IV
SELECTION MODEL FOR PROJECT VILLAGES
As discussed in the previous chapter, both of the methodologies used to calculate
treatment effects rely on the ex ante probability of each village being selected into the
treatment group. In the control function approach, the probability is used in the creation
of the selection correction terms; in the matching models, the probability is used as each
village’s propensity score. Since the ex ante probability of being treated is unknown, it
must be estimated from the ex post decision of whether the village is treated or not, and
from village characteristics thought to be important to the policy makers making the
decision. Choice of these characteristics comes from an understanding of the actual
selection process. A description of this process is provided below. Following this, the
probabilistic estimation model is described and variable selection is discussed. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the estimation results.
4.1

An Institutional Background to the Process of Selecting Project Villages
The Southwest Poverty Reduction Project (SWPRP) was conceived during the

“International Conference on Poverty Issues in China” held in Beijing in October 1992.9
After agreeing to cooperate in an effort to reduce the incidence of poverty, agents from
the World Bank and the Chinese Central Government worked together with local
government officials to identify specific project areas. The SWPRP became an integral
part of a much larger scale poverty reduction plan of the Chinese government, the so9

World Bank, Agricultural Operation Division 1995, p. 7.
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called 8-7 Poverty Reduction Plan.10 However, while the 8-7 Poverty Reduction Plan
targeted all state-defined poor counties in China, the SWPRP was much more limited in
scale.
Agreement was made to focus the SWPRP’s efforts in 35 counties in the
adjoining portions of three provinces in Southwest China, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region, Guizhou Province and Yunnan Province. In 1992, each of these counties was
among the poorest of the poor with per capita annual incomes below 310 Yuan (US
$37.50 equivalent) and per capita annual grain production below 220 kg. Within these 35
counties, the project focused on half of the townships with incomes below the county
average, and, within each township, the project was supposed to focus on the
administrative villages in the lowest quartile of income. This selection process resulted in
SWPRP investment in 1798 administrative villages in 290 Townships of the 35 counties.
In the Guangxi region, the project targeted 515 villages in 91 townships of 12 counties.
The selected villages were supposed to be the poorest of the poor in the region; however,
this may not have been so.
At the time of the project preparation, statistical data were available at the county
and the township level but not at the village level. As a result, the decision of which
villages were in the lowest income quartile was subjective. Selection was made through
consultation and interviews with villagers, village heads, local teachers, and local
government staff. Since these local groups would benefit from the project investment,
they may have had an incentive to overstate their needs in order to improve their
probabilities of selection. In addition, since project officials would be responsible for

10

The 8-7 Poverty Reduction Plan was a plan by the Chinese Central Government to elevate 70 million
rural residents from absolute poverty in eight years from 1993 to 2000.
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project implementation, they had an incentive to choose those villages with
characteristics that would result in lower operational costs and an increased probability of
demonstrable project success.
The objective of the selection process is to select the poorest villages. However,
availability of the data may not allow the process to achieve its objective effectively. The
extent to which the selection process is biased is examined later in this chapter.
4.2

Probit Model for the Selection Process
In a sample including both the project villages and non-project villages, let d

denote the treatment of the project. d=1 then represents villages that are selected into the
project village subsample, and d=0 represents the villages that are not. Suppose the
selection of the project villages is determined by a latent variable Y*, which may be the
net benefit to the village including the social benefit, and in turn Y* is determined by a
set of observed variables, Z, and the unobserved variables, V. The choice function can be
written as
∗

(4.1)

Z includes all measured characteristics of the sample villages. v is unobservable
to researchers but might be known by the decision makers. For example, the political
influence is known by the decision makers, but it is unmeasurable for the researchers. In
the case of the SWPRP, costs of the project participation for the villages are unavailable.
In this research, costs are assumed to be constant across the villages, so the selection of
project villages is based on potential benefits but not on the participating costs. The
reason for the project villages to be selected is because the decision makers believe that
the SWPRP can bring positive net benefits to the villages, so having positive net benefit
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is the rule governing the selection of the project villages. If the net benefits from the
project participation of the villages are greater than zero, or Y*>0, the villages are
eligible to be selected as project villages, but when

∗

0, the villages are ineligible.

This rule can be presented in an indicator function by modifying equation (4.1).
d
d

1
0

∗

0
0

∗

(4.2)

While the villages with Y*>0 are not always selected, they all have a probability
to be included in the project, and the probability has the same distribution of Y*>0.
∗

0

0

(4.3)

Assuming that Z includes all variables that determine Y* and unobservable V is
an error term with zero mean and normal distribution, Y* also distributes normally.
Further, supposing

is linear, or

, the cumulative density function (cdf) is

0

(4.4)

where Φ . is the normal distribution function. The equation (4.4) can be estimated in a
probit model before it is used to predict the probability of each village to be chosen as a
project village. The data required for the probit model include selection outcomes (d) and
characteristics or decision variables (Z).
The decision variables in Z must be chosen based on economic theory. However,
Z must also satisfy the fundamental requirements for model identification. As discussed
in Chapter 3, the identification of the matching approach relies on the assumption
presented in (3.26), which requires the independence of outcomes and treatment
assignments conditional on the observable variable Z. In the case of the SWPRP,
assumption (3.26) requires random assignments of the project villages among the villages
with the same characteristics so that the differences between the project villages and non43

project villages are unbiased estimators for the treatment effects. The independence of the
outcomes and treatment assignments is essential for the matching approach to eliminate
the selection bias, and this independency is obtained by conditioning on Z. Hence, the
choice of the variables in Z is an important step in the matching approach.
To implement assumption (3.26), two important issues must be considered in the
choice of the variables in Z. First, matching makes no distinction between X (variables
determining outcomes) and Z (variables determining selection). Therefore, Z and X are
indifferent in this chapter and should include all the variables that determine both
outcomes and participation. In other words, matching requires that all the variables that
determine both outcomes and participation are observable. Heckman and Robb (1985)
refers to the observability of all relevant variables in matching as the “selection on
observables.” It also means that, as pointed out by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd
(1997), no unobservables that correlate with outcomes and project village selection are
allowed. Second, as proposed by Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004), Z should include
the variables that are not influenced by the treatment. In the case of the SWPRP, only
relevant variables that are fixed or stable over time can be considerred in Z.
Consequently, variables in Z should be measurable, stable over time, involved in
the process of the project village selection, and related to poverty. Table 4.1 describes
nine measurable village characteristics that are thought to influence village selection. For
each characteristic descriptive statistics are provided for the pooled sample and
subsamples of treated and untreated villages. Results of a t-test for mean difference
across the two subsamples are also provided.
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Table 4.1

The percentage of the non-Han minority population is an indicator that measures
the population structure of the villages and also implies significant cultural differences.
Population in Guangxi is comprised of different ethnic groups such as Han, Zhuang, Yao,
Miao, Tong, Mulao and others. Han has the largest population in Guangxi and China. All
other ethnic groups are minorities. Although each ethnic group has a primary region of
inhabitation, different ethnic groups often reside in the same village despite language and
cultural differences. The dataset collected does not allow us to compute the share of each
ethnic group in a village, but it does allow us to compute the proportion of all non-Han as
a minority group. As shown in Table 4.1, the mean of the percentage of non-Han
ethnicities are 75.83 percent in the non-project villages and 86.3 percent in the sample of
the project villages. The project villages have a higher percentage of non-Han population
possibly indicating greater ethnic diversity. This seems to suggest that the ethnic
minorities are given priority in the selection process. Ethnic minorities are not always in
poverty; however, as discussed above, the majority of the ethnic minorities in Guangxi
are found in the remote and mountainous regions, where resources are scarce. Therefore,
to target the ethnic minorities in those regions one can also target the poor villages.
The natural village size measures how population is distributed inside a village. In
this research, a village refers to the administrative village that consists of multiple natural
villages. A natural village is a colony of households (from several to over a hundred) at a
particular location. Natural villages are separated by mountains, rivers, or geographic
distance, so their sizes are usually determined by geography. For example, residents in
mountainous villages have to spread into small natural villages that are located at the
bottom of mountain valleys or on mountain sides. The size of the valleys and the
availability of resources such as land and water determine the size of the natural villages.
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Being small in size may result in a disadvantage in economies of scale and a lack of
infrastructure services because of higher construction costs. The average size of the
natural villages in administrative villages can be an indicator for poverty, so the SWPRP
is expected to target the villages that are comprised of smaller natural villages. This
seems to be the case as evidenced by the difference in means in Table 4.1.
Illiteracy rate of the adult population measures the education level in the villages.
It refers to the percentage of illiterate residents in the population ages 15 and over. The
illiteracy rate roughly reflects the accumulated outcome of education in the past and does
not likely influenced by the project since the children who enrolled in school with the
project aids were under 15 year old by the time when the data collected in 2000. Better
education might have resulted in the intellectual residents leaving the village since
laborers with high school (12 years) or higher education are rarely found in the villages.
On the other hand, good education also results in a higher school enrollment rate and a
lower illiteracy rate. In Table 4.1, our dataset shows the mean of the illiteracy rates is
8.38 percent in non-project villages and 7.08 percent in the project villages. The
difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The project villages seem to
have a better education history.
Land is a critical resource for rural residents. Besides the quantity of land, land
quality also plays an important role in determining living standards. Three indicators for
the land resources are the farmland per capita, the percentage of farmland with irrigation,
and the percentage of high-slope farmland. The land with irrigation is usually flat and of
high quality and therefore more productive. The high-slope farmland refers to the
farmland with a slope greater than 25 degrees. The productivity is low on the high-slope
land because the top soil is eroded by heavy rains. Farming on the high-slope land further
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exacerbates the erosion. However, the residents have to do so to survive despite the low
marginal returns. A higher percentage of high-slope farmland indicates the scarcity of
quality land, so the SWPRP should invest in the villages with less and lower-quality
farmland. Table 4.1 implies that the project did so because the project villages have
statistically significant less farmland and irrigated land and greater high-slope land.
Distances from county towns and township markets measure the remoteness of
the villages. The remote villages usually lack infrastructure because of higher
construction costs. The farther the villages locate away from the county centers and
township markets, the higher the costs are for the transportation and other services to
reach the villages. The geographic distances isolate the remote villages from
technological progress, so the production process is still dominated by traditional
technology. To target the poor, the SWPRP should target the villages farther from the
county towns and township markets. However, evidence in Table 4.1 indicates that the
project villages are on average close to both county towns and township markets.
In addition to the above variables, a dummy variable denoting mountainous
geography is also included in the probit model. As shown in Table 4.1, 96.64 percent of
the project villages have a mountainous geography and only 84.54 percent of the nonproject villages do.
4.3

The Selection Model
A probit model for equation (4.4) is established using the Qlim Procedure in SAS.

The coefficients of the probit model are estimated from a pooled sample of 2541
observations including 327 project villages and 2214 non-project villages. The dependent
variable takes the value d=1 for the project villages and d=0 for non-project villages. The
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independent variables are chosen based on the economic theory described in the previous
section. As argued by Rubin and Thomas (1996), the variables should not be excluded if
they are theoretically relevant though statistically insignificant. Wooldridge (2005)
suggest that one should include anything that helps predict participation. However,
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) suggest that one should only include the
statistically significant variables. Based on these works, our probit model includes all
nine variables from Table 4.1. Table 4.2 presents the results of the probit model.
Table 4.2

Results of Probit Model
Parameter
INTERCEPT C
MOUNTAIN x1
x2
MINORITY

Estimate
0.7071
0.4272
‐0.0018

St. Error
0.2517
0.1631
0.0014

***
***

VILSIZE

x3

‐0.0014

0.0003

***

FARMLAND

x4

‐0.9604

0.1070

***

IRRILAND

x5

‐0.0118

0.0018

***

SLOPELAND x6

‐0.0051

0.0015

***

CTYDIST

x7

‐0.0029

0.0013

**

MKTDIST

x8

‐0.0200

0.0048

***

ILLITERACY

x9

‐0.0098

0.0039

**

Note: The significant levels are *--10%, **--5%, and ***--1%.
To evaluate the model, statistics such as the likelihood ratio, R2, and condition
index are computed for the probit model in Table 4.2. The likelihood ratio is 249.88. The
critical value of Chi-squared distribution with 9 degrees of freedom is 21.67 at the 1
percent right-tail. The null (joint) hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is rejected at the
1 percent significant level. The R2 is 0.0937. The condition index for multicollinearity is
19.4884 in the model. These statistics show that the model fits well considering it is
established from cross-sectional data.
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The predictability is evaluated by the “Hit or Miss Method” proposed by
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). In the Hit or Miss Method, the probabilities
P(x) are predicted for each village in the pooled sample. This is compared to the
proportion of project villages in the sample (0.1287). If P(x)>0.1287, then village is
considered to be eligible for participation. Based on this test, the probit model predicts
1620 eligible villages, 240 of them are the project villages, accounting for 73.43 percent.
The results of the simple t-tests in Table 4.1 and the probit results in Table 4.2
indicate that selection into the project may have been based, in part, on factors other than
poverty such as minimization of the cost of project operations. Since all villages in the
sample are government defined poor villages, the potential conflict in objectives does not
mean that poor villages were not selected for the project, but that those selected may not
have been the poorest of the poor.
The three demographic variables in the probit model are the percentage of nonHan minorities (x2), the size of natural villages (x3), and illiteracy rate. As shown in Table
4.2, the coefficient on x2 is negative and statistically insignificant. This result seems to
imply that the ethnic structure does not play a significant role in the process of project
village selection and contradicts the preset selection rule of targeting ethnic minorities by
the World Bank and Chinese government. However, considering that the project and nonproject villages in our sample both have a large percentage of non-Han minorities, it is
reasonable that the coefficient on x2 is statistically insignificant.
The natural village size (x3) presents the population distribution inside
administrative villages. As shown in Table 4.2, the coefficient on x3 is negative and
statistically significant. This result indicates that the villages composed of small natural
villages are more likely to be selected as project villages. The small natural villages
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suffer several disadvantages for development. In addition to a lack of economies of scale,
one of the most important disadvantages is the high cost of infrastructure construction. As
a result, small natural villages often lack transportation, education, and healthcare
services. The probit results indicate that the SWPRP project gives the priority to the
villages composed of small natural village so that the poorer are targeted.
The other demographic variable is the illiteracy rate (x9), which represents the
education level in recent history, but not the present. Table 4.2 shows a statistically
significant and negative coefficient on x9, indicating the inverse relationship between the
probabilities and the illiteracy rates. This is an unexpected result. Higher illiteracy rates
are usually related with poorer villages. Therefore, the villages with a higher illiteracy
rate should have a higher probability of selection. However, the SWPRP tends to choose
the villages with low illiteracy rates or better education perhaps because villages with
better education might require less cost for project implementation. This is evidence for
operational cost minimization.
Farmland especially high quality farmland is a critical resource closely related to
the living standards in the poor villages. As shown in Table 4.2, the quantity and the
quality of farmland are all involved in the selection process. The SWPRP chooses
villages with less farmland per capita (x4) and less irrigated farmland (x5). The
coefficients on x4 and x5 are all negative and statistically significant, indicating the
villages with less farmland and irrigated land are more likely to be selected. Therefore,
the poorer are targeted. However, the project also avoids the villages with a high
percentage of high-slope farmland (x6). The coefficient on x6 is negative and statistically
significant, implying villages with a higher percentage of high-slope land, indicating
poorer villages, have lower probabilities of selection. These results indicate a possible
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conflict in project village selection. On the one hand, the project generally gives more
opportunities for selection to the villages with less farmland and less irrigated land, which
usually represents the poorer villages. On the other hand, the project favors the villages
with less high-slope farmland perhaps to assure demonstrable outcomes with lower
operational costs.
The location characteristics of villages are represented by distances from the
county towns (x7), distances from the township markets (x8), and types of geography (x1).
The results in Table 4.2 suggest that the project is willing to choose the villages close to
the county towns and the township markets. The coefficients on x7 and x8 are negative
and statistically significant. These imply that the project tends to exclude the villages far
from the county towns and township markets. Given the fact that the transportation is
normally worse to the distant villages, the operational cost must be higher. The project
targets the poor villages close to the county towns and the township markets perhaps in
an effort to minimize the operational costs.
Finally, dummy variables representing the mountain geography (x1) is included in
the model. As shown in Table 4.2, it has a positive and statistically significant coefficient.
Villages located in mountainous regions have selection priority.
The probit model shows that the SWPRP successfully targets poor villages but not
necessarily the poorest villages. The project tends to choose the villages that have less
farmland and less irrigated land and are composed of small natural village in the
mountain region. These characteristics are normally associated with poverty. Meanwhile,
the project also tends to reduce the opportunity of selection for the villages far from the
county towns and township markets with higher percentages of high-slope land and
higher illiteracy rates. These behaviors do not result in the selection of the poorer villages
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and contradict the project objective of targeting the poorest. The minimization of the
operational costs might be a reasonable explanation for the contradictory behaviors in the
selection process. This minimization of operational costs might jeopardize the project
objectives. However, it provides the possibility for researchers to construct a control
sample from the poorer villages that are not selected into the project.
In next two chapters, the probabilities or propensity scores estimated from the
probit model will be used in an effort to control for selection bias when estimating the
impact of the SWPRP. Two very different methodologies will be implemented; first, the
control function approach, then matching.
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CHAPTER V
SPECIFIC TREATMENT EFFECTS
Evaluations of the Southwest Poverty Reduction Project (SWPRP) can be
concentrated on either average treatment effects or specific treatment effects. The average
treatment effects (ATEs) are the average returns from the project investment and are
evaluated in the next chapter. This chapter focuses on the specific treatment effects on the
individual villages. A structural model for specific treatment effect evaluation is
borrowed from Heckman and Robb (1985) and Heckman and Vyctlacil (1998), which
they refer to as the correlated random coefficient model (CRCM). In the CRCM, the
treatment effects on specific villages are considered as a random variable and
decomposed into a constant and slopes. The constant represents the ATE, and the slopes
measure the deviations from the ATE for specific villages. The model allows the ATE to
vary with village characteristics in conjunction with the treatment, so the treatment
effects are heterogeneous. The empirical model of CRCM is estimated by the control
function approach described in Chapter 3, in which the selection bias is removed by
inclusion of the inverse Mill’s ratio in the regression equation. The results of the model
can be extrapolated to other villages if their characteristics are known, so, according to
Ravallion (2008), this structural model is policy-relevant for development practitioners.
Next, the correlated random coefficient model and its estimation are described. The
results are used to investigate the specific treatment effects on the project villages.
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5.1

The Correlated Random Coefficient Model
Models for social program evaluations have to consider unobservability of

counterfactuals and selection bias. The correlated random coefficient model solves the
problem of unobservability of the counterfactuals based on a switching regression
equation and removes the selection bias by a control function. As before, treatment
effects are defined as the differences between the observed outcomes and the
counterfactuals or the potential outcomes if the treatment is not carried out. In the case of
SWPRP, the treatment effects are the differences between two states of an indicator with
and without the project. The problem of unobservability arises because only one of the
two states of the indicators is observable in a particular village. The switching regression
equation that can be traced back to Roy (1951) estimates the treatment effects as a
parameter on the treatment dummy variable. However, the estimates of the parameter
might be biased because the project villages have not been randomly assigned as shown
in Chapter 4. For example, because the lower income villages are more likely to be
selected as the project villages, the mean income of the project villages would be lower
without the project. Heckman (1979) shows that selection bias is a function of the
selection process and can be removed by including a control function into the switching
equation. In addition, the CRCM allows the problem of heterogeneous treatment effects
to be modeled by adding interaction terms into the equation.
To model the treatment effects, let y denote a potential outcome, which may be
one of the 21 indicators in Table 2.1. y1 represents the treated outcome and y0 is the
untreated outcome. Let d denote the treatment of the SWPRP; d=1 represents treatment
while d=0 represents no treatment. The four potential outcomes can be written in
conditional notation as
55

y1|d=1
y0|d=1

the treated outcome of a project village,
the counterfactual representing the untreated outcome of a project
village,
the untreated outcome of a non-project village,
the counterfactual representing the treated outcome of a nonproject village.

y0|d=0
y1|d=0

By choosing the appropriate counterfactual, the treatment effects, αi, on the
individual village i, is expressed as
(5.1)
i =1, 2…n, where n is the total number of villages in the pooled sample.
At the population level, the average treatment effect (ATE) is the expectation over
all individual villages.
(5.2)
However, the ATE is unobservable at the population level and needs to be estimated. The
sample ATE is conditional on a set of the sample characteristics, denoted as X. The
sample ATE can be computed in following equation.
|

|
|

(5.3)

Practically, interest may be on either the treatment effects of the project villages
or the treatment effect of the non-project villages if they have been treated. The treatment
effects are then conditional on these subsamples. The average treatment effects on the
treated (ATT) are conditional on being in the treated sample (d=1), and the average
treatment effects on the untreated (ATNT) are conditional on being in the untreated
sample (d=0).
| ,d

1
| ,d
| ,d 0
| ,d

1

(5.4)

0

(5.5)
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The unobservability of the counterfactuals y0|X,d=1 and y1|X,d=0 do not allow
equations (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5) to be calculated directly. For example, for project
villages, it is possible to observe the incomes with the project (y1|X,d=1), but the incomes
without the project (y0|X,d=1) are unobservable. Therefore, the treatment effects in
equation (5.4) are unattainable. Similarly, for the non-project villages, the incomes
without the project (y0|X,d=0) are observable, but the incomes with the project (y1|X,d=0)
are not. Instead of estimating the treatment effects with the above equations, the method
of control function estimates the treatment effects with a switching regression equation.
To construct the correlated random coefficient model (CRCM) for this study, take
the income as an example represented by y. Without the SWPRP, the average incomes of
individual villages, including the project villages and the non-project villages, are
determined by a set of characteristics including, but not limited to, land resources, labor
input, and weather. However, researchers cannot measure all of these characteristics.
Only a subset of these characteristics, X, is observed by researchers, and the rest are not
observable. For example, local weather may influence the incomes, but local weather
data are not among the available dataset. Letting u denote the unobservable variables, the
incomes can be expressed as11.
(5.6)
(5.7)
where β is a vector of coefficients including an intercept and

is the effect of the

treatment on village i. These two equations can be expressed in a single equation.

11

This section relies heavily on the discussion provided by Blundell and Dias.
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d

1
d

d
d

(5.8)

where d represents selection into the program. We assume that selection follows the rule
represented in equation (4.2) in Chapter 4.
If the selection into the program is nonrandom then ordinary least squares
estimation of equation (5.8) will be biased. In order to see this more clearly, we rewrite
equation (5.8) as
d
d

where

(5.9)
. In two important cases, OLS is an unbiased estimator for

equation (5.9). First, under random selection,
correlation between

is not correlated with d . However,

and d may arise in the case that the term d

in

is not

zero. According to our results in Chapter 4, this is very likely. Second, OLS estimates
would be unbiased if

was uncorrelated with d . However, we may have

correlated

with d which implies that selection is based on the expected gains to program
participation. Because d is determined by X,

is not constant and is correlated with X.

In either case, the non-participants and the participants will not be comparable and OLS
will provide biased results.
In order to correct the bias in the first case, we employ a two-step method
developed by Heckman (1979). In the first step, assuming a linear selection rule, the
probability of selection into the program,
d

1

0

(5.10)

is estimated using a probit model as shown in Chapter 4. The probit results are then used
to create inverse Mill’s ratios,

for the participant villages and

for the non-participant villages. In the second step, OLS is used to regress y on X, d, λ0
and λ1,
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d

d

1

d

(5.11)

The estimated coefficient δ provides an unbiased estimate of ATE, which is
assumed to be homogenous and will be identical to ATT and ATNT. Suppose
, the inverse Mill’s ratios can be combined into one term,
d

1

d

(5.12)

To correct the bias in the second case, where the treatment effects are
heterogeneous, we express the individual village treatment effect

as a linear function

of the village’s characteristics.
(5.13)
We can perform OLS on
d

d

(5.14)

which will result in an unbiased estimate of the population average treatment effect, δ,
and the village specific treatment effect,

. In addition, the average

treatment effect on the treated and the average treatment effect on the untreated can be
estimated as
∑

(5.15)

∑

(5.16)

And

where n1 and n0 are the number of treated and untreated villages, respectively.
5.2

Estimation of the Empirical Models
The model in equation (5.14) is used to evaluate the treatment effect on the 21

indicators given in Table 2.1. The empirical model for each indicator is estimated by
2SLS. The first step is to derive the inverse Mill’s Ratios from the probit model for the
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selection rule as described in Chapter 4. The second step is to estimate the outcome
models for each indicator using equation (5.14) by OLS. The
effect (ATE) and the

is the average treatment

are the specific treatment effects. Before presenting

the results, three issues need to be addressed.
The first issue is to determine the variable set of X and Z. In Chapter 4, we
identify nine characteristic variables that may be associated with poverty and the project
village selection process. They can all be included in X and Z. However, the exclusion
restriction requires that at least one variable in X should be excluded in Z to avoid
multicolinearity in equation (5.14). In the method of control function, the selection bias in
outcome equation (5.14) is supposed to be a function of the characteristic variable Z,
which also determines the outcome. In 2SLS, the equation (5.14) is estimated by
including in the generalized term for inverse Mill’s ratios (gr) to remove the selection
bias. If Z linearly determines the selection process, gr is also linearly correlated to X. The
parameters in equation (5.14) cannot be estimated consistently. However, this exclusion
restriction is not necessary when selection function is not linearly determined. In our
case, the probit function is a non-linear function and so the selection bias is not a linear
function of Z. Therefore, this exclusion restriction is not necessary in our model.
The second issue is to determine the subset of X that correlates with the
heterogeneous treatment effects. This requires one to determine interaction terms
between the demeaned X and the treatment d in equation (5.14). Literature rarely
addresses how to choose these variables. We arbitrarily assume that all variables in X
linearly determine the specific treatment effects and are included in the interaction terms
except x1, the dummy variable for mountainous villages. In our sample, as shown in
Table 4.1, 96.64 percent of project villages are mountainous villages. As a result, the
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interaction term, d*x1, almost equals the dummy for treatment, d. Inclusion of both terms
in equation (5.14) causes multicollinearity in the regression. By including all the rest of
the variables, we are able to explore which of the variables cause heterogeneity in the
specific treatment effects.
The third issue is to determine the common support to satisfy assumption (3.27) in
Chapter 3. This research follows the method suggested by Imbens (2009). In that method,
the predicted probabilities in Chapter 4 are used to identify the common support region,
which is the overlapping region of the probabilities of the project and non-project
villages. From the results of Chapter 4, the predicted probabilities range from 0.0130 to
0.5320 for the project villages and from 1.275E-53 to 0.5416 for the non-project villages.
Therefore, the common support region is the overlapping region from 0.0130 to 0.5320.
A trimmed sample for the outcome model is established by excluding the villages that
have predicted probabilities smaller than 0.0130 or larger than 0.5320. After trimming,
the sample includes 325 project villages and 1909 non-project villages.
As shown in Table 5.1, the models for the 21 indicators are different in goodnessof-fit. The R2 value of the model for immunized children is 0.0148, indicating a low level
of goodness-of-fit. A better goodness-of-fit occurs in the model for the food crop
production, which has a R2 value of 0.2713. The generally low R2 might be due to the
cross-sectional dataset.
Unbelievable results are found in Table 5.1. The coefficients on the row labeled
“D” represent the average treatment effects (ATEs) on each indicator. Surprisingly, the
ATEs on poverty rate and net income are as large as -47 and -107. These results suggest
that on average the project reduces the poverty rate by 47 percent while at the same time
decreases the net income by 107 Yuan per capita. Because poverty is measured by
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income in this research, the two results fail to support each other. An unreasonable result
is also found in the ATE on food crop. On average, the project increases the food crop
area by 2.5 Mu per household. One might question how this could happen in a household
with about 5 Mu of farmland in total. The occurrence of these unreasonable results might
be due to a misspecification of functional form. In this chapter, we arbitrarily specify the
linear function for each regression model. Obviously, the linear function is not the
appropriate function for every indicator to estimate the ATEs. In the next chapter, the
matching approach is implemented, which does not rely on any functional form.
Although the control function approach is inappropriate for ATEs, it can still be
used to investigate specific treatment effects. In Table 5.1, the coefficients of Dx2-Dx9 are
the slopes of ATEs, which determines the specific treatment effects on village
characteristics. The next section
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Dx4 ‐46.7281 7.6416 *** ‐153.3366 47.6685 ***

0.3676 0.0500 ***

x9

ILLITERACY

1.1251
‐

1.5146 *

0.4224 ***

0.4889 ***

0.7321 **

0.3116

0.3699

0.1165

0.1400 ***

0.1925 ***

5.9509 **

0.0190

0.1418 ***

0.0704

‐0.4943

‐0.1423

0.0992

‐0.8915

0.9882

13.0750

‐0.0172

‐0.3777

‐36.4878 13.2666 ***

0.9490

‐2.8615

‐1.6757

‐1.5084

‐1.8477

Note on significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

R
0.0845

0.1519 0.0593 **

2

‐0.0077 0.0187

SLOPELAND

x8

IRRILAND

CTYDIST

x5

FARMLAND

MKTDIST

0.0560 0.9540
‐0.0964 0.0309 ***

x4
0.0720 0.0224 ***

0.0053 0.0030 *

x3

VILSIZE

x7

0.0199 0.0227

x6

‐1.0494 2.1267

‐0.0600 0.1804

Dx9

D*ILLITERACY

x1

‐0.1083 0.2428

Dx8

D*MKTDIST

x2

‐0.1929 0.0677 ***

Dx7

D*CTYDIST

MOUNTAIN

‐0.1570 0.0784 **

Dx6

D*IRRILAND

D*SLOPELAND

MINORITY

‐0.3833 0.1174 ***

Dx5

0.1009
‐

D*FARMLAND

‐0.0944

Dx3

D*VILSIZE
‐0.0752 0.0162 ***

C
D
gr
Dx2

INTERCEPT
TREATMENT
MILL RATIO
D*MINORITY
‐0.8391

9.3554
‐

12.5936 **

‐3.5119

4.0650 ***

6.0870 *

2.5913

3.0759

0.9685

1.1643 ***

1.6005 ***

49.4815

0.1580

1.1787 ***

0.0583

‐3.2409

‐4.2427

‐1.2252

‐3.3323

7.3521

5.8327

0.0861

‐3.4959

364.1876 110.3119 ***

4.2995

28.2006

‐0.2099

‐11.0207

10.5496

612.6213 396.3641
‐

0.5594

Poverty Rate %
Net Income (Yuan)
Income in Kind (Yuan)
Mean S.Error
Mean
S.Error
Mean
S.Error
35.0908 4.6988 *** 781.0047 29.3112 *** 2022.7868 243.7228 ***
‐46.7238 9.5808 *** ‐106.6521 59.7652 *
552.9643 496.9476
‐
21.4674 5.7222 ***
49.1454 35.6953
‐212.7035 296.8062
‐0.1387 0.0587 ***
‐0.2821 0.3661
‐
8.0123
3.0441 ***

The Results of Correlated Random Coefficient Model

Variables

Table 5.1

0.6684 **

2.0642

2.4502

0.7715 ***

0.9274 ***

1.2749
‐

39.4161
‐

0.1259 ***

0.9389 ***

87.8726
‐

7.4524 ***

10.0319 **

2.7975
‐

3.2381
‐

4.8488 **

0.0586

0.5860

2.2786

‐2.7159

‐3.9830

‐0.7737

4.8941

0.4161

‐2.6342

‐134.9786

22.8624

‐23.1501

0.9164

‐2.2903

‐11.9513

503.9596 315.7369
‐

1.5443

0.0225 ***

0.0694 ***

0.0823

0.0259 ***

0.0312 **

0.0428

1.3243 **

0.0042

0.0315 ***

2.9523 ***

0.2504 **

0.3370

0.0940

0.1088 **

0.1629

0.0992

0.1964

0.0599

‐0.2150

‐0.0795

0.0163

3.3194

0.0063

‐0.1762

9.4472

‐0.6134

0.1098

0.0718

0.2379

0.0230

24.5871 10.6080 **

‐0.0699

Cash Income (Yuan)
Brick House %
Mean
S.Error
Mean
S.Error
2356.9966 194.1455 *** 76.0916 6.5228 ***
1004.7751 395.8601 ** ‐23.8673 13.3000 *
740.2120 236.4308 *** 19.1300 7.9435 **
‐7.0112
2.4249 *** ‐0.0947 0.0815
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0.0401

Dx3

Dx4

Dx5

D*VILSIZE

D*FARMLAND

D*IRRILAND

3.9402
0.0123
0.1384
0.2229
0.0778
‐0.1250

x3

x4

x5

x6

x7

x8

x9

VILSIZE

FARMLAND

IRRILAND

SLOPELAND

CTYDIST

MKTDIST

ILLITERACY

R

0.0725 *

0.0860
‐

0.0271 ***

0.0326 ***

0.0447

1.3835 ***

0.0044

0.0330 ***

3.0843 ***

0.2616 ***

0.3521
‐

0.0982
‐

0.1137

0.1702

0.1055

0.1797
‐0.0032

x2

MINORITY

0.7556

Dx9

D*ILLITERACY
9.1029

0.0922

D*MKTDIST

x1

‐0.0760

Dx8

D*CTYDIST

MOUNTAIN

0.1672

Dx6

Dx7

D*SLOPELAND

2

0.0235 *

19.3920 11.0823 *

0.0431

C
D
gr
Dx2

Thatched House %
Mean
S.Error
8.6066 6.8145
19.3393 13.8946
‐16.6704 8.2987 **
0.1601 0.0851 *

(Continued)

INTERCEPT
TREATMENT
MILL RATIO
D*MINORITY

Variables

Table 5.1

0.1111

‐0.2283 0.0445 ***

0.1337 0.0528 **

‐0.1182 0.0166 ***

‐0.1222 0.0200 ***

0.0373 0.0275
‐

2.7783 0.8493 ***

0.0099 0.0027 ***

‐0.0069 0.0202
‐

‐7.7779 1.8935 ***

0.2408 0.1606

0.0703 0.2162

0.0048 0.0603

0.1045 0.0698

0.1440 0.1045

10.5573 6.8035

0.0337 0.0144 **

0.5056

1.5613 **

1.8532
‐

0.5835 ***

0.7015 ***

0.9643 **

29.8128

0.0952 **

0.7102
‐

66.4634

5.6367

7.5877 *

2.1160

2.4492 *

3.6675 *

0.0379

‐3.3123

‐0.7060

‐1.6639

‐4.6234

2.0352

33.2934

‐0.1930

0.4316

24.5462

1.3042

14.2554

2.0385

4.0530

6.0989

524.5972 238.8112 **

‐0.2441

0.0666 ***

0.0018 0.0004 ***

0.3597 0.0499 ***

0.0091 0.0042 **

0.0264 0.0057 ***

0.0044 0.0016 ***

0.0012 0.0018

0.0174 0.0028 ***

2.2267 0.1794 ***

0.1825 0.0224 ***

0.2055

0.2713

‐0.0051 0.0012 ***

0.2440 *** ‐0.0092 0.0014 ***

0.0768 *** ‐0.0014 0.0004 ***

0.0923 *** ‐0.0025 0.0005 ***

0.1270 *** ‐0.0054 0.0007 ***

3.9249

0.0125 *** ‐0.0007 0.0001 ***

0.0935 *** ‐0.0015 0.0005 ***

8.7499 ***

0.7421 **

0.9989 ***

0.2786 ***

0.3224 ***

0.4828 ***

0.1552

‐0.2380

1.2355

‐0.4704

‐0.7474

0.4870

0.2992

‐0.0672

0.3684

37.5801

1.8439

4.1971

1.2240

1.1764

2.9724

315.6629 31.4396 ***

0.3708

HHs with TV %
Agri. Production (Yaun)
Grain Production (Kg)
Food Crop (Mu)
Mean S.Error
Mean
S.Error
Mean
S.Error
Mean S.Error
44.3370 4.1835 *** 1174.5954 146.8441 *** 373.8897 19.3321 *** 1.6982 0.1103 ***
10.4281 8.5300
681.5896 299.4132 **
383.4668 39.4178 *** 2.4903 0.2249 ***
‐4.1992 5.0946
‐494.0443 178.8271 *** ‐222.0498 23.5426 *** ‐1.3054 0.1343 ***
‐0.0422 0.0523
3.6974
1.8341 **
0.6577 0.2415 *** ‐0.0017 0.0014
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0.1008

‐0.0013 0.0014

ILLITERACY

R

‐0.0013 0.0016

x9

MKTDIST

2

‐0.0012 0.0005 **

x7

‐0.0008 0.0006
‐

x6

SLOPELAND

x8

‐0.0008 0.0008
‐

x5

IRRILAND

CTYDIST

0.1631 0.0258 ***

‐0.0003 0.0000 *** ‐0.0001 0.0000 *** ‐0.0001 0.0001

‐0.0002 0.0001 **

x2

MINORITY

x3

‐0.0008 0.0006
‐

x1

MOUNTAIN

x4

0.0150 0.0049 ***

‐0.4173 0.0575 ***

Dx9

D*ILLITERACY

VILSIZE

0.0175 0.0066 ***

Dx8

FARMLAND

0.0031 0.0004 *** ‐0.0004 0.0002 *

0.0012 0.0018
‐

Dx7

D*MKTDIST

0.0807

0.0004 0.0007

0.0594 0.0642

0.0150 0.0054 ***

0.0014 0.0073
‐

0.0045 0.0020 **

0.0039 0.0024 *

0.0001 0.0005

0.0010 0.0002 ***

0.0002 0.0002

0.0004 0.0003
‐

0.0826

0.0921

0.0013 0.0015

0.0021 0.0018

0.0007 0.0006
‐

0.0019 0.0007 ***

0.0025 0.0009 ***

0.0295 0.0085 *** ‐0.0010 0.0288
‐

0.0635 0.0189 ***

0.0017 0.0016
‐

0.0027 0.0022

0.0002 0.0006
‐

‐0.0020 0.0008 *** ‐0.0005 0.0004

‐0.0006 0.0009

0.0010 0.0003 ***

0.0001 0.0004

0.0005 0.0005

0.0100 0.0150

0.0414 0.0333

0.0017 0.0028

0.0093 0.0038 **

0.0012 0.0011
‐

0.0008 0.0007
‐

‐0.0156 0.0035 ***

D*CTYDIST

0.0013 0.0012

0.0027 0.0010 **

0.0027 0.0021
‐

0.0016 0.0018

0.0095 0.0032 ***

Dx6

D*SLOPELAND

0.2507 0.0678 *** ‐1.4545 0.2307 ***

D*IRRILAND

0.2525 0.1198 **

0.4374 0.2066 **

Dx4

Dx5

‐0.0025 0.0005 ***

D*FARMLAND

0.0003 0.0001 **

0.1360

‐0.0533 0.0364

0.0390 0.0432

0.0098 0.0136

‐0.0657 0.0164 ***

‐0.1314 0.0225 ***

4.2786 0.6954 ***

0.0118 0.0022 ***

0.0701 0.0166 ***

0.1203 1.5503
‐

‐0.1374 0.1315
‐

0.4291 0.1770 **

0.0069 0.0494

‐0.0278 0.0571

‐0.0063 0.0855
‐

‐7.5697 5.5703

‐0.0121 0.0118

0.1453

‐0.0811 0.0305 ***

‐0.0180 0.0362

‐0.0125 0.0114

‐0.0993 0.0137 ***

‐0.0600 0.0188 ***

‐2.8914 0.5822 ***

0.0080 0.0019 ***

0.0780 0.0139 ***

1.7661 1.2980

0.2579 0.1101 **

‐0.4023 0.1482 ***

0.1628 0.0413 ***

0.0038 0.0478

0.0698 0.0716

0.6670 4.6638

0.0283 0.0099 ***

Dx3

D*VILSIZE

0.0004 0.0003

0.0006 0.0004
‐

C
D
gr
Dx2

Variables

INTERCEPT
TREATMENT
MILL RATIO
D*MINORITY

(Continued)

Cash Crop (Mu)
Pig (Heads)
Cattle (Heads)
Goat (Heads)
Male Labor %
Female Labor %
Mean S.Error
Mean S.Error
Mean S.Error
Mean S.Error
Mean S.Error
Mean S.Error
1.0010 0.1270 *** 0.8734 0.0737 *** 0.2360 0.0417 *** ‐0.0853 0.1419
22.5681 3.4251 *** 20.7059 2.8678 ***
1.0804 0.2590 *** 0.2636 0.1502 *
0.2866 0.0850 *** ‐1.0819 0.2893 *** ‐17.5971 6.9838 **
‐4.0699 5.8473
‐0.7581 0.1547 *** ‐0.1111 0.0897
‐0.1823 0.0507 *** 0.5928 0.1728 *** 16.4225 4.1711 *** 7.9657 3.4924 **
0.0020 0.0016
0.0008 0.0009
0.0007 0.0005
‐
0.0035 0.0018 **
0.0606 0.0428
‐
0.0037 0.0358
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0.1023
0.3670
‐

‐0.2131
0.0315
0.0337

Dx4

Dx5

Dx6

Dx7

D*FARMLAND

D*IRRILAND

D*SLOPELAND

D*CTYDIST

R

0.0755

0.0896 ***

0.0466 ***

1.4420 *

0.0046

0.0344 *

3.2148

0.1300

‐0.0836

2

x9

SLOPELAND

ILLITERACY

0.0282 ***

‐0.2167

x6

IRRILAND

‐0.7770

‐0.1361

x5
‐0.1428

‐2.6878

x4

FARMLAND

x7

0.0019

x3

VILSIZE

x8

‐0.0597

x2

MINORITY

CTYDIST

‐3.8304

x1

MOUNTAIN

MKTDIST

0.0339 ***

‐0.3333

0.2726

‐0.0921

Dx8

Dx9

D*MKTDIST

D*ILLITERACY

0.1185

0.1774

‐14.6243 11.5513

0.0245

Dx3

D*VILSIZE
0.0008

C
D
gr
Dx2
0.0197

0.0609

0.0722 ***

0.0227
‐

0.0273 ***

0.0376

1.1620

0.0037 ***

0.0277 ***

2.5905
‐

0.2197

0.2957
‐

0.0825

0.0955 **

0.1429

9.3081

0.0512

0.0673

0.2810

0.0371

0.0893

‐0.0566

‐0.6362

0.0100

0.0902

1.8190

0.1838

0.1257

0.0479

0.1905

0.0565

4.8800

0.0190

0.1027

‐0.1646 0.0180 ***

‐0.0076 0.0213
‐

0.0453 0.0067 ***

‐0.0433 0.0081 ***

0.0205 0.0111 *

0.2404 0.3429
‐

0.0003 0.0011

‐0.0241 0.0082 ***

1.0990 0.7644
‐

0.0343 0.0648
‐

0.1144 0.0873
‐

0.0292 0.0243
‐

0.0524 0.0282 *

0.0034 0.0422
‐

1.3053 2.7465
‐

0.0114 0.0058 **

0.5376
‐

1.6603 **

1.9707 **

0.6205

0.7459 ***

1.0254

31.7032

0.1012 ***

0.7552 **

70.6777 ***

5.9941

8.0689
‐

2.2501
‐

2.6045
‐

3.9000
‐

0.0644

‐3.4318

4.5989

‐0.0996

‐3.8392

‐1.0260

31.9340

0.3568

‐1.6543

304.5322

9.7145

12.9934

1.5634

3.4852

2.5335

283.9762 253.9536
‐

0.1281

0.0259

0.0801

0.0950

0.0299

0.0360

0.0495

1.5290

0.0049 ***

0.0364 **

3.4086

0.2891

0.3891

0.1085

0.1256

0.1881

0.0148

‐0.0311

‐0.0054

0.0266

‐0.0267

0.0407

2.3785

0.0237

‐0.0766

‐1.8068

0.2790

0.2661

0.0961

0.0296

0.1309

7.0593 12.2475

0.0179

Car Access (Days)
Water Shortage %
Primary Enrol.Rate
Doctor Ratio (P/D)
Imm. Children %
Mean
S.Error
Mean S.Error
Mean
S.Error
Mean
S.Error
Mean
S.Error
95.3654 7.1029 *** 32.8824 5.7235 *** 101.6041 1.6888 *** 1534.2884 156.1551 *** 86.6115 7.5310 ***
1.3310 14.4826
1.4060 11.6702
1.5091 3.4434
‐
213.6509 318.3983
‐22.5717 15.3556
5.2792 8.6499
‐6.2329 6.9701
‐0.1791 2.0566
297.1209 190.1661
14.1256 9.1712
‐0.0796 0.0887
‐
0.0202 0.0715
0.0261 0.0211
2.1918
1.9504
‐
0.0723 0.0941

(Continued)

INTERCEPT
TREATMENT
MILL RATIO
D*MINORITY

Variables

Table 5.1

examines these slope coefficients to evaluate how the project impacts vary with village
characteristics.
5.3

The Specific Treatment Effects
The motivations for any project intervention are based on the assumption that

impacts can be generated through the interactions of the project investments and the local
factors. Based on this motivation, the SWPRP combines a set of investment activities
with the villages’ characteristics in order to achieve the desired outcomes. The
combinations of the project investments and the village characteristics are presented by
the interaction terms in the correlated random coefficient model. A test of the
significance of the coefficients on the interaction terms is a test of the null hypothesis that
the project does not generate the treatment effects by interacting with the local village
characteristics. The coefficients of the empirical models for the 21 outcome indicators are
reported in Table 5.1. In the table, row D is the coefficient on the treatment, which is the
ATE. Rows labeled Dxk are the interactions of the demeaned xk with the treatment d. xk
are defined as that in Table 4.1. The variable gr represents the inverse Mill’s ratio. In
order to give a clear picture of the specific effects, we summarize the significant effects
in Table 5.2. The signs in Table 5.2 represent the direction on the specific treatment
effects that are statistically significant.
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Percentage of Immunized Children

Population-Doctor Ratio

‐

+
+
+
+
+
+
‐

‐

‐
‐
‐

D

TREATMENT

‐

‐
‐

‐

+
+

+

+

+
‐

+
+

‐
+
+

‐

‐

+

Dx3

Dx2

D*MINORITY D*VILSIZE

+
+
+
+
+
+
‐

‐
+

‐
‐

Dx4

D*FARMLAND

+
‐

+
+
+
+

‐
‐
‐
+

Dx5

D*IRRILAND

-- --- --- --

Primary School Enrollment Rate

Education and Health Service

Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Days Accessible by Vehicles

Infrasture Service

Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)

Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)

Grain Production Per Capita (KG)

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)

Agriculture

Percentage of Household with TV Set

Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House

Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House

Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)

Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)

Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)

Indicators

+

+

‐

+
+

+

‐

+
+

‐
‐

‐
‐
‐
‐

Dx7

‐
‐

+
+
+
+
+

‐
‐
+

Dx8

‐

‐

+
+
+

‐
‐
‐
+

Dx9

D*CTYDIST D*MKTDIST D*ILLITERACY

Dx6

D*SLOPELAND

Interaction Impacts Between the Project Treatment and Village Characteristics

Wealth and Income

Table 5.2
t---

-- --- --

-- --

5.3.1

Minority Villages
As shown in the “Dx2” column in Table 5.2, the project yields better results in

poverty reduction through improving agricultural production especially grain production.
The sign of poverty rate on the row Dx2 is negative and statistically significant, indicating
that the poverty rate decreases as the percentage of non-Han minorities increases in the
project villages. In addition, the coefficients corresponding to agricultural production and
grain production are positive and statistically significant, indicating that the project is
more successful in increasing food production in minority villages.
On the other hand, the project is less successful in improving cash income,
income in kind, goat farming, and housing condition in minority villages. These results
imply that the treatment effects are diminishing when the percentages of non-Han
minorities increases. In other words, the higher the percentage of non-Han minorities in
the villages, the smaller the treatment effects from the project in terms of cash income,
income in kind, and goat farming. The positive slope on the percentage of thatched
houses indicates that the project has smaller impact on the reduction of poor housing
conditions in the minority villages.
The most interesting result is that by improving agricultural production in
minority villages, poverty is reduced without increasing income. This may indicate a
focus for future poverty reduction programs.
5.3.2

Natural Village Size
In villages comprised of larger natural villages, the project has a better result in

reducing poverty and increasing TV possession, food crops, cash crops, cattle farming,
off-farm employment of female labor, and the enrollment rate in primary school. The
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larger natural villages are normally associated with better geography and infrastructure.
Therefore, the conditions favor agricultural development. This makes the larger natural
villages wealthier prior to the project. As a result, more male laborers might already be
working outside the village, so the significant impact of the project is to aid the female
laborers in finding off-farm jobs. The alternative explanation might be that the female
laborers in the larger natural villages are more open to accept the off-farm jobs because
they are well informed of the outside world due to infrastructure such as a broadcast TV
network and roads. The project is successful in increasing the number of TVs, and this
might be due to the lower cost of TV services in the large villages. It is also successful in
promoting the enrollment rates of the primary schools in large natural villages. The larger
natural villages are more likely successful because they have better services in
information and infrastructure.
5.3.3

Illiteracy Rate
The illiteracy rate does not significantly affect the ATEs on poverty rate.

Investment in the villages with a high illiteracy rate does increase the food crop and cash
crop production but does not increase income. As the project activities fail to increase
cash income and income in kind, they also fail to improve the housing conditions in such
villages. This may contribute to the insignificant outcomes in high illiteracy rate villages.
5.3.4

Land Resources
The results in Table 5.2 show that the project has a better performance in the

villages with better land resources. The coefficients on the Dx4, Dx5, and Dx6 are all
negative and statistically significant in poverty rate, implying the ATE on poverty
reduction can be accelerated in the villages with more land resources regardless of land
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quality. The results also show that the ATEs on farming activities such as food and cash
crop growing and cattle farming are enhanced in the villages with more farmland (x4) or
more irrigated land (x5) and, as a result, the ATEs on grain production and agricultural
output are improved. The ATE on pig farming has a positive and significant slope on
Dx4. This suggests that the project promotes an expansion of agricultural production in
the villages with better land resources. Meanwhile, in the villages with a high percentage
of high-slope land (x6), the ATEs on grain production and agricultural output are
enhanced but the ATEs on farming activities are not. So, the project improves the
productivity and the agricultural output rather than expanding the growing area in the
villages with land scarcity. The access to roads and water are also significantly improved
in the villages with high-slope land. Interestingly, land resources allow the project to
achieve significant impacts in agricultural activities and outputs; these impacts do result
in a reduction of poverty rate but not necessarily in an increase of net income.
5.3.5

Location
Similar to the land resources, the project has a better result in reducing poverty in

the villages far from county towns (Dx7), but the average net incomes do not increase.
This implies a more equal distribution of income in the villages after the project. Such an
effect on the income distribution is derived from increasing the production of grains and
food crops and bringing more off-farm employment opportunities to female laborers.
As the distances from township markets (Dx8) increase, the ATEs on the income
in kind, food crop, cash crop, grain production, agricultural output also increase.
However, these impacts do not improve the results in poverty reduction.
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In this chapter, the correlated random coefficient models for 21 indicators are
implemented controlling the selection bias with the inverse Mill’s ratio from the selection
model in Chapter 4. The results of the models indicate that the treatment effects of the
project relate to villages’ characteristics. These relationships provide evidence for the
existence of the observed heterogeneous treatment effects and allow us to investigate the
performance of the project in villages with different characteristics. Land and labor are
found to be the key resources that cause the heterogeneity. In terms of poverty reduction,
the project performs better in the villages with more land resources. However, in the
villages with better land resources, the project fails to increase the average net income.
That is to say, the reduction of the poverty rate has been derived from the re-distribution
of incomes in the villages rather than from the increase of income. This is also shown by
the project’s failure to increase the average cash income and the average income in kind,
although agricultural production is successfully improved in the villages with more
farmland. More farmland allows the project to increase the food crop growing. The
phenomenon that the poverty rate can be reduced without increasing the average income
explains that, by extending the food crops, the project increases the income of the poorer
and reduces in the income of the richer in the villages. In addition, the investments in the
villages far from the county towns and larger natural villages also yield better results in
poverty reduction. A major conclusion is that investing in agricultural activities plays a
significant role in poverty reduction but not necessarily in increasing the average income
in the villages.
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CHAPTER VI
AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS
Evaluating the average treatment effects of the SWPRP at the village level is at
the center of this research. In this chapter, we estimate the average treatment effects using
matching approaches to correct selection bias. Unlike the control function approach in
Chapter 5, the matching approach does not require a specification of the functional form
to model the outcomes. With the propensity scores estimated in Chapter 4, the propensity
score matching estimators are established. The parameters including ATEs, ATTs, and
ATNTs are then estimated. Discussion is focused on the ATTs so that the impacts of the
SWPRP in the project villages are investigated in detail. To extrapolate the impacts on
non-project villages, the ATEs and ATNTs are also discussed. We begin the chapter with
a discussion of the various dimensions of village welfare that the SWPRP was designed
to target and describe the variables in the dataset that can be used as indicators of project
effectiveness. The matching results are then presented and concluding comments are
provided.
6.1

Possible Effects and Measurement
The objective of the SWPRP is to tackle the problem of absolute poverty with a

comprehensive approach that integrates resources and efforts at the village level. Such a
comprehensive approach is expected to generate multidimensional impacts on the project
villages. To detect the impacts, a set of indicators are required to measure the outcomes
from different aspects. Besides measurable, the indicators must have internal validity or,
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in other words, have an effective response to the changes derived from the project
intervention in the project villages. To identify this indicator set, the possible impacts are
reviewed from income and wealth, farming, off-farm employment, development of
infrastructure, education, and healthcare services.
6.1.1

Income and Wealth
The welfare of the households in the project villages should be a function of

income and wealth. According to the Agricultural Operation Division (1995), the annual
net income per capita is less than 320 Yuan (less than $40) in the poor villages before the
SWPRP. By the local standard, the income is not enough to keep warm or free from
hunger. Many previous efforts have been unsuccessful in improving wealth in this region.
The SWPRP integrates a variety of activities at the village level to improve the
households’ capacity to generate income and wealth. If the intervention of the project is
successful, responses should be found in the indicators related to income and wealth in
the villages.
The indicators are identified by investigating how income and wealth are
generated. The households in the poor villages obtain their incomes from two major
sources, farming and off-farm employment. In addition, transfer payments and fishing
and hunting provide other sources of income. However, the amounts from these sources
are usually very small and not available in our dataset. The available measures for
income sources are income from farming, and income from off-farm jobs.
Basically, farming in the poor villages is for subsistence. The majority of farm
products are for self-consumption and only a small part of the farm products are sold for
cash. The food crops such as corn and rice are basically for self-consumption. Even in the
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case of the excess production, households in the poor villages rarely sell the surplus. The
most common way to make use of the excess grains is to feed more animals especially
pigs. Because of inadequate markets, animal products such as pork are smoked and
preserved for later consumption. However, this situation might change with the
development of the local markets. Households might sell their pigs and buy pork from the
markets. The cash crop farming such as herb medicine or sugar cane growing are all
market oriented. In general, the income in the poor villages is derived from income in
kind and cash income.
The income in kind is traditionally a major form of income. As shown in Table
2.1, the income in kind accounts for nearly half of the total income. More than three
quarters12 of the total income is derived from farming. This implies a quarter of total
income is from off-farm employment, accounting for half of the cash income.
Cash is expended for commodities such as farming inputs, necessities, durable
goods, and services such as education and healthcare. Farming inputs are required for
every household engaged in farming. The amount of inputs usually depends on cash
income. The households in the village with extreme scarcity of land resources do not
produce enough food for subsistence, so they have to earn cash to buy food besides
necessities such as salt, oil, and clothes. In this case, households without an off-farm job
have to borrow food during the hungry season usually from February to June.
Housing is a necessity, and good housing conditions are a luxury good. 13 Poor
households usually live in a thatched house walled by bamboo or grass weaving. The
12

The data shows that there are 4.5 members in each household. In Table 2.1, agricultural value is 655 Yuan
per capita, which is about 2950 Yuan per household. The total income per household is the sum of cash
income and income in kind, and is 3880 Yuan. Therefore, the agricultural value accounts for 76 percent of
total income.
13
Buying a house is considered an investment in urban areas. However, housing could not be an investment
in a remote village. The value of a house in the remote village might depreciate rather than appreciate
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better-off households are able to buy materials to build a house of brick-and-tile structure
or even a concrete structure that provides comfortable living conditions. Adequate
transportation is a critical component for the availability of building materials.
Needless to say, televisions are also luxury goods and ownership completely
depends on cash income. Except for the cash income, the ownership of a television also
depends on signal availability and electrical supply. The cost of cable TV is too high in a
small and remote village.
Education and healthcare are luxury goods in the poor villages. Although no
tuition is allow to be charged for primary and middle school education by the
Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, students have to pay fees
for textbooks and other supplies. These fees are a large expenditure for the poor
households. Households with children in school have to plan for the fees by selling
animals or working off farm before the enrollment of each semester. It is not rare for one
child in a family to drop out, so the other children can attend school.
The intervention of the SWPRP intended to increase the agricultural inputs and
off-farm employment. As a result, increases in net income, cash income, and income in
kind would be expected. If this occurs, increases in luxury goods such as television
ownership and housing conditions might also be found. With our available dataset, the
project’s impact on income and wealth is evaluated by examining the ATTs of variables
including poverty rate, net income, cash income, income in kind, percentages of brickand-tile structure, percentages of thatched housings, and the ownership of television in
the project villages.

because of the cost to maintain it.
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6.1.2

Farming
Small scale farming is practiced by individual households for self-sufficiency. As

shown in Table 2.1, farmland for each household is about 5 Mu (about 0.86 acres) on
average. The small size of the farms can be traced to the land reforms in the 1950s and in
the 1980s. Under these reforms, land was collectivized and then re-assigned almost
evenly to each resident inside a village. Since the 1980s’, the land area for each
household has been constant although per capita land area varied with the change in
family size. To support their families, households have to grow everything they need.
Despite the small scale, farming includes a variety of activities categorized into
crop growing and animal farming. The major crops grown are rice on paddy land and
corn, soybean, sweet potato, sugar cane and vegetables on upland. The rice requires
irrigation and flat land and therefore could only be grown in a village with better land
resources. The seasonal yield of rice is about 300 to 400 kilograms of grain per Mu. With
good irrigation, rice is grown twice in a year. As a result, villages that grow rice are better
off. The villages without irrigation have to live on corn grown on upland and are usually
poorer. Due to low land quality, the seasonal yield of corn is about 200-300 kilograms of
grain per Mu. Technically, corn can also be grown twice annually. However, the second
crop depends heavily on rainfall in the fall. Normally, only one in three second crops are
harvested. Corn is the staple food for the people and also for the animals in the poor
villages.
Households raise animals such as pigs, goats, cattle or buffalo, and chickens. Pigs
and goats are the major sources of cash for large expenditures such as school fees,
healthcare, clothes, and festivals in households without off-farm income. Pig farming
relies on corn and side-products such as sweet potatoes. Households usually have
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between 1 and 5 pigs due to the limited amount of land. Goat farming depends on
availability of grass on the mountains and labor required to maintain the goats. In
addition, cattle or buffalo are used to plough the land. One head of cattle or buffalo is
normal in each household.
Technology in the poor villages is simple and labor intensive. The common
variety of corn has been passed down from generations. Corn is cultivated by human
labor and normally fertilized twice with animal manure. Animals are kept in dirty sheds
and are allowed to roam around on fallow land. Pigs are fed twice a day with cooked
food, a mixture of corn with green fodder such as sweet potato stems and leaves and wild
vegetables. Cattle, buffalo, and goats graze on mountainsides and are fed with crop
residuals. Farming with such traditional technology is unproductive.
To increase productivity, the SWPRP supported almost all the major farming
activities with about 45 percent of its total investment. The activities include raising
livestock (e.g. pigs, goats, and cattle) and growing food crops (e.g. rice and corn), fruits
(e.g. longan, litchi, grapes, pomelo, and other subtropical fruits), cash crops (e.g. sugar
cane, vegetables, and medical herbs), and forest products. Besides financial support, the
project provides training to farmers and local technicians. The investment is expected to
bring changes in food crop and cash crop growing and pig, cattle and goat farming. As a
result, grain production and the value of agricultural production should increase. To
verify the possible impacts on agricultural component, we examine the significance of the
ATTs on agricultural output value, grain production per capita, food crop growing area,
cash crop growing area, and the number of pigs, cattle, and goats in stock.

78

6.1.3

Employment
On average, off-farm employment provides about half of a household’s cash

income. For the households with young, skilled, and educated laborers, the share of cash
income from off-farm employment is larger. Two types of off-farm jobs are engaged by
rural laborers depending on the distance from home. The laborers who work near their
homes commute between sites and homes. They might still farm while working full-time
or part-time jobs. Therefore, they are considered as part-time off-farm employed. Their
incomes from off-farm employment are lower. However, they are compensated with
benefits from farming, being with their families, and taking care of their children and the
elders. The laborers employed in urban areas far from their homes stop farming and leave
their families. They are usually full-time off-farm employees and earn higher income. A
part of their income is remitted back to support their families that remain on the farms.
Notice that the laborers are still considered as residents of their original villages even
though they are employed and live in the urban areas. Families are not encouraged to
migrate with the laborers. As a result, the families, especially their children, stay in the
villages to receive education. Off-farm laborers still keep their share of land in the
village.14 The other family members at home often cultivate the land. In essence, the land
system serves as a social security system for the rural population. In the case of an
economic recession, the unemployed rural laborers can return to their villages and earn
their living from farming. Our dataset allow us to investigate the project’s impact on the
percentage of male and female laborers employed in urban areas.

14

By the Law of Land Administration of the People’s Republic of China, the land in a village is collectively
owned by all residents in the village. In practice, land is allocated to every resident and cultivated by
individual households in the village. The land might be re-allocated according changes in village
population.
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6.1.4

Rural Infrastructure
The SWPRP directly sought to improve two types of rural infrastructures, water

supply and roads. As shown in Table 2.1, more than half of the residents in the poor
villages in Guangxi still suffered from a water shortage15 in 2000. The SWPRP addressed
this problem by helping households to construct a water tank of about 30 cubic meters in
size in order to store water for the dry season, which normally continues through fall and
winter to early spring. The SWPRP provided help for the poor villages that did not have
access to a road prior to the project.16 As seen in Table 2.1, as of 2000, there were still
about five months on average in a year when vehicles could not access the poor villages.
The roads that are constructed with the aid from the SWPRP improved the transportation
but did not solve the problem completely. The outcomes of the project in this
infrastructure component are measured by the increase in days accessible by vehicles and
the decrease in the percentage of population with water shortage in the project villages.
6.1.5

Education
Lack of quality primary education is one of the important factors that cause the

problems of low enrollment and completion rate in the poor villages. To address these
problems, the SWPRP provided financial support for primary school renovation and
construction; tuition assistance and in-school nutritional supplements for poor students;
the purchase of textbooks, instructional equipment and furniture; and teacher and school
management training. However, the project stopped providing the in-school nutritional
supplements because the schools lacked the necessary facilities for food preparation, so
the project’s results in this area are derived from the delivery of the other activities. To
15

A village is categorized as having water shortage if it obtains drinking water beyond a horizontal distance
over 1.5 kilometers or a vertical distance over 100 meters for more than 100 days in a year.
16
A village is referred to as not having access to a road if the residents in the village have to walk longer
than 30 minutes to the closest road.
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measure the project’s impact on education, the enrollment rate of primary school is the
only indicator available in our dataset. However, this indicator only measures the change
in primary school attendance. No indicator is available in our dataset to measure the
improvement in education quality, which is very likely true since the project has a large
investment in activities such as teacher training that should lead to an improvement in
education quality.
6.1.6

Healthcare
Unavailability and unaffordability are the major healthcare problems in the

project villages. More complete healthcare services are provided in township hospitals,
which are about 17 kilometers on average away, so healthcare services are not available
in most project villages. A few villages have informal clinics that run by “bare-foot”
doctors who are also part-time farmers. Therefore, it is normal for the residents to travel
for more than one hour for healthcare services. However, even if they have access, the
cost of medical care in the township hospitals is too high for the poor residents to receive
their services.
The SWPRP provided financial support to construct new healthcare facilities, to
renovate the existing facilities, to train healthcare workers and birth attendants, to create
clinics, and strengthen the access of disease prevention and control, maternal and child
healthcare, and healthcare system management at the township and village levels. The
impacts of the SWPRP intervention are expected to be multidimensional, so they must be
measured with different indicators. However, the available data only allow us to measure
the impacts in terms of the population-doctor ratio and the percentage of immunized
children.
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In sum, we identify 21 indicators to measure the outcomes associated with the
SWPRP. In the next section, the impact of the project on these 21 indicators is evaluated
through the matching method.
6.2

Nearest Neighbor and Caliper Matching
To implement the matching approach on the SWPRP is to match the project

villages with the non-project villages and then to contrast the respective outcomes. To
match is to search for similarities or closeness between the project villages and the nonproject villages. Based on assumption (3.26), closeness is measured by differences in
villages’ characteristics, X. However, when X includes multiple variables Rosenbaum &
Rubin (1983) show that the estimation bias does not converge with an increase in sample
size. In order to obtain a converged estimator, they propose matching based on the
closeness of propensity scores (3.29). This section describes nearest neighbor matching
and caliper matching and their uses in evaluating the average treatment effects of the
SWPRP using the propensity scores derived in Chapter 4. Kernel-based matching is
described in the next section.
As in Chapter 3, let y denote a potential outcome, which is a potential outcome of
one of the 21 indicators in Table 2.1. y1 represents the outcome with the project and y0 is
the outcome without the project. Also, let d denote the treatment of the SWPRP, so d=1
represents villages that are treated and d=0 represents villages that are untreated. The
treatment effect on village i is conditional on the propensity score P X , which is
determined by the characteristics, X of village i.
α

y
y

y |X
y |P X

(6.1)

82

Sample wide, the average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT), and the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATNT) are defined
as
ATE
ATT
ATNT

E
E
E
E
E
E

α P
y
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y
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y
X
y
X
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0
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1

(6.3)

0

(6.4)

To calculate equation (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4), the counterfactuals of the project
villages, y |P X , d
y |P X , d

1, and the counterfactuals of the non-project villages,

0 must be estimated. Suppose assumption (3.29) holds, then y |P X , d

1 can be recovered from y |P X , d

0 and y |P X , d

0 from y |P X , d

1.

The variances of the treatment effects are estimated for statistical tests. The
conventional method for variance estimation is bootstrapping. However, Abadie and
Imbens (2006b) show that the bootstrapping method is not appropriate for nearest
neighbor matching. Nevertheless, for the purpose of comparison across methods in this
research, we estimate the variances for all estimators, including nearest neighbor
matching, caliper matching and kernel-based matching, using the bootstrapping method.
In addition to conditioning on the propensity scores to satisfy assumption (3.29),
steps are also taken to ensure that assumption (3.26) is satisfied. As mentioned in Chapter
5, we follow the suggestion by Imbens (2009) to obtain the common support by trimming
the outliers in terms of the propensity scores. Strictly speaking, the common support is
automatically derived in the caliper matching but not in nearest neighbor matching and
kernel-based matching. To be consistent, the trimmed sample is used in all methods
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including control function, nearest neighbor, caliper, and kernel-based matching. Our
trimmed sample includes 325 project villages and 1909 non-project villages.
6.2.1

Estimation of Nearest Neighbor Matching
In nearest neighbor matching, as discussed in Chapter 3, the project villages are

matched with a number (M) of the non-project villages in their neighborhoods, i.e., with
the closest propensity score. The number M is arbitrarily pre-determined and remains the
same for each project village. In order to examine the sensitivity, M is set to 1,3,5,7, and
9 in this research. The distances between the project villages and their Mth closest nonproject villages determine the widths of the neighborhoods in terms of the propensity
scores. For example, if M is 3, the matched neighborhoods for each project village
include 3 non-project villages. The widths of the neighborhoods vary at each project
village and determined by the propensity score difference between the project villages
and their 3rd closest non-project villages. In nearest neighbor matching, the matched
neighborhoods contain a fixed number (M) of closest non-project villages and are
different in widths at different project villages.
After the matched neighborhoods are constructed for each project village, the
treatment effects at each project villages are computed by contrasting the outcomes
between the project villages and the non-project villages in their matched neighborhoods.
The average of these treatment effects at all project villages is the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT). To compute the ATNT, the places of the project villages and
the non-project villages are exchanged. The neighborhoods of the project villages are
constructed for each non-project villages. The outcomes of the non-project villages are
contrasted to their matched project villages in the neighborhoods. The ATE is the average
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over the treatment effects at all villages including the project villages and the non-project
villages. The results with different Ms are given in Table 6.1 for the ATEs, Table 6.2 for
the ATTs, and Table 6.3 for the ATNTs.
To compare the results on the different Ms that determine the neighborhoods, we
cannot find a clear pattern of relationship among the estimated treatment effects,
variance, and number of matches (M). For example, in Table 6.2, as the number of
matches (M) increases, the ATTs on some indicators such as poverty rate and income
decrease and then increase while the ATTs on other indicators such as the value of
agricultural products and the percentage of female labor employed off-farm increase and
then decrease. Theoretically, variances should become smaller as the number of matches
(M) increase. We cannot see such a pattern in our results. The standard error of the ATT
on the poverty rate is 1.43 when M=1, falls to 1.1 when M=3, and increases to 2.7 when
M=7, and falls again to 0.42 when M=9. This instability in variance might be due to the
invalidity of the bootstrapping method as pointed out by Abadie and Imbens (2006b).
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Education and Health Service

***
***
***

***

**

M=5
S.Error
Coef.

M=7
S.Error

Coef.

11.4798
-8.3068

0.6768
0.8950
69.0179 *** 283.4648
4.8784
-1.0533

6.9618
2.7658 ***

5.3523
5.4021

11.3252
-8.1625

6.0281
5.3475

0.2418 ***
0.6377
74.9152 *** 303.7764
5.8252
-0.7559

5.1285 **
0.2489 ***

3.2722
2.0516 ***

M=9
S.Error

12.3064
-7.9611

5.9599
5.5004

9.4569
3.9497 **

0.1191 ***
4.1376

13.3264
-8.0509

5.8825
5.9895

3.9719 ***
4.4022 *

0.1579 ***
2.0752 ***

**
***

***
***
***
**

0.2613 **
0.3909 1.5327
0.4177
0.0486 ***
33.2257 *** 306.6051 22.1797 *** 327.1526 146.4650 **
2.7433
-0.8005 1.4765
-1.1330
4.0236

1.0656 ***
1.9367 ***

0.0134 ***
0.2570 ***

3.4524
2.7990
0.0436
0.0440
0.0676
0.0119
0.0121

-5.0092
0.9373 *** -4.8959 1.5963 *** -5.1304
0.9884 ***
4.3844 10.5337
11.3437 7.3683
15.5384 14.8756
205.3078 80.2413
203.9740 49.4487 *** 195.0849
0.4654 ***
87.0667 101.0052
112.6651 24.7192 *** 137.1217 460.6826
10.1668
2.5221 *** 10.0385 0.0471 *** 10.2319
3.1351 ***
-8.9072
0.8457 *** -8.9265 0.4920 *** -9.0077
3.7438 **
1.2269
3.7146
0.3590 2.1615
-0.2735
0.8413

Coef.

-40.8595 115.3373
-73.1882 102.9278
-93.1272 32.5443 *** -97.1777
-3.8213
5.6380
-5.7579
0.4990 *** -6.6455 6.8434
-8.1981
**
0.1841
0.0227 ***
0.1377
0.0031 ***
0.1304 0.0695 *
0.1356
-0.0454
0.1202
-0.0662
0.0101 *** -0.0789 0.0070 *** -0.0905
**
0.0723
0.0282 **
0.0621
0.0177 ***
0.0590 0.0216 ***
0.0548
-0.0104
0.0023 *** -0.0179
0.0022 *** -0.0242 0.0157
-0.0259
***
0.1490
0.1141
0.1387
0.0574 **
0.1422 0.1214
0.1583

*

2.8756
1.2890 ***

61.0896
5.0590
0.0796
0.1387
0.0367
0.0112
0.0133

2.0164
12.7142
2.8295
98.7557
3.4092
0.0285
0.6349

M=3
S.Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by bootstrapping with 1000 replecations.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

0.8884
242.6122
1.1375

10.4888
-7.7762

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.6784
4.3785

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture
-101.3917
-4.9545
0.1564
-0.0062
0.0872
-0.0099
0.1414

Coef.

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

M=1
S.Error

-3.0272
0.8713 *** -4.5122
2.3281
8.1812
8.0391
183.3309 119.6913
174.0811
129.0824 29.6950 *** 105.1253
8.8734
1.6468 ***
9.9476
-8.3458
1.1452 *** -8.6934
0.9224
2.4589
1.9563

Coef.

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects (ATE) Estimated from Nearest Neighbor Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.1
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M=3
S.Error

5.1541 **
2.2345 ***

1.1611 ***
0.8100 ***

0.0774
0.2653
217.5048 102.6430 **
0.8578
0.9133

12.7823
-11.3932

3.3180
3.3792

-0.0410
212.4089
-3.8595

13.9238
-8.0573

3.2975
3.4847

73.2367
-94.1707
-9.4283
2.2407
0.0788 ***
0.2041
0.0361
-0.0351
0.0076 ***
0.0647
0.0144
-0.0106
0.0167 ***
0.2329

0.2157
83.5922 **
4.8538

0.0146 ***
5.1263

-0.0642
202.8038
-3.2489

12.6874
-7.9626

3.6202
3.7461

*** -100.3091
-4.3033
***
0.1932
**
-0.0354
***
0.0591
-0.0152
***
0.2373

2.1150
0.6656 ***

7.6851
11.9187
0.0242
0.0169
0.0201
0.0080
0.0574

M=5
S.Error

Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Coef.

M=7
S.Error

Coef.

M=9
S.Error

12.8737
-8.3638

6.7879 *
4.5549 *

3.3565
2.2475

13.3434
-9.0486

3.3767
3.4376

1.2857 ***
0.6790 ***

1.0614 ***
1.4846 **

0.1191
0.0035 0.4417
0.1423 0.3286
91.1684 ** 214.9489 42.3147 *** 219.7022 98.0747 **
0.7265 *** -3.6903 1.0474 *** -3.8218 2.6999

0.3893 ***
2.9823 ***

3.4576
3.5934

-97.4747 61.9290
-86.5643 55.0547
-2.1460 4.1897
-1.1902 3.9858
***
0.2013 0.0477 ***
0.2023 0.0270 ***
*** -0.0341 0.0108 *** -0.0365 0.0188 *
***
0.0614 0.0246 **
0.0667 0.0536
-0.0165 0.0179
-0.0173 0.0108
**
0.2321 0.0703 ***
0.2228 0.0918 **
0.9669 ***
0.6324 ***

67.6635
4.9349
0.0696
0.0070
0.0106
0.0200
0.1085

-2.5720
2.3322
-2.6727 2.6707
-3.1837 0.4193 ***
14.2747 18.4648
18.1805 11.8694
23.5577 8.1239 ***
180.9195 104.2807 *
182.4723 65.9597 *** 197.9425 15.1085 ***
120.8759
6.7809 *** 143.8425 64.9365 ** 145.2282 23.2252 ***
8.1931
1.4726 ***
7.7582 3.9165 **
7.6617 0.7429 ***
-7.2931
0.1691 *** -7.2040 3.2758 **
-7.0797 2.4988 ***
-0.0471
1.5695
-0.0722 0.6538
-0.2829 0.2198

Coef.

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by bootstrapping with 1000 replications.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

Education and Health Service

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture
-85.2999
2.3661
0.2148
-0.0422
0.0339
-0.0099
0.2354

Coef.

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

M=1
S.Error

-5.1981
1.4335 *** -2.8183
1.1046 **
17.6819 20.9492
16.4062 14.9743
227.2038 231.1420
177.3797 150.8606
144.7790 58.9320 ** 157.2263 87.6201 *
10.5721
3.0992 ***
9.0068
0.5851 ***
-10.7617
2.7148 *** -7.7301
4.3867 *
0.8324
1.9628
-0.4964
3.6993

Coef.

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Estimated from Nearest Neighbor Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.2
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M=3
S.Error
Coef.

M=5
S.Error
Coef.

M=7
S.Error

Coef.

Education and Health Service

2.8748 ***
5.4183

4.5197
2.9094 **

1.0543
0.8796
295.5618 166.7451 *
-0.5756
1.5698

11.0637
-8.3493

5.7022
5.7286

0.7572
320.9667
-0.3315

11.0933
-8.1965

6.4380
5.6201

54.7021
-68.5710
5.3571
-6.0056
0.0007 ***
0.1283
0.0048 *** -0.0715
0.0291 **
0.0627
0.0078
-0.0183
0.1556
0.1219

12.2098
-7.8925
0.7023
0.4569
26.9944 *** 322.2092
3.6439
-0.3085

1.9833 ***
2.7485 ***

6.3859
5.8250

*
-92.3870
*
-7.4115
***
0.1183
*
-0.0865
***
0.0586
-0.0255
0.1269
3.7847 *
2.5065 **

35.9254
3.2326
0.0047
0.0431
0.0071
0.0169
0.2239

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

7.8380
6.4674

1.5829 **
0.3595 ***

54.4054 *
-31.7835
6.3262
-2.8667
0.0104 ***
0.1806
0.0782
-0.0472
0.0700
0.0736
0.0145
-0.0104
0.0933
0.1347

1.0265
0.6838
246.8866 132.0248 *
1.1852
1.2407

10.0984
-7.1604

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.7398
4.5486

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture

13.3235
-7.8810

***
***
***
***
***
***

1.3055 ***
1.8466 ***

1.8709 ***
1.5019 ***

67.4750
12.1867
0.1051
0.0444 **
0.0676
0.0208
0.0163 ***

1.8589
1.2607
18.4527
13.7385
2.2649
0.2426
0.2088

M=9
S.Error

0.8952
0.4646
0.0063 ***
64.9456 *** 345.4456 223.8181
2.3344
-0.6753
0.4466

7.4517
5.0262

6.3091
6.4240

-98.9846
-9.3911
0.1242
**
-0.0997
**
0.0528
*** -0.0274
0.1473
***

0.4281 ***
0.0158 ***

56.8413
1.0758
0.1306
0.0416
0.0274
0.0089
0.1755

-104.1312
-6.2008
0.1464
-0.0001
0.0963
-0.0099
0.1254

Coef.

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

M=1
S.Error

-2.6576
1.1070 **
-4.8005
3.0868
-5.4242
5.1844
-5.2744
0.0689 *** -5.4618
-0.2858
2.9815
6.6147
5.1827
2.7007 30.0388
10.1797 19.8702
14.1731
175.8617 179.8000
173.5195 147.0004
209.4599 132.8210
207.6346 40.7974 *** 194.5984
126.4100 40.5630 *** 96.2553 148.5910
81.3108 46.3459 *
107.3573 101.4217
135.7415
8.5842
1.1113 *** 10.1078
0.5158 *** 10.5029
0.8372 *** 10.4267
1.2481 *** 10.6695
-7.9345
0.1124 *** -8.8574
3.2594 *** -9.1820
2.0581 *** -9.2197
1.2601 *** -9.3359
0.9377
1.8576
2.3738
6.5695
1.4438
0.0786 ***
0.4324
0.1492 *** -0.2720

Coef.

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects on the Untreated (ATNT) Estimated from Nearest Neighbor Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.3

6.2.2

Estimation of Caliper Matching
Caliper matching is used to prevent particularly bad matches that might occur in

nearest neighbor matching. Nearest neighbor matching allows the widths of matched
neighborhoods to vary freely. The widths of the neighborhoods might be too big so that
the matching actually contrasts villages with very different characteristics. Calipers are
used to limit matching within a tolerated distance. The size of the caliper is also
determined arbitrarily.
As noted by Smith and Todd (2005), determining a priori the caliper size is
difficult because a tradeoff occurs. A smaller caliper width excludes some observations
that may be good matches and a large caliper width may include poor matches. The
results of matching with the caliper set at 0.00005, 0.0001, 0.005, and 0.001 are reported
in Table 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 for the ATEs, the ATTs, and the ATNTs respectively.
Similar to nearest neighbor matching, the findings here do not show a clear
relationship among the caliper, treatment effects, and their variances. As shown in Table
6.5, when the size of caliper increases, ATTs on cash income starts with 342 Yuan, falls
to 108 Yuan, and then increases to about 199 Yuan. The standard error is as small as 0.4
and as large as 112. In essence, caliper matching is a type of nearest neighbor matching,
and this instability of the variances may also result from the failure of bootstrapping.
The results from nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching vary
dramatically with the number of matches and the size of the caliper, both a priori
decisions. Employing a different matching technique, kernel-based matching, which uses
all observations as matches with appropriate weights, may lead to more consistent results.
This method is used in the next section.
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Education and Health Service
0.9588
53.7605
8.1440

5.1693 **
0.5490 ***

4.5045
0.4311 ***

0.8446
96.4283
1.7223

15.0447
-2.2343

1.6828
5.3285

1.4200
60.9719
2.8906

9.8173
0.3318 ***

2.3154
5.2962

15.4027
1.7322

1.9754
5.8898

1.8548
1.8472
175.5383 134.3379
2.4540
1.0029 **

18.7958
-2.4108

1.9378
5.1813

Calper=0.005
Coef.
S.Error

85.31759
2.956513
0.131343
0.000193 ***
0.046486 *
0.018869
0.055621

1.875504 3.080246
119.0501 60.11946 **
1.290657 4.783388

15.63558 5.919014 ***
2.245859 6.033747

2.032205 0.617089 ***
5.393739 4.124411

*** -60.8611
*** 2.977792
*
-0.088252
-0.017579
-0.082168
*** -0.011113
-0.065287

19.9675
0.1218 ***

2.6600
6.2348

36.7788
0.2169
0.0530
0.0330
0.0822
0.0050
0.1222

1.9880
2.4409
155.2844 139.4541
1.9790
1.9050

17.6750
-0.6586

1.1092
5.0510

-126.1537
3.6700
-0.0883
0.0028
-0.0810
-0.0167
-0.0632

-11.6081
7.9327
-8.853163 8.702242
11.6261
1.1781 *** 10.03806 9.261395
280.5983 101.4352
220.3749 55.11263 ***
-161.9078 143.7136
-208.7079 252.9277
13.6662
7.3661 *
17.11965 8.19312 **
-17.6533 12.1265
-20.08474 12.12837 *
15.8311 15.2442
14.54216 9.519751

Calper=0.001
Coef.
S.Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

0.5500
53.2054
4.5985

11.3857
-2.6059

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.0003
3.5433

Off-farm Employment

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

83.6019 *
4.6687
0.1243
0.0392
0.0747
0.0221
0.0538

-11.2536
7.1705
8.3022
4.3488 *
270.7179 263.4658
-188.0310 336.7333
14.9931 13.3732
-17.8281 16.7259
14.9974 13.3547

Calper=0.0005
Coef.
S.Error

28.9185 *** -142.8920
2.3382 *
3.2618
0.0082 ***
-0.0682
0.0267
0.0003
0.0849
-0.0718
0.0228
-0.0127
0.0090
-0.0499

-6.6358
3.7711 *
-2.9812 15.7179
160.4484 104.6139
-81.4209 224.6798
15.2020 10.5942
-16.9904 13.0635
10.4064
6.7487

Calper=0.0001
Coef.
S.Error

37.8100 ** -170.4892
30.2062
-4.2283
0.1225
0.0256
0.0271
0.0051
0.0036 ***
-0.0537
0.0480
-0.0092
0.0095
0.0076

-90.6751
0.2266
0.0384
-0.0289
-0.0094
-0.0054
0.0052

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Agriculture

-5.9853
1.9840 ***
-0.4260 18.5729
319.4623 249.1942
-10.3319 150.2317
14.5243 10.3808
-16.5936
9.4608 *
6.0394
8.3677

Calper=0.00005
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects (ATE) Estimated from Caliper Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.4
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Calper=0.001
Coef.
S.Error

Education and Health Service
-0.1351
176.7203
0.7619

11.5045
-8.2591

1.6651
3.5513

Calper=0.005
Coef.
S.Error

14.6748
-8.9967

3.6594
3.1715

1.0288 ***
1.4373 ***

1.8207 ***
0.7813 ***

13.2607
-9.3225

3.2996
3.0020

1.5514 ***
1.7819 ***

2.6330
0.9214 ***

68.5165
10.1813
0.0952 **
0.0302
0.0483
0.0086 **
0.1170 **

12.5167
-8.9062

3.0934
3.5279

2.5749 ***
1.1890 ***

0.8964 ***
0.6896 ***

-93.0299 46.6938 **
1.1708 0.3712 ***
0.2156 0.0083 ***
-0.0449 0.0090 ***
0.0773 0.0198 ***
-0.0175 0.0069 **
0.2319 0.0046 ***

0.3691
0.5325 0.1974 ***
0.5964
0.6933
0.2011 1.2486
6.1364 *** 244.3568 91.7663 *** 213.7197 102.2104 ** 227.4030 12.7937 ***
5.1443
0.3342 1.6873
-1.6879
0.3255 *** -2.9064 0.1345 ***

3.1539 ***
0.1327 ***

3.3567
1.4840 **

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

8.6360
3.4790 ***

-0.3817
0.4389
162.6673 114.9569
1.7914
6.1119

8.9756
-9.3181

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

2.2187
1.8766

Off-farm Employment

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

7.1322
4.0880

-56.2455 185.0128
-153.3147 140.7647
-92.7946 55.2955 *
-81.5971
1.3953 11.6810
-2.0161 3.2149
-1.5983
3.7602 32.4014
0.2631
0.1038 **
0.2169
0.0983 **
0.2116 0.0973 **
0.2136
-0.0347
0.0117 ***
-0.0504
0.0111 *** -0.0331 0.0382
-0.0376
0.0905
0.1014
0.0506
0.0112 ***
0.0624 0.0336 *
0.0663
-0.0094
0.0659
-0.0158
0.0057 *** -0.0137 0.0043 *** -0.0183
0.1530
0.1281
0.2713
0.1971
0.2411 0.0811 ***
0.2314

Agriculture

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

***
***
***
***
**

Calper=0.0005
Coef.
S.Error

-2.5967
1.9382
-3.8068 1.8599 **
-3.5123
2.3786
-2.9879 0.7477 ***
4.5494
4.3846
15.3946 21.6785
19.5577 13.1839
22.6591 7.1764 ***
108.4397 112.3318
168.0011 17.6742 *** 199.0965 72.2084 *** 199.3158 12.0769 ***
172.5034 11.7231 *** 154.5288 63.2474 ** 153.9251 132.1687
147.3804 18.9235 ***
10.3407
1.2871 *** 11.1606 2.9804 ***
9.4106
0.9332 ***
7.3095 2.4308 ***
-10.3062
1.2847 *** -9.6312 1.9046 *** -8.6685
0.6676 *** -7.0735 2.3541 ***
1.2363
5.1174
0.6003 0.8666
0.1734
3.8221
-0.4070 0.5539

Calper=0.0001
Coef.
S.Error

-2.5197
14.5958
342.3210
186.2795
10.4538
-9.3606
-1.5339

5.7200
35.3702
0.3759
13.2488
3.1694
0.6114
0.5964

Calper=0.00005
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Estimated from Caliper Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.5

92

Education and Health Service
2.0264
2.0406 ***
9.6082

16.1222
3.3822

2.4392
2.4082 **

18.8468
1.2848

6.4688
10.0258

1.4312
2.5996
48.3554 111.9033
2.2973
1.3680 *

17.1643
1.3729

1.6934
6.3926

21.0741
3.3532

2.1545
7.6011

90.3021 *
4.8196
0.1142
0.0372
0.1044
0.0318
0.0820 *

2.2404
2.3518
155.4662 154.7077
3.0723
1.8282 *

19.9978
-0.4899

1.4357
5.7675

-180.7721 150.9404
-157.5038
-7.5953
3.7537 **
4.8012
0.0607
-0.1498
-0.0890
0.0383
0.0306
0.0100
-0.1161
0.1414
-0.1110
-0.0052
0.0362
-0.0124
-0.1502
0.1247
-0.1348

-13.4255
9.9175
6.2335 14.3048
300.6769 358.2041
-287.9442 411.5682
16.1109 16.8728
-20.2188 21.5218
19.1965 16.8608

Calper=0.0005
Coef.
S.Error

Calper=0.005
Coef.
S.Error

*

**
**
***

24.4669
0.0075 ***

2.7401
7.5070

61.8585
2.1214
0.0322
0.0476
0.0858
0.0084
0.1727

2.2926
2.8353
142.4928 150.8050
2.7817
2.1810

18.6413
1.2380

0.6297
5.4996

-135.9073
4.8233
-0.1544
0.0116
-0.1133
-0.0164
-0.1276

2.1607
100.5925
2.0056

16.1669
4.1456

1.8514
5.7116

3.3928
73.1907
5.6237

7.3852 **
7.2500

0.8842 **
4.9550

-55.3812 108.3947
3.2856
3.5288
-0.1400
0.1545
-0.0129
0.0017 ***
-0.1093
0.0574 *
-0.0100
0.0210
-0.1159
0.0650 *

-13.3802
9.0636
-9.8523 10.3249
9.8898
4.5370 **
7.8881 12.1658
298.4392 106.0857 *** 223.9622 66.7237 ***
-231.0443 202.7694
-269.3664 298.9344
14.5977
8.8471 *
18.7908 10.0058 *
-19.6201 14.7175
-22.3012 14.6007
19.2586 17.6029
17.0887 11.2183

Calper=0.001
Coef.
S.Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

1.2428
-28.1894
6.6859

13.1779
2.3852

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.5815
4.7827

Off-farm Employment

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

78.4523
28.6546
0.1241
0.0587
0.0819
0.0339
0.1113

-116.2766
-2.4009
-0.1287
-0.0246
-0.0836
-0.0025
-0.1046

Agriculture

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Calper=0.0001
Coef.
S.Error

-8.5623
0.8103 ***
-9.0540
7.4131
-11.5962
5.9754 *
-7.4899 31.4552
302.4647 451.2081
191.5874 256.5977
-156.5301 269.7953
-233.4521 363.8734
17.5510 15.9326
18.1126 16.7621
-21.9720 17.1218
-20.9925 20.7982
11.6708 14.1583
15.8968 14.2143

Calper=0.00005
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects on the Untreated (ATNT) Estimated from Caliper Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.6

6.3

Kernel-Based Matching
Nearest neighbor and caliper matching are based on strong assumptions. Apart

from independency between outcome and treatment, the matching assumptions also
require that all relevant variables are included in X. However, the inclusion of all relevant
variables in X is not always guaranteed. For example, the local weather is a variable that
should be included in the characteristic set of the project villages in the SWPRP.
Unfortunately, such a dataset is unavailable at the village level. To relax the observability
restriction, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) proposed using kernel-based
matching models including conventional kernel matching, local linear regression
matching, and regression-adjusted local linear matching. In this section, these three
methods are used to investigate the treatment effects of the SWPRP.
Kernel-based matching requires weaker assumptions than assumptions (3.26) for
the nearest neighbor matching. Suppose the parameter to be evaluated is ATT,
assumption (3.26), which requires both y1 and y0 are independent of the treatment d given
X, under kernel-based matching, can be relaxed to
y

d|X.

(6.5)

i.e., it only requires that the outcomes of the non-project villages be independent of the
project village selection process. In other words, the counterfactuals of the project
villages are required to have the same distribution as the outcomes of the non-project
villages. This requirement is sufficient to estimate the ATT because the distribution of the
project villages after the project is observable.
Assumption (3.26) can also be relaxed by invoking the assumption of additive
separability between the observable and unobservable variables. Under the additive
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separability assumption, the outcomes are determined by two additively separate
components, the observable and unobservable components. Suppose a linear functional
form, the equation (3.1) and 3.2) can be rewritten as
y
y
α

where

Xβ
Xβ

(6.6)
(6.7)

u and

u . As before, u1 and u0 denote the unobservable

variables and i is the index for the villages. Combining (6.6) and (6.7) with (3.26) and the
additive separability assumption derives,
d|X
d|X

y
y

Xβ
Xβ

U
U

d|X
d|X

(6.8)
(6.9)

Assumption (3.26) becomes
,

d|X

(6.10)

Assumption (6.10) requires the independency of the unobservables on the
treatment, e.g. local weather conditions. The regression-adjusted local linear matching
discussed later is based on this assumption. In which, the observable component X β will
be removed and the residuals (U1 and U0) are matched to estimate the treatment effects.
In contrast to the weaker independence condition, kernel-based matching requires
stricter overlapping of the treated and untreated subsamples, compared to nearest
neighbor matching and caliper matching. Theoretically, the kernel-based matching might
estimate each counterfactual using all observations in the control sample. If the control
sample includes outliers, shown by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), the
kernel-based matching is a biased estimator. To be consistent, the dataset for kernelbased matching is trimmed as in Chapter 5. The same dataset for the control function
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approach and matching approach discussed above is also used in the following kernel
matching, local linear regression matching, and regression-adjusted local linear matching.
6.3.1

Kernel Matching
Both nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching estimate the counterfactuals

using only the closest villages in the control sample and equal weights are assigned to
each matched village in the neighborhoods. For example, a project village i is matched
with the M non-project villages in its nearest neighborhood. The counterfactual of the
project village can be calculated using
E y X, d

0

∑
∑

-

y |X, d
y |X, d

0
0

(6.11)

where, j is the index for the villages in the nearest neighborhood and j=1,2…M. The
weight for each village is 1/M. In nearest neighbor matching, M is pre-determined and
the distance of each non-project village from the project village varies. Therefore, these
non-project villages of different distances are given the same weight 1/M. In caliper
matching, M varies and the width of the nearest neighborhood is held constant. This
results in that the weights are constant for each non-project village in the same
neighborhood but vary in different neighborhoods. Giving different villages the same
weights implies the assumption that all the villages in the neighborhood bear the same
information and that the villages beyond the nearest neighborhood are uninformative and
can be excluded. This seems an unreasonable assumption.
Kernel matching does not rely on these assumptions. In conventional kernel
matching, the weights are determined by the distances and all villages in the control
sample are used to estimate the counterfactuals for project villages. As given in Chapter
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1/ ) in equation (6.11) are replaced by the weights derived from a

3, the weights (
kernel function
w

(6.12)

∑

where, h is the bandwidth, which can vary or be constant. To avoid complications, we use
a constant bandwidth in this research. The choice of the bandwidth h is discussed below.
pi and pj present the propensity scores for village i and j. M equals the sample size of the
non-project villages, n0. Different forms of kernel function can be specified. However,
this research uses the Gaussian function as given in (3.35).
K

e

√

(6.13)

The counterfactual estimated in weighted form was given in Chapter 3 and repeated
below,
E y |d

1

∑

w y |d

0

(6.14)

The kernel weight is in fact the kernel regression written in the weight form.
Arg min
∑
μ

y

μ

K

(6.15)

where pj is the propensity score of a non-project village and pi is the propensity score of a
village at which the counterfactual is to be estimated. The regression in equation (6.15) is
a point-wise estimator for the counterfactual of village i. Solving the minimizing problem
in (6.15) for μ derives the estimator in equation (6.14). The estimated μ is the estimator
for the counterfactual E y |P X , d

1.

Similarly, a kernel regression can be established for y |P X , d
counterfactual E y |P X , d

1. The

0 can then be predicted from the kernel model using the

P(X) of the non-project villages.
96

In kernel regression, the bandwidth h must be pre-determined. Jones, Marron, and
Sheather (1996) show that the variance is large if h is too small and that the bias is large
if h is too large. At the same time, they also indicate that h can be smaller if the sample
size is large. In the case of propensity scores, the values are restricted between 0 and 1.
Todd (1999) suggests either a fixed bandwidth from 0.2 to 0.4 or to vary the bandwidth at
each observation according to the density. However, Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd (1998)
use a fixed bandwidth of 0.06 in their evaluation of a labor training program. For the
convenience of comparison across methods, a fixed bandwidth is applied in the kernel
matching, local linear regression matching, and regression-adjusted local linear matching.
Sensitivity will be examined by comparing the results of h=0.02, 0.08, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6.
With the counterfactuals and the measured outcomes, the treatment effects in
equation (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4) are calculated. The results for different indicators are
given in Table 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9. The interpretation of these results is discussed in section
6.5. In comparison with the results of nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching,
the estimates of the treatment effects and the variances are quite consistent across
different bandwidths. The variances converge to a smaller value when the bandwidths
increase. Therefore, they are not very sensitive to the bandwidths. This conclusion holds
for the ATE, ATT, and ATNT.
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-78.2889
-4.1917
0.1600
-0.0516
0.0740
-0.0120
0.1395

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Education and Health Service

***
***

***

**

-5.2800
11.4993
201.4704
161.7537
10.4183
-9.0703
0.4902

0.8557
64.6051 ***
2.2393

3.7539 ***
2.2774 ***

2.0773 ***
1.6354 ***

0.5647
291.5902
-0.6271

12.6902
-8.9212

6.2533
5.9238

75.8009
-105.9338
7.6723
-4.4534
0.0567 ***
0.1707
0.0584
-0.0882
0.0332 **
0.0637
0.0105
-0.0227
0.0574 **
0.1424

2.0609
19.2705
70.5582
104.4537
3.1761
3.1140
1.7534

-5.6013
13.7397
221.4403
184.1831
10.7898
-9.9017
1.7021

0.8187
62.0041 ***
2.5614

2.9267 ***
2.1167 ***

0.7374
279.9670
-0.7169

13.3114
-9.9258

7.0958
6.3937

13.4563
-9.9226
0.7220
0.6490
54.8537 *** 279.2927
2.6747
-1.5540

2.6002 ***
1.9049 ***

7.4533
6.3834

-98.6619
-4.3885
***
0.2118
*** -0.1036
*
0.0638
**
-0.0288
***
0.1526

**

***
***
**
***
***

**

***
*
***
***

***

0.6576
51.0867 ***
2.0257 ***

2.3840 ***
1.8433 ***

1.3538 ***
1.1449 ***

45.0504
6.2185
0.0462
0.0219
0.0314
0.0095
0.0474

1.7006
12.3274
60.0660
84.6441
2.3558
2.3019
1.5160

Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S. Error
-5.1508
9.5190
*** 214.7539
*
147.9214
*** 10.0251
*** -9.6738
1.5533

***

1.4351 ***
1.3029 ***

43.2996
6.5609
0.0524
0.0236
0.0399
0.0107
0.0459

1.7288
13.3200
60.0466
99.6934
2.4532
2.4064
1.5876

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S. Error

-107.6225
-1.8533
**
0.1960
***
-0.0988
**
0.0748
**
-0.0253
***
0.1337

**

***
***

***

***

1.5232 ***
1.5528 ***

49.3318
6.7390
0.0529
0.0311
0.0320
0.0110
0.0517

1.7224
15.9224
62.6138
113.3874
2.6577
2.6037
1.6146

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S. Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

0.8599
290.4881
-0.8594

11.1257
-8.0792

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

5.4586
5.1964

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture

-4.4105
1.5173
193.3024
82.8090
9.4610
-8.2924
1.6036

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S. Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects (ATE) Estimated from Kernel Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.7

0.7179
286.5497
-1.7512

14.5279
-9.7710

7.7097
6.3388

-103.9455
-7.8045
0.2110
-0.1071
0.0607
-0.0312
0.1607

-4.7087
9.9650
223.8321
118.0080
9.8206
-9.7093
1.3712

***
***
**
***
***

**

***
***

***

***

0.5996
51.0034 ***
1.8257 ***

2.2779 ***
1.8258 ***

1.3661 ***
1.0955 ***

45.1544
6.0111
0.0457
0.0216
0.0279
0.0097
0.0446

1.6735
11.9050
59.5838
79.4205
2.2709
2.2349
1.4602

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S. Error
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-85.1847
-1.2641
0.2065
-0.0404
0.0686
-0.0194
0.2302

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Education and Health Service

***
**
**
**
**

***
***

*
*
***

0.5418
55.9122 ***
2.1462

2.1769 ***
1.8271 ***

1.3616 **
1.1337 ***

62.7467
5.3407
0.0439
0.0205
0.0271
0.0094
0.1070

1.7015
11.4793
67.9652
77.7757
2.2576
2.2992
1.4474

0.1185
238.4022
-3.1063

13.3662
-8.9674

3.5928
3.6518

-87.7079
-1.9776
0.2016
-0.0430
0.0762
-0.0193
0.2402

-2.8161
25.1980
214.8655
129.9844
8.8333
-8.2584
-0.3502

13.6606
-9.0135
0.5159
0.0825
52.7175 *** 240.6141
2.1827
-2.5628

2.1075 ***
1.7534 ***

3.7490
3.5889

-90.8110
-3.3711
***
0.1992
**
-0.0417
***
0.0799
**
-0.0196
**
0.2547

13.7932
-8.7392
0.5111
0.1451
49.8317 *** 246.8694
1.9905
-2.1418

2.0657 ***
1.7268 ***

3.9453
3.5337

-87.4747
-6.7169
***
0.1849
**
-0.0470
***
0.0778
**
-0.0222
**
0.2698

14.2584
-8.6172
0.5168
0.1864
51.1312 *** 251.0741
1.8599
-1.9165

2.0644 ***
1.7354 ***

4.0382
3.6092

-83.4856
-10.4917
***
0.1741
**
-0.0542
***
0.0771
**
-0.0262
**
0.2843

**
***
**
***
**
**

***
***

**
***

0.5171
50.6474 ***
1.7705

2.0445 ***
1.7184 ***

1.2822 ***
1.0649 ***

60.4850
5.2701
0.0423
0.0199
0.0255
0.0088
0.1070

1.5870
10.7409
64.7028
76.1095
2.0880
2.1309
1.3684

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S. Error
-0.9902
**
26.0848
*** 254.4713
75.3793
***
9.9660
*** -9.3315
-0.3912

1.2924 ***
1.0737 ***

60.8746
5.2034
0.0425
0.0197
0.0255
0.0089
0.1071

1.5980
10.8966
65.1456
75.1200
2.1121
2.1636
1.3773

Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S. Error
-1.6871
**
26.6659
*** 237.9326
102.4508
***
9.8413
*** -9.1456
-0.2909

1.2843 ***
1.0663 ***

60.8201
5.3293
0.0437
0.0193
0.0257
0.0098
0.1022

1.5876
10.9716
66.0991
75.3933
2.1130
2.1712
1.4351

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S. Error
*
-2.4722
**
26.8948
*** 227.7501
*
122.7582
***
9.3868
*** -8.6927
-0.2481

1.3133 ***
1.0937 ***

61.0431
5.1540
0.0427
0.0197
0.0259
0.0090
0.1070

1.6208
11.0312
65.8363
75.0467
2.1579
2.1967
1.4129

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S. Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

0.1241
239.6651
-2.6585

13.0713
-8.7957

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.1679
3.5504

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture

-2.9246
22.4683
196.4759
123.9570
8.1196
-7.6685
0.0391

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S. Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Estimated from Kernel Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.8
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Education and Health Service
0.9559
70.6896 ***
2.4140

4.2329 **
2.4955 ***

2.3459 **
1.8268 ***

0.6406
300.6453
-0.2050

12.5751
-8.9133

6.7062
6.3106

-109.0366
-4.8749
0.1654
-0.0959
0.0616
-0.0232
0.1258

-6.1340
11.5001
220.3661
194.6404
11.0287
-10.1075
2.0341

0.8991
66.2814 ***
2.7571

3.1819 ***
2.2585 ***

0.8488
286.6667
-0.4027

13.2519
-10.0811

7.6656
6.8712

-5.7404
6.5998
210.8078
155.6626
10.0564
-9.7637
1.8673

0.4710 *
60.4776 ***
3.4696

2.4753 ***
1.4967 ***

0.7348
284.8126
-1.4540

13.3989
-10.1241

8.0506
6.8686

-5.3418
7.2206
218.6158
125.2654
9.7959
-9.7736
1.6713

0.6953
52.2641 ***
2.1136

2.4938 ***
1.9080 ***

0.8084
292.5893
-1.7231

14.5738
-9.9675

8.3348
6.8035

***
***
*
**
**

**

***
***

***

***

0.6248
51.9678 ***
1.8778

2.3613 ***
1.8794 ***

1.4082 ***
1.1256 ***

43.3369
6.2430
0.0471
0.0224
0.0288
0.0101
0.0397

1.7208
12.3048
60.6520
81.6134
2.3441
2.2970
1.5099

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S. Error

*** -107.4287
-7.3470
***
0.2173
***
-0.1161
*
0.0579
**
-0.0320
**
0.1396

***
*
***
***

***

1.4023 ***
1.1905 ***

43.4237
6.5235
0.0480
0.0229
0.0332
0.0098
0.0433

1.7608
12.8626
61.4174
88.2915
2.4522
2.3831
1.5836

Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S. Error

*** -100.5664
-3.9922
***
0.2164
***
-0.1133
*
0.0614
**
-0.0299
**
0.1326

***
**
***
***

***

1.6362 ***
1.1699 ***

38.0710
6.3976
0.0595
0.0185
0.0441
0.0110
0.0463

1.9846
13.3584
48.7356
98.3650
3.5510
2.9653
1.4760

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S. Error

-110.4846
-1.5949
***
0.1954
***
-0.1085
*
0.0739
**
-0.0263
***
0.1131

**

1.6294 ***
1.7020 ***

50.0584
7.2798
0.0567
0.0341
0.0341
0.0118
0.0459

-5.6995
1.8103 ***
9.1671 17.3707
199.1899 65.3508 ***
167.1623 124.5041
10.6881
2.8598 ***
-9.2085
2.7907 ***
0.6333
1.7278

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S. Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

0.9852
299.1405
-0.5531

10.7945
-7.9573

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

5.8486
5.4766

Off-farm Employment

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

84.7144
8.5534
0.0628 **
0.0667
0.0361 **
0.0115
0.0564 **

-77.1149
-4.6901
0.1521
-0.0535
0.0750
-0.0107
0.1241

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Agriculture

-4.6634
2.2689 **
-2.0495 21.6370
192.7621 76.6438 **
75.8038 115.4073
9.6893
3.5475 ***
-8.3986
3.4680 **
1.8699
1.9465

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S. Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Average Treatment Effects on the Untreated (ATNT) Estimated from Kernel Matching

Wealth and Income

Table 6.9

6.3.2

Local Linear Regression Matching
Attention should be paid to the boundary observations under kernel matching.

Unlike the interior points on the overlapping region, which are smoothed from two sides,
the boundary points are smoothed from one side. Fan (1992) finds that bias may occur at
the boundary points because kernel matching does not converge at the same order as the
interior points. Furthermore, the kernel regression does not converge at the same order at
the points with different densities. Fan shows that the local linear regression is more
efficient.
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) proposed to incorporate the local linear
regression in matching. To estimate the counterfactuals for the project village, the model
runs a weighted regression of the outcomes of the non-project villages on the propensity
scores.
rg min
∑
μ ,μ

y

μ

μ p

p

K

(6.16)

where pj is the propensity score of a non-project village and pi is the propensity score of a
village at which the counterfactual is to be estimated. The bandwidth is the same as the
one used with conventional kernel matching. The regression in equation (6.16) is a pointwise estimator for the counterfactual of village i. To solve the argument minimizing
problem in (6.16), a complicated equation for the weight is given by Heckman, Ichimura,
and Todd (1998) as
w

∑

∑
∑

∑
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(6.17)

The weights calculated with equation (6.17) are used to estimate the
counterfactuals for the project villages in equation (6.11). A similar procedure is used to
estimate the counterfactuals for the non-project villages.
With the estimated counterfactuals, the treatment effects are computed in equation
(6.14). The estimated treatment effects are given in Table 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12. In local
linear regression matching, the estimated ATTs are stable with different bandwidth sizes.
Similar to the findings by Jones, Marron and Sheather (1996), the variances are larger
when the bandwidth is either too small or too large. However, this trend is only found in
ATTs. The variances of ATEs and ATNTs decline with the bandwidth size. The sample
size of the project villages and the non-project villages may play a role in the difference
of variances.
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Education and Health Service
0.8177
293.7150
-0.6659

12.1551
-7.0134

5.4745
4.9887

-97.2523
-5.8114
0.1584
-0.0092
0.0864
-0.0156
0.1426

0.9995
76.9754 ***
2.1759

4.2740 ***
2.6958 ***

2.4047 **
1.9281 ***

0.4853
298.3084
-0.3882

12.0077
-7.6861

5.7580
5.2701

0.9792
69.3759 ***
2.5311

3.3090 ***
2.3245 ***

0.6960
287.4565
-0.1582

12.7260
-9.0611

6.3707
5.9710

0.8033
64.5035 ***
2.7394

3.0209 ***
2.2548 ***

0.5889
278.5817
-0.6725

12.0729
-9.6059

6.5140
6.1884

***
**
*
**
**

**

0.8117
58.2258 ***
2.7544

2.9088 ***
1.9866 ***

1.5225 ***
1.4472 ***

45.5010
7.0145
0.0558
0.0340
0.0396
0.0107
0.0599

-5.4409
1.8474 ***
13.4142 14.8586
201.6907 61.5622 ***
172.5100 111.0907
10.7274
2.6860 ***
-9.4731
2.6419 ***
1.3647
1.7461

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S.Error

-103.4500
-1.1538
***
0.1790
*
-0.0821
*
0.0765
*
-0.0235
**
0.1480

**

1.6704 ***
1.6110 ***

46.5942
7.1527
0.0571
0.0395
0.0421
0.0114
0.0542

-5.2269
1.9536 ***
16.0020 15.5623
208.3710 64.5541 ***
155.9819 123.7500
10.7322
2.7109 ***
-9.2545
2.6027 ***
1.1668
1.7643

Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S.Error

-113.9348
-2.8171
**
0.1640
-0.0742
*
0.0783
*
-0.0221
***
0.1377

*

1.8238 ***
1.8710 ***

60.1549
7.5235
0.0584
0.0598
0.0326
0.0120
0.0578

-4.3270
2.0217 **
11.7604 18.0415
192.3701 65.3030 ***
83.8307 130.3166
9.5683
2.9164 ***
-8.0059
2.8674 ***
0.2335
1.9183

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S.Error

86.6447
-108.2186
8.5125
-7.1569
0.0700 **
0.1493
0.0869
-0.0485
0.0412 **
0.0631
0.0125
-0.0205
0.0545 ***
0.1519

-3.5247
2.4512
12.7988 22.1515
200.2766 73.6668 ***
35.6363 109.4559
9.1400
3.2372 ***
-7.9704
3.2670 **
1.3572
2.5694

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S.Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

18.6992
16.3991

0.6791
8.9131
239.0216 671.5927
-0.3812 20.5990

10.8281
-6.8467

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

4.0247
4.5237

Off-farm Employment

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

15.2728
15.9194

-101.2490 611.9674
-6.4332 50.3903
0.1442
0.2487
0.0095
0.3057
0.0934
0.2404
-0.0123
0.0662
0.1573
0.2636

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Agriculture

-2.9446 13.1659
2.8261 104.0910
175.7670 438.5778
93.7835 711.3890
8.4529 21.3217
-7.1405 19.6739
0.5851 19.7239

Wealth and Income

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Table 6.10 Average Treatment Effects (ATE) Estimated from Local Linear Regression Matching
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Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S.Error

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S.Error

Education and Health Service

13.2156
-8.9374

3.4560
3.6682

2.1217 ***
1.7435 ***

1.2897 ***
1.0587 ***

12.9855
-8.8810

3.7306
3.7582

2.0454 ***
1.6745 ***

1.2784 ***
1.0811 ***

13.0085
-8.9572

3.8540
3.8762

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

2.1857 ***
1.7341 ***

1.3371 **
1.1213 ***

2.0083 ***
1.7739 ***

1.2951 ***
1.0871 ***

13.1441
-9.0992

3.9613
3.9528

2.0497 ***
1.6855 ***

1.2736 ***
1.0843 ***

0.1030 0.5597
0.0901 0.5247
0.0941 0.5264
0.1303 0.5195
0.1375 0.5237
236.4919 53.3295 *** 236.9959 51.4717 *** 233.2477 50.2136 *** 231.3280 51.6850 *** 233.0097 50.2226 ***
-2.3891 2.1362
-2.8323 2.0546
-3.0978 2.2129
-3.3227 2.2029
-3.4079 2.2831

12.8974
-8.7653

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.2842
3.6215

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture
-84.9390 60.0933
-89.0289 58.0114
-95.9223 59.0753
-96.2008 56.1518 *
-97.0867 59.1388
-1.4049 5.5446
-1.6144 5.1622
-2.0841 5.3175
-2.2739 5.0741
-2.0532 5.2735
0.2053 0.0445 ***
0.2062 0.0426 ***
0.2028 0.0427 ***
0.2026 0.0424 ***
0.2042 0.0426 ***
-0.0393 0.0198 **
-0.0416 0.0199 **
-0.0420 0.0191 **
-0.0456 0.0191 **
-0.0468 0.0192 **
0.0672 0.0266 **
0.0740 0.0262 ***
0.0719 0.0258 ***
0.0714 0.0268 ***
0.0721 0.0258 ***
-0.0195 0.0098 **
-0.0180 0.0095 *
-0.0189 0.0094 **
-0.0195 0.0092 **
-0.0197 0.0094 **
0.2299 0.1049 **
0.2329 0.1040 **
0.2366 0.1049 **
0.2363 0.1041 **
0.2356 0.1050 **

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S.Error

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S.Error

-3.1839 1.6832 *
-3.3106 1.5622 **
-3.0961 1.5958 *
-3.0558 1.6104 *
-3.2098 1.6079 **
22.2911 11.1656 **
25.4405 10.4987 **
23.9265 10.6843 **
23.1401 10.4056 **
23.4127 10.7183 **
188.6938 65.2913 *** 203.2590 62.3519 *** 199.5367 63.3162 *** 200.8246 61.8522 *** 200.7243 63.0508 ***
123.7536 74.4245 *
122.2675 73.3299 *
110.4686 71.8585
110.1787 76.5375
116.8994 71.4517
7.8939 2.3559 ***
7.9921 2.2065 ***
8.1319 2.2094 ***
8.1496 2.1133 ***
8.3131 2.2075 ***
-7.4669 2.3906 *** -7.6279 2.1573 *** -7.7075 2.2239 *** -7.7173 2.1172 *** -7.9082 2.2212 ***
0.0101 1.5184
-0.2365 1.5162
-0.4471 1.4599
-0.5115 1.4430
-0.4929 1.4657

Wealth and Income

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Table 6.11 Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Estimated from Local Linear Regression Matching
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-104.0258
-7.2892
0.1338
0.0178
0.0978
-0.0111
0.1449

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Education and Health Service
10.4269
785.9003
24.0703

21.8406
19.1710

17.8642
18.6194

714.9402
58.8284
0.2906
0.3574
0.2812
0.0775
0.3061

15.3713
121.6332
511.7472
831.6599
24.9157
22.9831
23.0580

0.9415
303.3712
-0.2971

11.9745
-6.6858

5.8181
5.2135

-98.6523
-6.5259
0.1502
-0.0037
0.0885
-0.0152
0.1273

-3.5612
10.6467
199.7689
20.8877
9.3354
-8.0287
1.6286

1.1233
85.8599 ***
2.3231

4.8426 **
2.9959 **

2.7233 **
2.1657 **

97.3377
9.4953
0.0786 *
0.1004
0.0455 *
0.0137
0.0519 **

2.7384
25.1363
80.3204 **
121.1995
3.5920 ***
3.6327 **
2.8935

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S.Error

0.5519
309.3847
0.0731

11.8412
-7.4827

6.1031
5.5275

-110.3121
-8.0206
0.1401
-0.0496
0.0616
-0.0208
0.1375

-4.5365
9.6892
191.1500
79.2956
9.8129
-8.0567
0.3494

-5.5966
14.7868
209.6558
163.7798
11.1719
-9.5162
1.4525

1.0922
75.9799 ***
2.7238

3.6642 ***
2.5557 ***

0.7924
297.0122
0.3806

12.6779
-9.0788

6.7991
6.3277

**
*
*
*
**

**

***
***

***

***

0.8807
69.1886 ***
2.9746

3.3018 ***
2.4324 ***

1.8026 ***
1.7704 ***

47.7868
7.7591
0.0617
0.0444
0.0459
0.0121
0.0481

2.0920
17.0584
67.9243
136.0506
2.9223
2.7969
1.8952

Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S.Error

-116.9540
-2.9096
**
0.1575
-0.0790
*
0.0794
-0.0225
***
0.1209

*

***
***

***

**

2.0135 ***
2.0860 ***

64.2582
8.2394
0.0638
0.0685
0.0354
0.0130
0.0531

2.1962
20.0108
69.1837
145.4896
3.1742
3.1206
2.1091

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S.Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

0.7772
239.4523
-0.0393

10.4758
-6.5201

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

4.1508
4.6773

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture

-2.9039
-0.4878
173.5663
88.6812
8.5481
-7.0849
0.6830

Wealth and Income

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

0.6658
286.3401
-0.2069

11.8906
-9.6921

6.9486
6.5690

-104.5333
-1.0007
0.1747
-0.0881
0.0773
-0.0241
0.1331

-5.8207
11.7120
201.8553
181.9774
11.1384
-9.7395
1.6810

***
**
*
**
**

**

***
***

***

***

0.8846
62.0983 ***
2.9703

3.1522 ***
2.1299 ***

1.6351 ***
1.5672 ***

45.3791
7.5470
0.0602
0.0377
0.0431
0.0113
0.0545

1.9658
16.0779
64.2609
121.4823
2.8650
2.8132
1.8765

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S.Error

Table 6.12 Average Treatment Effects on the Untreated (ATNT) Estimated from Local Linear Regression Matching

6.3.3

Regression-Adjusted Local Linear Matching
Returning to the common assumption that the outcomes are determined by a set of

characteristic variables X, all the matching methods discussed above do not use the
information carried by the characteristic variables directly. For example, Chapter 5
demonstrates that the land quantity and quality are involved in the determination of
outcomes. To solve the problem, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) propose a
regression-adjusted local linear matching.
The regression-adjusted local linear matching incorporates the functional form of
the outcome equation and the additive seperability into the matching estimator. The
procedure to carry out the matching estimation starts with the estimation of the outcome
equation for the project village sample.
βX

y
where U1i

α

U

(6.18)

u . The equation (6.18) is estimated using the partial regression method.

In this method, (a) y1 and X are regressed on the propensity scores P(X) respectively. (b)
The residuals of y1, denoted by y , are regressed on the residuals of X, denoted by X, to
estimate β. (c) The β is inserted in equation (6.18) to calculate
y

.

βX

The same procedure is used to obtain

(6.19)
from the non-project village sample.

and

are used to estimate the treatment effects following the same procedure as the local linear
regression matching. The results are given in Table 6.13, 6.14, and 6.15. Again the
treatment effects are stable with bandwidth size. The variances converge at an
appropriate bandwidth and are generally larger when the bandwidth is either too small or
too large for the ATTs, while they generally decline for the ATEs and ATNTs.
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Education and Health Service

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S.Error

0.7136
289.5032
-0.5663

12.8935
-7.4925

4.9654
4.6203

-86.6580
0.1366
0.2163
-0.0181
0.0968
-0.0056
0.1422

12.8792
-8.2195

5.1269
4.7836

0.9266
0.3445
75.3159 *** 295.7626
2.0570
-0.1172

3.9533 ***
2.9759 **

2.3833 **
1.8009 **

77.6456
-98.5640
5.7708
-1.5789
0.0801 ***
0.2029
0.0821
-0.0515
0.0414 **
0.0754
0.0128
-0.0115
0.0531 ***
0.1532

0.8743
65.5343 ***
2.5191

3.4234 ***
2.6571 ***

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S.Error

0.3814
272.7527
0.2101

12.9703
-9.3118

5.5187
5.2358

12.0074
-9.5891
0.7554
0.2611
60.3801 *** 263.9718
2.7499
-0.1730

3.0659 ***
2.3315 ***

5.5732
5.3689

-99.1569
0.7598
***
0.2160
*
-0.0765
**
0.0906
-0.0157
***
0.1608

**

1.6204 ***
1.4956 ***

43.5964
5.8136
0.0485
0.0377
0.0419
0.0113
0.0525

***

***
**
**

**

0.7431
57.7830 ***
2.5694

2.9324 ***
2.1212 ***

1.5216 ***
1.3309 ***

40.6685
5.8550
0.0455
0.0313
0.0419
0.0105
0.0576

-4.7886
1.8169 *** -4.8389
1.7701 ***
16.1119 15.3316
13.0936 14.2100
198.3969 63.1715 *** 193.4874 62.6027 ***
165.5681 117.5602
172.3527 108.1567
9.7721
2.7184 ***
9.8022
2.5299 ***
-8.4462
2.5800 *** -8.5915
2.4373 ***
0.6411
1.7482
0.8683
1.6909

Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S.Error

-108.8446
0.3395
***
0.2077
-0.0729
**
0.0926
-0.0138
***
0.1479

*

1.7546 ***
1.7366 ***

52.4545
6.2485
0.0543
0.0558
0.0322
0.0125
0.0561

-3.8100
2.1978 *
-4.3408
1.7926 **
13.3557 22.4026
12.7299 18.2041
188.1703 71.9301 *** 187.6639 63.8816 ***
74.0109 106.2898
116.3200 128.6761
7.5487
3.8145 **
8.5246
3.0872 ***
-6.7827
3.8695 *
-7.2895
3.0453 **
1.1281
2.5121
0.0581
1.9151

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S.Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

23.6412
25.6282

0.5508
9.1873
245.0937 645.4188
-0.2978 21.6716

12.4365
-7.5042

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.5859
4.2849

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment
14.7286
14.9482

-95.9995 570.9558
-0.2705 28.5820
0.2076
0.2526
0.0013
0.2913
0.1007
0.2959
-0.0029
0.0756
0.1546
0.2733

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Agriculture

-3.2550 12.8747
2.6600 95.9183
165.4823 497.1269
131.9662 870.8797
6.6815 22.5572
-5.8832 18.5537
0.6663 20.2604

Wealth and Income

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Table 6.13 Average Treatment Effects (ATE) Estimated from Regression-adjusted Local Linear Matching
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Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S.Error

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S.Error

Education and Health Service

12.9525
-8.7625

3.5896
3.7812

2.0318 ***
1.7219 ***

1.3032 ***
1.0411 ***

12.8429
-8.7359

3.8422
3.8850

2.0163 ***
1.7136 ***

1.2898 ***
1.0421 ***

12.8606
-8.7761

3.8749
3.9405

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

2.1308 ***
1.8458 ***

1.3323 **
1.0692 ***

1.9907 ***
1.7611 ***

1.2788 ***
1.0303 ***

12.8922
-8.8088

3.8851
3.9319

1.9943 ***
1.7593 ***

1.2784 ***
1.0296 ***

0.1501 0.5358
0.1591 0.5053
0.1812 0.5018
0.2101 0.5057
0.1924 0.5057
238.8585 54.0364 *** 237.6477 53.1164 *** 235.8145 52.4383 *** 233.7114 50.2320 *** 234.3439 50.1625 ***
-2.3974 2.0674
-2.8495 1.9626
-3.0551 2.1107
-3.1877 2.1923
-3.1801 2.1971

12.7811
-8.6723

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.4017
3.7200

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

Agriculture
-85.7048 56.6038
-87.2933 55.4283
-92.8957 55.3349 *
-92.1589 55.2372 *
-92.5125 55.3832 *
-2.3333 4.9194
-2.2156 4.7818
-2.2346 4.8064
-2.2028 4.6451
-2.1481 4.6099
0.1945 0.0377 ***
0.1960 0.0361 ***
0.1922 0.0359 ***
0.1920 0.0364 ***
0.1937 0.0363 ***
-0.0374 0.0201 *
-0.0413 0.0207 **
-0.0412 0.0207 **
-0.0435 0.0196 **
-0.0430 0.0195 **
0.0649 0.0269 **
0.0705 0.0249 ***
0.0676 0.0251 ***
0.0672 0.0260 ***
0.0682 0.0261 ***
-0.0214 0.0099 **
-0.0197 0.0098 **
-0.0207 0.0097 **
-0.0211 0.0092 **
-0.0210 0.0092 **
0.2290 0.1028 **
0.2315 0.1092 **
0.2338 0.1093 **
0.2336 0.1033 **
0.2344 0.1034 **

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S.Error

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S.Error

-3.1699 1.6517 *
-3.3413 1.5478 **
-3.1453 1.5183 **
-3.0482 1.5333 **
-3.0928 1.5348 **
22.3941 10.5644 **
25.5005 10.4416 **
24.4697 10.3351 **
23.8593 10.1469 **
23.9220 10.1674 **
192.4312 63.5576 *** 206.0664 62.2704 *** 204.6650 61.6422 *** 207.2479 61.2206 *** 207.6533 61.3468 ***
118.2269 71.9787
119.7457 69.0339 *
111.0873 69.8542
111.5103 72.3350
115.8155 71.7069
8.2138 2.1920 ***
8.2316 2.1659 ***
8.4263 2.1543 ***
8.4620 2.0651 ***
8.5987 2.0649 ***
-7.7150 2.1901 *** -7.7920 2.2195 *** -7.9439 2.2135 *** -7.9609 2.0835 *** -8.0882 2.0844 ***
0.1096 1.4516
-0.1556 1.4254
-0.2750 1.4247
-0.3104 1.3798
-0.3032 1.3862

Wealth and Income

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Table 6.14 Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT) Estimated from Regression-adjusted Local Linear Matching
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Education and Health Service
10.7489
754.8979
25.3592

27.6241
29.9690

17.2269
17.4776

0.8080
298.3314
-0.1776

12.8835
-7.2763

5.1996
4.7632

-86.5498
0.5370
0.2197
-0.0142
0.1013
-0.0032
0.1270

-3.8897
11.2881
185.1235
66.2248
7.4325
-6.6109
1.3466

-4.5443
10.7312
184.7696
117.2108
8.5413
-7.1781
0.1148

12.8854
-8.1316

5.3456
4.9366

1.0403
0.3723
83.8552 *** 305.9686
2.2053
0.3830

4.4785 ***
3.3312 **

2.6920 *
2.0175 **

-5.0849
14.7929
196.8900
174.7713
9.9952
-8.5288
0.8031

0.9697
71.0966 ***
2.7058

3.8054 ***
2.9289 ***

0.4106
279.3993
0.7886

12.9890
-9.4030

5.7986
5.4563

-5.1361
11.2501
191.0758
181.9779
10.0071
-8.6771
1.0677

0.8244
64.4727 ***
2.9885

3.3546 ***
2.5264 ***

0.2728
269.0158
0.3389

11.8567
-9.7220

5.8606
5.6135

***

***
**
**

**

***
***

***

***

0.8044
61.2230 ***
2.7628

3.1823 ***
2.2703 ***

1.6215 ***
1.4384 ***

40.2552
6.2528
0.0487
0.0346
0.0456
0.0111
0.0518

1.8775
15.4105
65.3858
117.6675
2.7035
2.5881
1.8102

Bandwidth=0.6
Coef.
S.Error

-100.2881
1.2549
***
0.2198
*
-0.0822
**
0.0944
-0.0148
***
0.1483

**

***
***

***

***

1.7415 ***
1.6393 ***

44.2285
6.2185
0.0524
0.0422
0.0457
0.0121
0.0457

1.9395
16.8051
66.2834
129.2774
2.9385
2.7725
1.8848

Bandwidth=0.4
Coef.
S.Error

-111.6853
0.7723
***
0.2103
-0.0780
**
0.0969
-0.0126
***
0.1334

*

**
**

***

**

1.9157 ***
1.9293 **

55.4426
6.7403
0.0600
0.0636
0.0350
0.0136
0.0500

1.9270
20.3130
67.5496
143.4150
3.3859
3.3184
2.0961

Bandwidth=0.2
Coef.
S.Error

87.0261
-99.5290
6.2008
-1.4673
0.0914 **
0.2048
0.0948
-0.0532
0.0461 **
0.0767
0.0140
-0.0099
0.0488 ***
0.1395

2.4350
25.5037
77.9275 **
118.3776
4.2842 *
4.3335
2.8282

Bandwidth=0.08
Coef.
S.Error

Note: The standard errors in column S.Error are esimated by the bootstrapping with 1000 replications.
Significant levels: * —10%; ** —5%; and *** —1%.

Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

0.6190
246.1552
0.0596

12.3779
-7.3053

Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Infrasture Service

3.6172
4.3811

Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

Off-farm Employment

667.3787
33.3407
0.2955
0.3406
0.3460
0.0883
0.3190

-97.7522
0.0807
0.2098
0.0079
0.1068
0.0003
0.1420

Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

Agriculture

-3.2695
15.0589
-0.6997 112.1854
160.8944 580.7268
134.3052 1018.0233
6.4207
26.3805
-5.5713
21.6779
0.7610
23.6920

Wealth and Income

Bandwidth=0.02
Coef.
S.Error

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Indicators

Table 6.15 Average Treatment Effects on the Untreated (ATNT) Estimated from Regression-adjusted Local Linear Matching

6.4

Assumption Verification
All methods in this research are based on two important assumptions, (3.26) and

(3.27). In assumption (3.26), the treatment is required to be independent of the outcomes
conditional on the characteristic variables X, which determine the outcomes and the
treatment. Assumption (3.27) requires overlapping of the treated and the untreated
samples. The two assumptions are satisfied when the treated sample and untreated sample
are randomly drawn from the same population. If the two assumptions are satisfied,
treatment effects are identified. Since the project villages of the SWPRP are not randomly
assigned, the two assumptions may be violated. Therefore, to verify the assumptions is
crucial to this research.
Effective methods for a direct verification of the two assumptions are not yet
completely developed in literature. However, an indirect test to verify assumption (3.26)
is suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998). Their test is based on the idea that
the mean of the counterfactuals of the treated sample must equal the mean of the
untreated sample if assumption (3.26) holds. In their method, assumption (3.26) is
verified by testing the null hypothesis that the counterfactual mean of the project villages,
E y |d

0 , equals the outcome mean of the non-project villages, E y |d
H : E y |d

0

E y |d

0.

0

(6.20)

A problem occurs in this test because the counterfactual E y |d

0 is

unobservable, so the null hypothesis cannot be tested directly. However, there are some
non-project villages that have a propensity score that equals or is “similar” to the project
villages, so they are eligible for treatment but are not treated by the project. Their
outcomes can be used to estimate the counterfactuals of the project villages. Therefore,
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testing the equality between the mean of these eligible villages from the non-project
sample and the mean of the other non-project villages is equivalent to testing the null
hypothesis. If the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, it indirectly proves the
independence of the treatment on the outcomes.
To carry out the test, the non-project villages are first separated into two groups.
One group includes the non-project villages that have the propensity scores greater than
the percentage of treated in the sample, 0.1287. These are considered to be eligible to be
treated by the SWPRP. This group is referred to as “treated” group. The other group
includes the non-project villages that have a propensity score that is smaller than 0.1287
and are considered to be ineligible. This group is referred to as “untreated” group. A
dummy variable T is created for the “treatment.” T=1 is assigned to villages in the
“treated” group, and T=0 is assigned to the villages in the “untreated” group. The variable
T is used to re-estimate the propensity scores. With the re-estimated propensity scores,
the villages in the “treated” group are matched with the villages in the “untreated” group
with their five nearest neighbors. Then the “treatment effects” of the 21 indicators are
estimated and given in Table 6.16. The results show that none of the “treatment effects”
in the table are statistically significant from zero. Thus, assumption (3.26) holds. By
conditioning on the characteristics X, the outcomes are independent of the project village
selection.
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Table 6.16 Independence Test

Wealth and Income

Indicators

Percentage of Households under the Poverty Line (826 Yuan)
Net Income Per Capita (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Cash (Yuan)
Income Per Household in Kind (Yuan)
Percentage of Households Living in Brick-tiled House
Percentage of Households Living in Thatched House
Percentage of Household with TV Set

Coef.

ATE
S.Error

Coef.

ATT
S.Error

Coef.

ATNT
S.Error

-7.5748
9.1627
-6.6361
10.7990
-7.8705 11.6379
22.3943 66.7971
83.5075
66.4069
3.1378 87.2699
-428.8320 501.4194 -1539.1523 1051.4686 -78.9749 335.4221
-621.6552 403.9061
-52.2848 399.6650 -801.0613 520.5553
9.1149 13.1037
-22.5845
15.3473 19.1032 15.3665
-6.6413 12.7677
6.6943
16.8111 -10.8433 15.4199
-6.0917
8.0297
-0.2292
13.0596
-7.9389
8.7627

Agriculture
Value of Agricultural Products Per Capita (Yuan)
Grain Production Per Capita (KG)
Food Crop Growing Area Per Capita (Mu)
Cash Crop Growing Area per Capita (Mu)
Pigs in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Cattle in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)
Goats in Stock Per Capita at the End of the Year (Heads)

-262.8509 207.0191
-55.5465 31.5226
0.0412
0.2576
-0.1641
0.1438
-0.1571
0.1130
-0.0261
0.0618
0.0228
0.1399

-54.4739
-44.5633
-0.0765
0.1133
-0.0267
0.0647
0.0034

225.6024 -328.5096 264.7566
30.5447 -59.0072 41.7211
0.2143
0.0783
0.3482
0.1238
-0.2514
0.1855
0.1797
-0.1982
0.1236
0.0684
-0.0547
0.0776
0.2711
0.0290
0.1298

Off-farm Employment
Percentage of Male Laborer Employed Off-farm
Percentage of Female Laborer Employed Off-farm

-3.7157
-2.4810

6.0610
5.2588

7.9327
3.6202

8.2859
7.1757

-7.3860
-4.4034

6.9302
6.2403

16.7635
-0.5812

14.5639
9.8556

3.5103
-11.7467

19.3087
11.9431

20.9395
2.9370

17.6045
12.2133

-2.8270
3.0253
376.0235 351.6303
-0.9298 11.3983

-1.3794
185.9665
-4.5016

Infrasture Service
Days Accessible by Vehicles
Percentage of Population with Water Shortage

Education and Health Service
Primary School Enrollment Rate
Population-Doctor Ratio
Percentage of Immunized Children

3.1131
-3.2832
3.9554
451.0852 435.9096 433.4536
15.6362
0.1957 13.7562

To verify assumption (3.27), we examine overlap of the propensity score
distributions of the project villages and the non-project villages. In Chapter 5, we find the
overlap region is from the propensity score 0.0130 to 0.5320. The trimmed sample
containing the villages with propensity scores in the region is used to estimate the
treatment effects in Chapter 5 and this chapter. The use of the trimmed sample assures the
condition of (3.27). However, the satisfaction of assumption (3.27) does not assure a
balance in the distributions between the project village sample and the non-project village
sample. Matching is the method to derive the balance of the distribution. The result of the
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balanced distribution is examined by comparing the distributions of the treated and
untreated samples before and after matching.
To compare the distributions, a frequency distribution of the propensity scores is
graphed for project and non-project villages before and after matching. Figure 6.1 and 6.2
illustrate the distributions of the project villages and the non-project villages before
matching. Obviously, the two graphs have different distributions. The graph for the nonproject villages (Figure 6.2) skews toward the right much more than that of the project
villages’ graph (Figure 6.1). The density is about 7 percent in the first column of Figure
6.1, denoting the propensity scores between 0.0 and 0.05, for the project village sample
while it is about twice in the first column of Figure 6.2 for the non-project village sample.
Inversely, the densities at the other columns of Figure 6.1 are all larger than the densities
of Figure 6.2. Figure 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the distributions of the project villages and the
non-project villages after matching. Apparently, two graphs have similar densities at all
points on the propensity score ranges.
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Figure 6.1

The Distribution of Project Villages before Match
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Figure 6.2

The Distribution of Non-Project Villages before Match
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Figure 6.3

The Distribution of Project Villages after Match (M=5)
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Figure 6.4

The Distribution of Non-Project Villages after Match (M=5)

Since assumption (3.26) and (3.27) are satisfied in our dataset, the average
treatment effects estimated by different matching methods are similar. Larger differences
are presented in the results from the control function method. This difference may be due
to the incorrect specification of the linear function for some indicators. Considering the
possibility of the incorrect specification of functional form, we choose to investigate the
impacts of the SWPRP with the average treatment effects estimated from kernel-based
matching in the next section.
6.5

The Average Treatment Effects of the SWPRP
Treatment effects are the gains from project investments. As discussed in section

6.1, the gains of the SWPRP are measured by the changes in the 21 indicators at the
village level. In other words, the project investments are attributed to the changes in these
indicators of the project villages. The changes are evaluated with different parameters
such as average treatment effects (ATE), average treatment effects on the treated (ATT),
and average treatment effects on the untreated (ATNT). Each parameter is estimated
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using different estimators. In our results in Table 6.1-6.15, the estimates of these
treatment effects are basically consistent. However, the vairances are unstable in nearest
neighbor matching and caliper matching. As pointed out by Abadie and Imbens (2006b),
this might be due to invalidity of the bootstrapping method in nearest neighbir matching.
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) note that the bootstrapping method is appropriate in
kernel matching. The results of kernel-based matching are very close among different
approaches. However, the regression-adjusted local linear matching has a smaller
variance at each bandwidth. Based on these results, we choose to evaluate the project
impact mainly based on the average treatment effects estimated from the regressionadjusted local linear matching. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) also find that this
approach has better performance in their evaluation of a labor training program.
Meanwhile, using the results of the regression-adjusted local linear matching allow us to
make a comparison with the results of Chen, Mu, and Ravallion (2008). They evaluate
the SWPRP with the same methods using the panel data aquired from household surveys.
The following interpretation of our results focus on the ATTs in Table 6.14 because it
provides answers to the central question of this research, what impact has been produced
in the project villages. However, we are also interested in generalizing our results. The
estimated results of the ATEs in Table 6.13 and the ATNTs in Table 6.15 are briefly
discussed to evaluate the generalized impacts if the project is inplemented in the villages
outside the project villages. The discussion is organized by categorizing the 21 indicators
into five groups: wealth and income, agriculture, employment, infrastructure, and
education and health services.
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6.5.1

Wealth and Income
The general objective of the SWPRP is to improve living standards in the poorest

villages. Improvement in living standards is usually measured by increases in income and
consumption. The indicators for income and consumption are given as the first group
labeled ‘Wealth and Income’ in Table 6.14. In the group, an important indicator that
measures the distribution of wealth and income is poverty rate, which is the head count
rate of the population under the poverty line of 826 Yuan ($100 equivalent at that time).
A change in the poverty rate indicates both a change in the distribution and a change in
wealth and income.
As shown in Table 6.14, farmers’ annual net income per capita significantly
increased by 22.4-25.5 Yuan, or an increase of about 3.0-3.4 percent. Further
investigation reveals that the annual cash income per household significantly increased
by 192.4-207.6 Yuan, accounting for about 7.6- 9.1 percent. The ATT of income in kind
is statistically insignificant. Thus, the increases in income are mainly derived in cash.
Since the household size is about 4.5 in our sample, the cash income per capita is about
43-46 Yuan. The cash income is gross income and should be larger than the net income.
This implies that the increases in income are coincident with additional household
expenditures.
However, increases in the average income do not necessarily result in poverty
reduction if the project benefits the wealthier more than the poorer in the project villages.
It is crucial to investigate whether or not the project reduces poverty in the project
villages. As shown in Table 6.14, the ATT of the poverty rate ranges from -3.0 percent to
-3.3 percent and statistically significant, meaning that the poverty rate fell by 3.0-3.3
percent in the project villages. This range of reduction in poverty agrees with the
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increases in net income. However, the gain in poverty reduction seems to be much
smaller than that reported by Chen, Mu, and Ravallion (2008). Possible reasons that
explain a smaller impact at the village level are discussed in next chapter. Although our
estimate of the reduction in the poverty rate is smaller, it is statistically significant. These
results are consistent with the project reducing poverty.
Considering consumption, we find that housing conditions significantly improved.
Expenditure on housing is considered as consumption in this research because no market
exists for the houses themselves in the poor villages. In Table 6.14, it is surprising to find
that the brick-and-tile structures increased by 8.2-8.6 percent and the thatched houses
decreased by 7.7-8.1 percent. Normally, households must accumulate money for a long
period until they are able to construct a new house. To attribute such a large improvement
in housing conditions to the income increases by the project investment is unreasonable
since the increases in net income are small. Therefore, other factors must also be involved
in the improvement of housing conditions in the project villages. One possible factor is
the improvement of transportation. Improvement in transportation allows isolated villages
to access construction materials with lower costs. This allows households in the villages
to improve their housing conditions by spending their savings. When the savings are
spent on housing, no money is left to purchase other large assets such as TVs. As shown
in Table 6.14, the project does not significantly increase TV sets in the project villages.
6.5.2

Agriculture
As mentioned above, the project is not able to generate a significant impact on the

average income in kind. As shown in Table 6.14, this result is confirmed by the ATT on
the grain production, which is the major source of income in kind. The project does not
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lead to a significant inprovement in grain production in the project villages. These imply
that the project may not change the total outcomes from agriculutral activities. This lack
of impact in total agricultural outcomes is also seen in agricultural production value,
which has a negative ATT that is weakly signficant at the 10 percent level. The reduction
in agricultural value may be due to the out-migragtion of labor. However, evidence
shows that the project does have a signficant impact on specific agricultural activities.
In crop farming, as shown in Table 6.14, the ATT is possitive 0.19-0.20 Mu for
the food crops and negative 0.04-0.05 Mu of the cash crops. They are all statistically
significant but have opposite signs. With the project investment, households increase the
farming of food crops and decrease the farming of cash crops. The increases and
decreases are not parallel. Since no evidence shows a reduction in land use for other
crops, households must extend the food crop production by using poor (usually highslope) land. However, this shift to the food crop growing does not result in an increase in
grain production.
It is interesting that households increase food crop production rather than cash
crop production. First, consumer preferences might play a role in the decision. Grains,
especially corn, are the major food in the poor villages. Suffering from a food shortage
for a long time, households give priority to increasing grain crop production with the
available resources. Second, cash crops are mainly produced for markets. The markets for
cash crops are underdeveloped in the poor regions. At the same time, cash crop
production usually requires more inputs. The risk is higher in cash crop production
because of the variation in markets and the frequent occurrence of natural disasters such
as drought, flood, and strong wind. Finally, grain is also the food for animals. The excess
grain can be used for animal farming. Therefore, investing in food crop production with
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the project aid may be the best choice because food crop production satifies the need for
self-subsistence, is less risky, and is important for animal farming.
With regard to animal husbandry, as shown in Table 6.14, the households in the
project villages increase pig and goat farming and reduce cattle or buffalo farming. Pig
farming is one of the major sources of cash income and protein. For example, households
might preserve smoked pork for year-round consumption or sell their pigs to the market.
The number of pigs in a household is usually determined by the farmland and laborers on
the farm. Almost every household keeps one to four pigs. Traditionally, pig farming is a
method to make use of the agricultural by-products, so cost is not an important factor.
However, this situation might change due to the availability of commercial fodders and
off-farm employment. With the investment of the project, households may increase pig
farming with commercial fodders. Thus, pig farming becomes less labor intensive and
more productive. As a result, the project is able to increase the pig farming and off-farm
employment simultaneously.
Goats can adapt well to the mountainous geographic environment and are the
another source of cash income and protein. Goat farming is popular only in the villages of
the rocky mountainous regions. Usually, the key factors that determine goat farming are
the cost of the young goats and labor. The laborers staying in the villages might choose to
keep goats. For cattle and buffalo, they are traditionally used for agricultural power. The
demand for cattle or buffalo is determined by the amount of land and labor. Since the
amount of land in a houshould does not change by the project investment, the cattle or
buffalo farming is expected to remain unchanged. However, the off-farm employment
does not allow some households to keep cattle or buffalo. In this case, the households
share cattle or buffalo with their neighbors.
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The agriculutral component of the projct was expected to improve the living
standards of the poorest with about 45 percent of the SWPRP’s investment. However, our
findings show no gains from the investment in terms of total agricultural outcomes such
as income in kind, agricultural production value, and grain production. The limitation of
resources such as land is the main constraint for expansion in agricultural production in
the project villages. Meanwhile, the out-migration of labor might lead to less labor inputs
in agricultural activities. This does not mean that the poorest do not benefit from the
project investment. Evidence in Chapter 5 indicates that villages with more land benefit
more from the investment in agriculture. More importantly, households adjust
agricultural activites from cash crop production to food crop production, pig farming, and
goat farming so that laborers are free from farming and are available to be employed offfarm.
6.5.3

Off-Farm Employment
As shown in Table 6.14, the project is successful in helping both male and female

laborers to find off-farm jobs. The ATTs are increases of 3.4-3.9 percent for male labor
and 3.7-3.9 percent for female labor. These results are supported by the evidence from
Chapter 5, where, in Table 5.2, the specific treatment effects on off-farm employment for
both male and female labor increase in the villages with the better land resources. Before
the project, the laborers in the villages with better land resources might have a higher
income, so more of them are likely to work on farm. With the project, the laborers might
find that the off-farm employment could bring more income and therefore shift to offfarm jobs. The laborers in the villages with poor land conditions might have already
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worked off farm before the project, so there is not much the project could do to promote
labor mobility in such villages.
6.5.4

Rural Infrastrucutre
The project is also successful in improving the rural infrastructure such as water

supply and transportation. As show in Table 6.14, the proportion of the population
suffering from water shortage in the project villages is reduced by 8.7-8.8 percent. The
project improved household conditions by releasing laborers from the task of obtaining
water. As also shown in Table 6.14, the accessible days by vehicles to the project villages
are significantly increased by about 13 days in a year. The increase of vehicle
accessibility improves transportation conditions so that both agricultural products and
production materials can be marketed and obtained with lower costs. Therefore, the net
return to agricultural production increases. Also, as disccussed above, improvements in
transportation might be the cause of the rapid improvement in the housing conditions.
Meanwhile, road construction is likely to bring a positive spillover effect to the nonproject villages closed to roads. The benefit from investing in infrastructure might not be
limited to reducing the cost of production. The improvement in infrastructure might also
create convenience for the housholds in the project villages to reach other services.
6.5.5

Education and Healthcare Services
The project seems to have been ineffective in increasing school attendance. As

shown in Table 6.14, the enrollment rate of primary schooling does not significantly
increase. The design of the education component is based on the assumptoin that poor
education in the project villages is caused by low income, low instructing quality, and
lack of education facilities such as classrooms, teaching tools, and text books. The
122

problem of low income was addresed by the investment in farm and off-farm
employment. In the education component, the project invested mainly on teacher training,
new school buildings, teaching equipment, and text books. These investments might lead
to an improvement in education quality rather than an increase in education networks.
Education networks have been well developed in China before the project. Complete
primary schools were established to teach students of 1-6 grades in each administrative
village and teaching points were set up to instruct students of 1-3 grades in the larger
natural villages. Therefore, lack of education services might not be the case. The major
problem in education could be the low teaching quality. As discussed in Chapter 2, parttime teachers were commonly hired in poorer villages. Thus, the enrollment rate may not
be an approciate indicator to measure the project’s impact in education quality.
Similarly, our indicators for healthcare services fail to capture the impact of the
project investment. As shown in Table 6.14, the ATT on the population-doctor ratio is
positive and statistically significant, meaning that fewer doctors provided services in the
project villages. This result is puzzling. In order to address the low level of healthcare in
the project villages, the project established clinics, subsidized and trained village doctors.
At the same time, it also invested in hospitals at the township level. Unlike education,
healthcare services are market goods, and we need to examine both demand and supply.
Certainly, the increase in income was likely to increase the demand for healthcare
services. But this increment may be small because the increase in net income is small. On
the supply side, competition increased among the village clinics and the township
hospitals. The township hospitals were likely in a better position to compete. As a result,
the village clinics would not have enough clients to recover their operational cost and
doctors would stop their services in the project villages.
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The results from the ATTs indicate that the project does produce a significant
impact on the project villages. We are also interested in evaluating the possible effects if
the project had been implemented in non-project villages since they are also categorized
into poor villages by the local government. By investigating the ATEs and ATNTs, we
find that the conclusions from ATTs generally hold if the results are extrapolated to the
non-project villages. In general, the magnitudes of the ATEs and the ATNTs are larger
than the ATTs. For example, the ATE on the poverty rate is between -3.3 and -4.8 in
Table 6.13, implying that the project would have better result in reducing poverty rate in
a randomly-selected village. In Table 6.15, the ATNT of the poverty rate ranged between
-3.3 and -5.1, meaning the project would had reduced poverty rate by 3.3-5.1 percent if
the project has been carried out in the non-project villages. These results seem to suggest
that the project did not use resources efficiently in terms of reducing poverty. Recalling
the results from Chapter 4, we find that the project selected the villages with less land
resources in order to target the poorer villages. The results from Chapter 5 indicate that
the project would have better results in reducing the poverty rate in the villages with
better land resources. Combining these two results, we find that it is reasonable to assert
that the project would have better results in reducing poverty rate in the non-project
villages. The non-project villages have better land resources and therefore are wealthier.
However, the project had to trade off between targeting the poorer villages and
efficiency.
Differences are found among the ATTs, ATEs, and ATNTs. Income does not
have a statistically significant ATE and ATNT. That is, the project did not significantly
increase income in non-project villages.
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In this chapter, the impacts of the SWPRP are evaluated by investigating the
treatment effects on 21 indicators. The treatment effects, measured by ATTs, ATEs, and
ATNTs, are estimated using different techniques of matching including nearest neighbor
matching, caliper matching, kernel matching, local linear regression matching, and
regression-adjusted local linear matching. The results from regression-adjusted local
linear matching are stable and insensitive to bandwidth size and have small variances.
We, therefore, used these results to investigate the impact of the SWPRP. From the ATTs
from regression-adjusted local linear matching, we conclude that the SWPRP produced a
significant overall impact in the project villages. With the project, the annual farmer net
income increased by 3.0-3.4 percent and the poverty rate fell by 3.0-3.3 percent. This
comprehensive impact was mainly derived from the investment in farming, off-farm
employment, and infrastructure.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Since the Southwest Poverty Reduction Project (SWPRP) was a comprehensive
intervention in a complex social environment, its impacts were multiple. With a diverse
package of activities, the project attempted to tackle absolute poverty in 1798 poor
villages in Southwest China from 1995 to 2001. The activities were composed of various
detailed investments in rural education, rural healthcare, farming, rural infrastructure,
labor mobility, improving institutions, and monitoring in order to improve living
standards in these villages. To ensure sizable outcomes, the total investment by the World
Bank and Chinese government was to $463.55 million. The outcomes of such a largescale and complicated project are expected to produce diverse impacts on the targeted
regions. This research investigates these multiple impacts with rigorous econometric
techniques using a dataset from one of three project provinces—Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region.
The outcomes of the project are measured by the changes, referred to as the
treatment effects, in 21 different indicators constructed from a village survey dataset on
4214 poor villages in 2000. The dataset includes a sample of 327 project villages and
3887 non-project villages in Guangxi. Our original sample includes villages from both
non state-defined poor countries and state-defined poor counties. As a rule in the village
selection process, only the poor villages from state-defined poor counties are considered.
Notice that the poor villages in state-defined poor counties are eligible, while the poor
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villages in non-state-defined poor counties are ineligible, to received aid from the central
government prior to and during the SWPRP. To eliminate this historic bias, the villages
from non-state-defined poor counties are excluded from the dataset. The new dataset
includes 327 project villages and 2214 non-project villages. A probit model is established
from this new dataset to estimate the probabilities of the villages to be selected as the
project villages. The model is then used to examine the selection process of the project
villages and the effectiveness of targeting the poorest villages. More importantly, the
estimated probabilities or propensity scores play a critical role in the econometric
methods employed to eliminate selection bias.
The selection bias is first reduced by trimming the outliers from the new dataset
excluding the villages from non-state-defined poor counties. The outliers inside the statedefined poor counties are trimmed by comparing the distribution of the estimated
propensity scores. The project villages and the non-project villages are found to overlap
in a region from 0.0132 to 0.5320. The villages beyond this overlapping region are
considered as the outliers and therefore are excluded from the sample. The trimmed
sample includes 325 project villages and 1909 non-project villages.
The selection bias is also removed by employing the econometric methods such as
the control function approach and the matching approach. In the control function
approach, the correlated random coefficient model (CRCM), proposed by Heckman &
Robb (1985), is established to deal with the problem of observed heterogeneity related to
village characteristics. This model allows us to examine the specific treatment effects on
villages with particular characteristics. The CRCM can also be used to investigate the
average treatment effects. However, the precise estimation of the average treatment
effects relies on the correct specification of the functional form in the CRCM, and
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verifying the correctness of the functional form is difficult. Therefore, matching is
introduced to estimate the average treatment effects without requiring a functional form.
Various techniques are used in matching such as nearest neighbor matching, caliper
matching, kernel matching, local linear regression matching, and regression-adjusted
local linear matching. The sensitivity of these estimators is examined by choosing
different parameters. In nearest neighbor matching, the number of nearest neighbors
varies from 1, 3, 5, 7, to 9; the caliper in caliper matching is chosen to be 0.00005,
0.0001, 0.0005, and 0.001; the bandwidths for the kernel function are 0.02, 0.08, 0.2, 0.4,
and 0.6. With trimming and econometric methods, the selection bias is minimized or
eliminated in our estimated results.
The first important result is from an investigation of the project village selection
process using the probit model. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the results of the probit
model indicate that the project tends to cover the villages that are composed of small
natural villages and lack farmland and quality land in the mountainous regions. Because
these characteristics are usually associated with poverty, the SWPRP was successful in
targeting the poorer villages. However, the model also suggests that the project gave
higher probabilities to the villages close to township markets and county centers and
having a lower percentage of high-slope land and lower illiteracy rate. Results indicate
that the selection process does not always lead to the selection of the poorest villages.
This behavior can be understood as the result of operational cost minimization of the
project management agents. As a result, the selected 327 project villages are not all the
poorest villages in the poor counties. There are some poorer villages among the nonproject villages. Such a result violates the project objective but allow us to construct a
control group for the treatment effect estimation.
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The specific treatment effects are investigated using the results from the
correlated random coefficient model. With the model, particular attention is given to the
specific treatment effects on individual villages. The results in Table 5.2 show that the
treatment effects vary with the village characteristics. Land is the major factor related to
the heterogeneity of the treatment effects. In the villages with more farmland, the project
benefits the poorer more than the wealthier. Evidence suggests that the project promotes
off-farm employment and food crop farming in such villages more effectively. The
results imply that the project improves the income distribution in the villages.
The average treatment effects are estimated with the matching estimators, which
do not require the specification of the functional form. The treatment effects measured by
ATEs, ATTs, and ATNTs are estimated from different matching techniques and are
shown in Table 6.1-6.15. By comparison, the treatment effects from regression-adjusted
local linear matching method have smaller variances and are relatively insensitive to
bandwidth. Therefore, its results are used to evaluate the project’s impacts. According to
the results, the project reduces the poverty rate in the project villages by 3.0-3.3 percent
and increases net income by 22.4-25.5 Yuan, accounting for an increase of 3.0-3.4
percent. The results from the poverty rate and the net income support each other.
The impacts on income and poverty are further confirmed in the treatment effects
on the other indicators, especially farming, off-farm employment, and rural infrastructure.
With the project, households increase the activities of food production, pig farming, and
goat farming. The project is also successful in promoting nearly 4 percent of male labor
and female labor to be employed off farm. The project also increased the vehicle
accessible days by 13 days in a year and reduces the population that suffers from water
shortage by about 8 percent. The project’s impact on the primary school enrollment is
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insignificant. Fewer doctors provide healthcare service in the project village after the
project; this might be due the improvement of healthcare services available at the
township level, which were also supported by the project. Our indicators may be not
appropriate for detecting the changes generated by the project in the areas of education
and healthcare services.
As expected, our findings agree with the findings by Chen, Mu, & Ravallion
(2008) although the dataset and methods are different. Their dataset is a panel data of
2000 households with project and without project. The baseline data allows them to
examine the impacts of the SWPRP using the method of difference-in-difference. With
kernel matching technique, they reported a reduction of 11 percent in the poverty rate at
the 808 Yuan poverty line and an income gain of 169 Yuan in 2000. They find that the
majority of income increases are derived from animal farming. Notice that the 169 Yuan
income is the gain to a typical household with the project. Taking 4.5 as the household
size, the income gain per capita is 38 Yuan. Both the treatment effects on the poverty rate
and the income are higher than the results from our dataset.
Two factors might contribute to smaller treatment effects in our dataset compared
to the results of Chen, Mu, and Ravallion. First, their results are estimated from
household data. The treatment effects in their estimation represent the impact on the
households that actually participated in the project. Our dataset is at the village level and
includes households that might not directly participate in the project. The treatment
effects estimated from household data must be larger than that estimated from the village
data. Second, Chen, et al use the difference-in-difference method with a panel data,
which control for time variants. However, time-variant is impossible to be controlled in
our cross-sectional dataset. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the SWPRP is considered as a
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part of Chinese government’s 8-7 Plan that aimed to reduce poverty in the poor counties.
That is, there are other poverty reduction programs going on in the non-project villages.
The observations from the non-project villages might be contaminated. The
counterfactuals estimated from the non-project villages are not time-invariant. Our
estimates might have a downward bias.
Although a downward bias is possible, the results estimated at the village level are
practically relevant. First, our results indicate that targeting the poor villages can be an
effective method to target the poor. In China, the rural poor are usually geographically
concentrated. Most households in poor villages are poor. To identify the poor households
inside such villages is impractical. Meanwhile, investments such as public infrastructure
and services affect whole villages. Therefore, it requires the efforts of the whole villages
rather than individual households. Moreover, as in the SWPRP, the financial support for
individual households is limited. The wealthier households may not be interested in such
a small financial support and thus might be automatically eliminated from participation.
Our results show that to target the whole village is a practical and effective strategy in
poverty reduction.
Second, the results imply that investing in farming can result in a redistribution of
income to the poorer households. The project offered a package of diverse opportunities
such as off-farm employment and various farming activities to households in the poor
villages. Households chose the appropriate activities to participate in. The skilled and
educated laborers who find an off-farm job in urban regions are usually better-off. Those
left are usually unskilled, low-educated, and poorer. The support in farming activities
provides a chance to increase income from farming. More importantly, the benefits from
farming are likely distributed to the poorer households rather than the wealthier.
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Third, the results suggest that land and labor are the key resources in poverty
reduction. As discussed above, farming is important in income redistribution in rural
villages. Land and labor are therefore critical. To improve the land and the capacity of the
labor is a key component in the design of a poverty reduction program.
Fourth, the results indicate households make decisions on allocating their
resources based on their available resources and the development of the local markets.
The phenomenon that households tend to choose to increase food crops rather than cash
crops suggests that markets remain underdeveloped.
Fifth, the results demonstrate that the comprehensive approach can be an effective
strategy in poverty reduction. The results of poverty are similar, but the causes of poverty
are multi-dimensional. Effective approaches to solve the problem of poverty therefore
should be multi-dimensional. Challenges occur practically in the effort of integrating a
diverse package of activities at the appropriate targets. The effectiveness of such an
integral approach is shown in the success of the SWPRP.
Finally, the results from this research show that a complete solution of the poverty
problem in the project villages requires further efforts. Although the project yielded a
significant reduction in poverty, the poverty rate reached as high as 47 percent in the
project villages in 2000; this poverty rate is accounted using a poverty line as low as 826
Yuan (US$100, equivalent) annual income per capita. Our data does not allow us to
evaluate the dynamics of poverty in the villages. However, the results of Chen et al show
that the project impact disappeared in 2004. Obviously, the project villages need
assistance beyond the completion of the project investment. A method for establishing a
lasting impact does not currently exist. While benefiting from the project, households in
the project villages remain vulnerable because the benefits are too small to have lasting
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impact. When the project services ended and the project capital was repaid, the sources
for increasing income may also vanish. Some households may return to poverty. To
extend the impact of the Southwest Poverty Reduction Project, a method that allows for
continued services should be developed.
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